Az emberi élet értéke. Egy rendhagyó közgazdasági kérdés magyarországi vizsgálata = The value of human life. Development of an expectional economic issue in Hungary by Adorján, Richárd
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richárd Adorján 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE 
 
 
Development of an exceptional economic 
issue in Hungary 
 
 2
 
Department of Public Services 
 
 
 
 
 
Tutor: Dr. Ernő Kemenes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Richárd Adorján 
 
 3
BUDAPEST UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS AND 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
PH.D. PROGRAM IN MANAGEMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE VALUE OF HUMAN LIFE 
 
Development of an exceptional economic issue in 
Hungary 
 
 
 
 
PH.D. DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richárd Adorján 
 
 
 
 
 
Budapest 
 
2004. 
 4
 
 5
CONTENTS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................ 9 
I.1. The initial problem........................................................................................ 10 
I.2. The structure of the dissertation.................................................................. 14 
II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS ..................................................................................... 17 
II.1. The key points of cost-benefit analysis ...................................................... 18 
II.1.1. The most important characteristics of the method.................................. 18 
II.1.2. Philosophical issues and other critiques ................................................ 20 
II.2. The history of CBA and its use in Hungary .............................................. 22 
II.2.1. From the beginning till the Executive Order of President Reagan ........ 22 
II.2.2. The role of CBA in Hungary today ......................................................... 22 
III. THE HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TOWARDS VALUING A HUMAN LIFE
.................................................................................................................................... 27 
III.1. The road to establishing the concept of statistical human life ............... 27 
III.2. The most important critique of the concensual method......................... 34 
III.3. An attempt to synthesize............................................................................ 36 
III.4. Summary of Jones-Lee in the problem of value of human life .............. 39 
IV. THE COLOURFUL METHODOLOGY ...................................................................... 43 
IV.1. The consumer market approach............................................................... 43 
IV.1.1. Investigating the optimal motorway speed ............................................ 44 
IV.1.2. Investigating the market of smoke detectors.......................................... 45 
IV.1.3. Hedonic models outside labour market ................................................. 47 
IV.1.4. The effect of a new information ............................................................. 48 
IV.2. Labour market approach .......................................................................... 49 
IV.2.1. Description of the method...................................................................... 49 
IV.2.2. The earliest important researches ......................................................... 52 
IV.2.3. Are workers Bayesian decision makers? ............................................... 55 
IV.2.4. Calculations by perceived risk............................................................... 56 
IV.2.5. Wage-risk inequilibrium ........................................................................ 57 
IV.2.6. The value of life expectancy................................................................... 58 
IV.3. The contingent valuation method ............................................................. 59 
IV.3.1. Description of the method...................................................................... 59 
IV.3.2. The techniques of questioning ............................................................... 61 
IV.3.3. Limitations of the CV method ................................................................ 62 
IV.3.4. Early contingent valuation researches .................................................. 62 
IV.3.5. The most important CV research........................................................... 63 
IV.3.6. A comparison of the hedonic price and the contingent valuation method
........................................................................................................................... 66 
IV.4. Empirical results of the most important researches ............................... 67 
 
 6
V. HYPOTHESES, CONCEPTUALIZATION, OPERACIONALIZATION ........................... 68 
V.1. Hypotheses of the research.......................................................................... 68 
V.2. Conceptualization and operationalization of the key concepts ............... 71 
VI. EMPIRICAL RESEARCHES CONDUCTED IN HUNGARY......................................... 75 
VI.1. The research based on hedonic price approach ...................................... 75 
VI.1.1. Databases used in the research ............................................................. 75 
VI.1.2. The independent variables..................................................................... 76 
VI.1.3. Risk variables......................................................................................... 80 
VI.1.4. The dependent variable ......................................................................... 81 
VI.1.5. The results of regression analysis ......................................................... 82 
VI.1.6. Limitations of the method, possible sources of errors........................... 89 
VI.1.7. Brief evaluation of the results................................................................ 91 
VI.2. Establishment of the research based on the contingent valuation method
............................................................................................................................... 91 
VI.2.1. Subjects of the first pilot test.................................................................. 92 
VI.2.2. Role of the interviewer and the subsidiary materials used.................... 93 
VI.2.3. Experiences of the survey ...................................................................... 95 
VI.2.4. The second pilot test ............................................................................ 100 
VI.2.5. Lessons of the pilot test........................................................................ 100 
VI.2.6. Repeating the test................................................................................. 105 
VII. REGULATION IN CASE OF A BOMB ALARM – A THEORETICAL MODEL............ 111 
VII.1. Current regulation and law surroundings ........................................... 113 
VII.2. An alternative regulation model............................................................ 116 
VII.2.1. Bomb alarm versus act of terrorism with explosion........................... 117 
VII.2.2. Calculation of the costs of the regulation .......................................... 118 
VII.2.3. Calculation of the benefits and the net benefit of the regulation ....... 122 
VIII. CLOSING REMARKS......................................................................................... 124 
APPENDIX 1 .............................................................................................................. 129 
APPENDIX 2 .............................................................................................................. 130 
APPENDIX 3 .............................................................................................................. 131 
APPENDIX 4 .............................................................................................................. 147 
APPENDIX 5 .............................................................................................................. 150 
APPENDIX 6 .............................................................................................................. 153 
REFERENCES............................................................................................................ 155 
 
 7
TABLES 
 
Table 1. Implicit value of human life (time period 1974-79, in dollar). 46 
Table 2. Explanatory variables that were included in most cases. 77 
Table 3. Models of the first round. 83 
Table 4. Models of the second round. 85 
Table 5. The explanatory variables of Model 2.4. 87 
Table 6. Models of the third round. 88 
Table 7. Risk evaluation rank order of the respondents. 99 
Table 8. The value of human life in our sample of 10 people. 99 
Table 9. Distribution of answers given to Question 1 in the pilot questionnaire 
based on the total sample and the subsample of boys and girls in 2001. 101 
Table 10. Results given for the value of statistical human life for each sample 
based on the answers given to the second question in 2001. 104 
Table 11. Distribution of answers given to question 1) in the test 
questionnaire based on the total sample and the subsample of boys and 
girls in 2003. 106 
Table 12. Results given for the value of statistical human life for each sample 
based on the answers given to the second question in 2003. 108 
Table 13. Hit results of certain expressions in the Internet. 111 
 
 
FIGURES 
 
Figure 1. Subsidiary table for Question 10.      94 
Figure 2. Subsidiary table for Question 13.      95 
 
 8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
’The world is dangerous, the possibility of an accident lurks in 
every situation of life, this danger and possibility equivalent to 
human life. Yes, perhaps this danger gives deeper aim and 
tension for people. 
Just think of a human life or the world without the danger of 
accidents. What an arrogantly self-confident, shamelessly proud 
and bumptious life it would be! No, the danger of an accident 
lurks in every moment of you, the objects, the situations, the 
people, the chemical materials, the static and physical figures are 
all against you.’ 
/Sándor Márai: Füves Könyv/ 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The seminar of Professor David Grrenberg was the first opportunity for me to meet 
the approach that put a money value to the value of human life. On that course this 
trial did not surprise us (the students), because so far we had attained the way of 
looking at things of cost-benefit analysis (CBA). 
 
Later on, when I decided to choose this topic for my PhD thesis, I realised from the 
reaction of other people, that this way of looking at things is by no means comes 
natural to most of them. The monetizing of the value of human life is something that 
encounters opposition. I think that is right. Human life is not an interchangeable good 
and its value is not an economic category. The discipline of economics is not the 
only science that investigates the value of life (other social sciences, some branches 
of natural science and philosophy also make some efforts), and it must be very 
cautious in this field. 
 
After a few years, when I began to work on problems of the economic aspects of 
budget-making and allocation of public funds in the Ministry of Finance, I noticed 
that the way of thinking of CBA is quite rare even among experts. 
 
One very important goal of my thesis is to contribute to the procedure, in which these 
kind of researches and approaches become known and accepted (at least among 
economists), and its results become applied in the process of searching for the most 
effective way of allocating public funds. 
 
 10
I.1. The initial problem 
 
’To persons who are not murderers, concentration camp 
administrators, or dreamers of sadistic fantasies, the inviolability 
of human life seems to be self-evident that it might appear pointless 
to inquire into it. To inquire into it is embarrassing as well 
because, once raised, the question seems to commit us to beliefs we 
do not wish to espouse and to confront us with contradictions 
which seem to deny what is self-evident.’ 
/Edward Shils: The Sanctity of Life/1 
 
The writer of these rows can identify himself with the above citation as well as other 
statements of J. Glover [1977]. Glover – as we can read it in the Preface – wrote a 
philosophical book about human life, its sanctity, its value and rights, about saving 
and extinguishing it. He investigates the problems that dominate the social debates 
nowadays, like the problem of abortion, euthanasia, capital punishment, suicide and 
war. However, the presented dissertation does not deal with similar problems. Let us 
see, what the discipline of economics can put to the problem in question. 
 
In the seventies, with the trend of institutional economics, economics began to 
penetrate into spheres of life that – according to many – do not and cannot belong to 
this discipline’s sphere. ’According to the representatives of the new trend, a human 
being is able to enforce his or her efforts in a rational and intelligent way not only by 
individually facing economic decision situations but also through family relations 
and political activities, even if in donating some money to the poor or handicapped 
people, picking up a literature fad or trying to act out his or her emotions.’ (Bara-
Szabó [1997], p. 45). 
 
Still, I would not include my present research2, method of approach or analysis 
technique in this interesting and challenging trend, even if the subject of the 
                                              
1 Citation: Glover [1977], p. 39. 
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examination (homo sapiens, the human being itself) would make it possible or even 
indicate it. Therefore, it is recommended to accurately describe the problem and 
solution that we will be dealing with in the following sections.3 
 
A heterogeneous society presents a very wide range of requirements to the state. 
Through certain, more or less efficient mechanisms, these requirements aggregate to 
concrete programs and projects. There is only one economic criterion for realising 
these programs: their net social benefit (i.e. the difference of the social benefit and 
the social cost) must be positive and larger than in case of alternative programs. 
 
Among methods that indicate possible relative advantages and disadvantages, the 
cost-benefit analysis has proved to be the most viable.4 An important characteristic of 
this method is that it requires indicating the benefits and costs with a monetary value 
when a given economic system is evaluated. This seems to be impossible in many 
cases. That is, among other reasons, why we have to specify the value of human life 
with a monetary value in order to be able to compare it to the values of other items, 
i.e. to be able to compare it to benefits of different kinds and to contrast it with the 
costs necessary for reaching these benefits. It must be seen that in the decisions of 
various state bodies there is an implicit trade-off between human life and other 
values, such as the values of education or culture. Otherwise, no more libraries 
would be built until we have erected barriers next to every road, built dams for every 
river and used all possible means to protect human life. However, because they are 
scientifically unfounded, the decisions of policy are accidental and subject to the 
                                                                                                                                
2 The research on which the present study is based on was partially funded by the SSCD (Social 
Sciences Curriculum Development Program for Selected Central European Universities) program, 
which is financed by the United States Information Agency. Of course, these organisations take no 
responsibility for the ideas described here. 
3 I would like to thank to those who helped me select and access to the adequate literature. I would 
like to especially thank to David H. Greenberg, Sherwin Rosen, Pauline M. Ippoliton, Shelby 
Gerking and Ann Fisher, who provided such studies to me that would not have been accessible 
without their help. 
4 Boardman-Greenberg-Vining-Weimer [1996] provides an excellent review on the cost-benefit 
analysis and the other possible methods. In Chapter II we also summarize the unique characteristics 
of CBA and its role in Hungary. 
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politicians’ own preferences, which rarely map accurately the preference system of 
the electors.5 
 
What is it all about? We want to specify how the members of society (or a given 
population) evaluate their own life. It is a widely accepted viewpoint that the state 
should make decisions concerning spending public money based on the opinion of 
the society – which ’created’ the state in the first place – that is, the preference 
system of the society should be used as a starting point. 
 
W. K. Viscusi [1983], who is a leading theoretical and practical expert on the subject 
and filled high positions in the Ford and Carter administrations, summarised his 
experience in a book that uses very few mathematical-statistical approaches; 
therefore, it can be understood by those who are not experts in this field. 
Nevertheless, the book accurately deals with the most recent developments. 
 
The goal of the book is to introduce the role of the regulating authorities for each 
program where the risks of losing human life must be taken into account, in some 
form. The author considers that there are two crucial roles for these institutions. One 
is to create (by, for example, providing adequate information) conditions and 
circumstances in which people are able to establish and articulate their real 
preferences. The other is to look at and aggregate these preferences (this is where a 
cost-benefit analysis can help) and make them appear in the decisions. 
 
There is a consensus in economic society (Viscusi [1986], p. 207) that in this context, 
human life must only mean statistical human life and its value should be based on the 
current willingness-to-pay (WTP) of the people. Namely, we have to summarise how 
much money individuals in the population under review are willing to sacrifice in 
order to decrease the risk of death by a certain level, or – as another solution – how 
                                              
5 Cf. with the well-known theory of Downs [1990] and the following professional literature. The cost-
benefit analysis, of course, cannot replace the political decision-making, it should rather be 
considered as an input factor in the process. Without the methods to tap the preferences of the 
society (whose methods must be more than the only procedure of political voting); however, it is 
impossible even theoretically having an effective or close to effective way of allocating public 
funds. 
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much money they are willing to accept as a compensation in exchange for the 
increased risks (the latter can be called willingness-to-accept compensation (WTA)). 
 
The definition and operationalization of the concepts can be found in Chapter V. The 
following is an example from Hungary to illustrate the relevance of the study topic in 
public policy decision making. 
 
Ameliorating vehicle traffic in Budapest, the capital of Hungary and its 
unquestionable traffic centre, has been a request (rightfully) from both experts and 
residents for a long time. The M0 ring road, which was completed in the mid-1990s, 
was supposed to concentrically connect the incoming highways and other main roads 
in order to bypass Budapest. 
 
The accident and death statistics were exceptionally high on a section of highway, 
some few tens of kilometres. The reason for this is probably an unfortunate 
combination of several disadvantageous circumstances (construction faults, traffic 
miscalculations or irregularities of the drivers, etc.). 
 
The real reasons are not important from our point of view. What is important is the 
fact that spending a certain amount of money, the number of expected deaths – i.e. 
the statistical death cases – could be definitely decreased, in other words, statistical 
human lives could be saved. The costs would be different depending on the solution: 
reconstruction expenses, regulation costs or cost of loss of time due to slower 
driving, etc. 
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The question here is whether it is worth it to save x statistical lives (i.e. to decrease 
the chances of the occurrence of death) at y expense, whose amount can be 
determined. This question must be answered by the decision makers. The result of 
our calculations can help decision makers to be able to compare – based on social 
preferences – the calculated costs with the benefits of saving statistical human 
lives. Such a comparison can only be done (or more accurately, is only worth doing) 
if the units of measure are the same in both categories. In the present case, this unit is 
the value of money, i.e. the Hungarian forint. 
 
It is important to note that decision makers only receive certain facts to make their 
decision. There can be several reasons for differing from the judgement provided by 
the numbers: decision makers put different subjective weights on certain cost or 
benefit items; political factors or the media can influence the decision; and the 
pressure or indifference of public opinion can also interfere, etc. These factors, 
however, are outside of the borders of this study. Once we have specified the value 
of a statistical human life (VSL), we are ‘not interested’ in the future course of the 
problem. Our calculations are only one, albeit important, link in the whole chain; 
however, without this link, we believe the chain becomes unusable and decision-
making becomes incidental. 
 
I.2. The structure of the dissertation 
 
I set the following triple goal in front of my dissertation, the structure of it is 
subordinated to reach these goals. 
 
a) I want to present the cost-benefit analysis ’in motion’ by reviewing the literature 
and methodology of this topic. It would contribute to make this method and 
mental approach known among economists. 
b) By examining theoretical questions and testing hypothesis I would like to enrich 
the scope of knowledge in this field. 
c) By the result of my empirical research I would like to help the practical decison 
making. 
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In Chapter II I present the most important characteristics of cost-benefit analysis and 
the potential of the Hungarian usage. The theoretical questions and the review of the 
foreign literature take place in the next chapter. In this I show the most important 
milestones of the road to establishing the concept of statistical human life. 
 
Chapter IV occupies an intermadiate position between theory and practice. In this 
part I present the colourful methodology of valuing human life, its development and 
the arising theoretical and practical problems. Out of the three main branches of this 
methodology I go into details in case of two: the hedonic price method and the 
contingent valuation (CV) approach. The third one, the so called consumer or other 
market approach is also presented through the most important studies using and 
developing this method. 
 
In Chapter V and VI empiry gains the main role. First I set my research hypotheses 
and operationalize the most important concepts. Then I reveal the procedures of my 
empirical researches based on the methods showed in Chapter IV. One of these 
researches was conducted four years ago, I have the opportunity to present the results 
of it. In case of the other research, the dissertation presents the ground-work of the 
examination using large sample. Three pilot tests, the experiences and the changes 
induced by them are reviewed. The large sample research itself has not yet been 
conducted due to technical and financial reasons, it will be one important direction of 
further steps. 
 
In Chapter VII I carry out a theoretical model about the cost-benefit analysis of a 
potential regulation for bomb alerts. According to my knowledge there were no 
efforts took for going thoroughly into this question inside or outside Hungary. My 
goal by writing this chapter was to show how to use the sophisticated methods and its 
results in public policy. 
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The dissertation closes with a short evaluation of the most important statements and 
results, and the broad outline of the possible research direction in the future.6 
                                              
6 During the creation of the above structure and the final version of my dissertation I tried to fully 
satisfy the recommendations that has been drawn up when I defended the plan of my thesis. These 
recommendations were the following: 
1. Erasing the prologue. 
2. Making the structure more unambiguous. 
3. Making the methodological part more robust. 
4. Emphasizing the main statements and conclusions. 
5. Giving the practical usability prominence. 
 
I accepted the first three – mainly structural – recommendations and made the required changes. I 
also made efforts to fulfil the rather substantial and also accepted the 4th and 5th requirements. The 
whole idea and analysis of Chapter VI is to illustrate how to utilize the considerations of the thesis. 
 
Finally I took into consideration the detailed comments of Professor László Hunyadi and Professor 
David H. Greenberg that they wrote to my studies in this topic (Adorján [2000] and Adorján 
[2001]). Hereby I would say thank you for the valuable recommendations. 
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II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is a method, but in my opinion it is worth to consider it as a 
way of looking at things or an approach. To be able to use this method in solving 
public policy problems, one has to accept certain philosophical considerations, 
premisses, and take a stand on other important questions. Questions like ’do we have 
the right to put money value to human life, the life of an animal or the beauty of a 
landscape’? The person who gives negative answer to these questions, refuses the 
justification of the use of CBA. 
 
The main characteristic of CBA – considering it as a direction or channel of thought 
– is the ability to use its technical tools in almost every sphere of life. This ability 
does not come from the insensibility of CBA (or the person uses it), rather from the 
fact, that the involvement of all these aspects of a program results a better decision. 
Of course, CBA uses its own tools to achieve this goal. 
 
Thus, when an expert monetizes things during the cost-benefit analysis that is 
unacceptable for some people, he does not do it because he sees the same world with 
different eyes, quite the contrary, he thinks that the use of all these factors make the 
analysis more accurate and complete. 
 
In this chapter first we present the key ideas of cost-benefit analysis7, then the role of 
CBA in today’s functioning of the public sector in Hungary will be shown. During 
this a short historical outlook will also be presented. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
7 There is no reason to analyse the steps or the method of CBA in details, its literature could fill a 
library. The following books are accesible in Hungary: Boardman-Greenberg-Vining-Weimer 
[1996], Layard [1972], Lesourne [1975], Mishan [1971a], Mishan [1973], Sassone-Schaffer [1978] 
and Sugden-Williams [1978]. 
 18
II.1. The key points of cost-benefit analysis 
 
II.1.1. The most important characteristics of the method 
 
CBA could be characterized by three main features, which are on one hand really the 
most important ones, and on the other hand, in this combination make it different 
from any other method or economic procedure. 
 
1) First – because of the use of it in peblic sector programs –, all effects (costs and 
benefits) should be counted that accrue to a given population or – taking a global 
perspective – the whole mankind. There is no priority to a single person, a public 
or a private company, or the state itself in contradiction to methods in private 
sector where the effects on the company itself gain dominance.8 That is why this 
method is often called social cost-benefit analysis. 
 
2) Second, CBA catalogues all identifiable impacts where a cause-and-effect 
relationship exists between the physical outcome of the project and human being 
with standing. In case of private sector programs, only the impacts with financial 
effects count, the process of net present value calculation, which is very similar 
to CBA as a technique, concentrates only on cash flows. For instance, in case of 
building a dam, CBA involves the caused changes in the biocenosis or the 
modification in the landscape. 
 
3) Third, CBA values every impact (either having any effect on cash flow or not) in 
monetary terms, opposite to other common methods, like cost-effectiveness 
analysis. This is inevitable if we want to measure all impacts in a common way in 
order to find out whether the present value of social benefits exceeds the present 
value of social costs, i.e. the net social benefit is positive or not. In the former 
case the given project is worth realizing, in the latter not. 
                                              
8 Of course, it is impossible to take every effect into consideration in practice. First, some effects or 
preferences are excluded because they are harmful for the society. (For instance, though people who 
consume drugs have positive feelings and they are willing to pay for this, we have to thwart the 
expression of such preferences when analysing the cost and benefits of a program against drugs.) 
Second, in some cases it is necessary to tighten the perspective to practical reasons. 
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The net social benefit rule directly comes from the potential Pareto criterion. Any 
changes in the allocation of goods is Pareto efficient if it makes at least one person 
better off without making anyone else worse off. The potential Pareto criterion 
(often called Kaldor-Hicks test) expect less: any changes in the allocation of goods is 
potential Pareto efficient if the person (or people) who are better off can compensate 
the person (or people) who are worse off. (The point is the possibility to find a set of 
transfers that makes at least one person better off without making anyone else worse 
off.) That is why potential Pareto criterion is equivalent with the criterion which 
requires the net social benefit to be positive as a result of the change. 
 
According to all this the following definition can be drawn up: 
 
Cost-benefit analysis is a frame for evaluating the programs, projects, governmental 
activities in public sector. It is an economic method that values the utility of a project 
not only from the viewpoint of the participants based on the pure cash flows, but 
investigates the effect on the whole economy, the welfare of the given society or 
population. The method tries to attach money value to all social benefits and social 
costs in order to compare them. 
 
There is one final important feature of CBA yet. It values all impacts in terms of 
willingness-to-pay (or willingness-to-accept compensation) and all required inputs in 
terms of opportunity costs. It means that all benefits are equal to the sum of money 
the winners are willing to pay and all costs are equal to the sum of money the losers 
are willing to accept as a compensation, or to the value of the input in its best 
alternative use. 
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II.1.2. Philosophical issues and other critiques 
 
„Most of the differences between economists and economic models 
are the results of the fundamental cultural values and the political 
differences coming from philosophical considerations.” 
/Michael Barratt Brown: The models of political economics/9 
 
Valuing a human life gained importance among experts and perhaps the whole 
humankind for practical reasons, however, it would be carelessness to neglect the 
philosophical problems of the field. It is also true that the ethical considerations in 
connection with the valuing of a human life actually pervade the entire CBA. The 
reason for this is the way in which economics treats the problem, i.e. the 
introduction of the concept of statistical human life. According to this, the 
decreasing of the risk of death and so the saving of a human life is a benefit, that 
must be counted in the same way as other, really different type of benefits, e.g. the 
joy from the beauty of a landscape or the value of the produced jackets.10 Therefore, 
it is worth it to take a look at the philosophical problem, which manifests in two 
dimensions.11 
 
The first problem comes from the name of this method. ’Cost-benefit analysis’ fully 
builds on the principle of utilitarianism. According to this mode, all activities have to 
be valued by the following test: it must be determined whether the pleasure exceeds 
the pain, happiness exceeds unhappiness, utility exceeds inutility, benefits exceed 
costs. Bentham’s principle of ’the most pleasure to the most people’ reincarnates in 
the criterion of net social benefit maximisation. It is far from the truth if we believed 
that utilitarian thoughts are widely accepted and expressed among philosophers. The 
problem is not only how to define utility, happiness or pleasure, and how to define 
                                              
9 Citation: Adorján-Hoppál-Mikó-Süveges [2000], p. 16. 
10 However, producing jackets is quite rare as a benefit of a public program. 
11 Gillroy-Wade [1992] presents the widest range of ethical problems and considerations arising in 
public policy. 
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their level, but it is also a matter of doubt, whether it is admissible or possible to 
measure the ’goodness’ of an activity based on such principles and considerations.12 
 
The other theoretical issue is also connecting to the basic postulate of welfare 
economics. According to this, any effects of a program are to be evaluated for the 
society by reference to what each member of the community is willing to pay or to 
receive for the estimated impact (Mishan [1971b]). Thus, this procedure makes the 
estimated money benefit of a program dependent on the income and wealth 
distribution among the members of the society or the given population. In other 
words, people with greater income and wealth have bigger weight in the decision 
about these programs, their ’vote’ is more valuable in saying how the ’cake is 
divided’.13 This procedure can be refused ’either because it is felt that the income 
distribution is inequitable and hence not a just basis of public program evaluation; or 
it is felt that whether or not the income distribution is equitable it is simply not an 
appropriate basis for determining the production and distribution of certain goods’ 
(Acton [1976], p. 61). 
 
Considering the above ideas Steven Kelman’s conclusions are not unexpected. His 
conclusions are that (1) in certain cases a decision might be right even though its 
benefits do not outweight its costs, and (2) there are good reasons to oppose efforts to 
put money values on non-marketed benefits and costs (Kelman [1981], p. 33). 
Further on, with respect towards these considerations we accept the foundations of 
cost-benefit analysis and built on them in our investigation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
12 See, for example: MacIntyre [1992] and Sen-Williams (ed.) [1982] for this subject in detail. 
13 There are techniqes in cost-benefit analysis to defend this problem. One of them is putting weights 
to certain social groups’ or individuals’ benefits and costs based on ethical or any other decision 
makers’ consideration. 
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II.2. The history of CBA and its use in Hungary 
 
II.2.1. From the beginning till the Executive Order of President Reagan 
 
The method of cost-benefit analysis basicly originates in the United States of 
America. The roots go back to the beginning of the 19th century, when in 1808 the 
systematic comparison of the costs and benefits was recommended by the U.S. 
Treasury. The Food Control Act in 1936 could be considered as the next important 
step, which required the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to evaluate the benefits and 
costs of all water resource projects, ’to whomsoever they accrue’. 
 
A practical guide to CBA was produced in 1950, nicknamed the Green Book. 
Finally, in the history of the application of CBA the most significant event was the 
issue of the Presidential Executive Order 12291 of 1981 by President Ronald 
Reagan. This requires that a regulatory impact analysis (RIA) accompany every 
regulatory initiative over $100.000 in cost from government agencies. RIA is a 
special kind of CBA that identifies distributional and fairness considerations. 
 
Outside the United States, the development of the method has been relatively slow, 
but recently speeded up. Under the European Community Directive on 
Environmental Assessment, certain types of projects must undergo a cost-benefit 
analysis. However, the world outside North America uses CBA only in case of cross-
border and other very large projects (dam and highway systems, building airports 
etc.). Using this method in case of building a zoo or starting a training program is 
symptomatic only in the U.S. 
 
II.2.2. The role of CBA in Hungary today 
 
There is probably no area in economics whose research, interpretation and 
application have not changed fundamentally in our region due to the political 
changes at the end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990s. This is especially true for 
those parts of economics that were almost nonexistent in the socialist system, such as 
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several issues of public policy analysis, among them, cost-benefit analysis and our 
current subject, the examination of the value of human life. 
 
In the socialist system14, the state had an extensive role in the direction and control of 
social and economic life. However, due to the logic and the operation mechanism of 
the system, this required means that were fundamentally different from the North 
American and Western European practice, which is built on traditional economics 
and subsequent theories. A theory or a method which is built on scanning the 
preferences of society is totally incompatible with the planned economy, the 
bureaucratic coordination, the autocratic ruling and paternalism of the state party. 
 
It is unsurprising that a bit more than one decade was insufficient to integrate this 
way of thinking into the region’s administrative systems and that exercising public 
policy becomes natural and its methodology is widespread. However, the 
development of the political system must point in a direction where the state would 
like to act on the behalf of its ‘subjects’ (i.e. the citizens) much more than before. 
The reason for this is that the primary goal of the state is to achieve as high a level of 
satisfaction as possible for its citizens, because then the chances of re-election for 
those currently in power is highest. 
 
According to this, the first steps towards the probably long process of widespreading 
of CBA was made in Hungary at the end of the previous decade. The Government 
Decree15 on the governmental task plan in connection with the development of public 
administration for 1999-2000 prescribed that ‘the cost-benefit analysis of decisions 
and the performance evaluation of work must be ensured in all ministries and central 
administrative bodies that operate in a ministerial form’. The task plan for 2001-2002 
– according to the recommendation of the Ministry of Finance that should play an 
important role in the process of modernisation – is much more concrete, sets 
achievable goals, put greater emphasis on the appearence of CBA in different spheres 
of public administration. It prescribes that 
                                              
14 See the classic work of Kornai [1992] for its examination in more detail. 
15 Government Decree No. 1052/1999. (V. 21.), Point I/4.a. 
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a) methodological assistance must be given for developing CBA and for the 
extensive use of it, 
b) the legal background of the duty of the application of CBA must be created 
(which institutions, under which conditions and circumstances would be obliged 
to make a CBA), 
c) the present possibilities for applying CBA and its obstacles under the present 
informatical, human resource conditions, and also the accessibility to databases 
must be investigated, 
d) the informatical and data-safety conditions must be investigated in order to create 
wide and accesssible databases that could constitute the basis of the use of CBA 
in public sector and the first steps must be made in this direction, 
e) the maintainance of the ministerial background institutions must be reinforced by 
the use of cost-benefit analysis, 
f) the use of the money coming on the basis of the Act about the Subsidy for 
Developing of Vocational Training must be scrutinized by the application of 
CBA.16 
 
Out of the six prescriptions four are indirect, aiming to create the legal and economic 
conditions for spreading of CBA. These are very important points of the Decree, 
however, the real value of them depends on the implementation and the consequent 
creation of the further steps needed. We can say that at the time of writing this part of 
the dissertation (October of 2003), only the germ of the implementation can be seen. 
At the moment, the public policy and public funds allocation decisions are mainly 
characterized by the dominance of the political dimension and the enforcement of 
particular interests, the lack of the coordination between the professional and the 
financial aspects and the eventuality. 
 
                                              
16 The II/12. (first three points), II/15. e), I/1. b) and II/14. Points of Government Decree No. 
1057/2001. (V. 21.), respectively. 
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The last two points contain prescribtions about the direct use of cost-benefit analysis. 
Beside this, that kind of direct indication to the usage of this method can be found in 
the following parts of the whole Hungarian law system. 
 
a) A Parliamentary Decree from Year 2000 prescribes that CBA must be applied in 
solving the problems of placement of the scrap item.17 
 
b) An Act from the Year 2000 prescribes that choice between the less risky 
dangerous materials used up for different activities must be based on a cost-
benefit analysis.18 
 
c) A modification of a Governmental Regulation from the Year 2002 prescribes, 
that in case of establishing or obtaining a share in a company, a foundation or a 
public foundation, a cost-benefit analysis must be conducted in order to justify 
the reason for the existence.19 
 
d) A Directive of the PSZÁF20 mentions cost-benefit analysis as an element of the 
preparation process of the cost-managing procedure of the voluntary pension-, 
health-, mutual and private pension funds.21 
 
e) A few ministerial and governmental regulations from 2003 on the appropriation 
of special estimates of the budget prescribes that in case of workplace creation or 
maintainance programs the competitiveness of the subsidised activities must be 
justified by a cost-benefit analysis for a certain period of time.22 
 
                                              
17 Parlament Decree No. 38/2000. (V. 5.), Point 5. c). 
18 Act XXV of 2000, Paragraph 20, Section (1). 
19 Governmant Regulation No. 2171998. (XII. 30.), Appendix No. 18, Point 4. 
20 State Supervision of Financial Institutions. 
21 PSZÁF Directive No. 1/2002. (MK 88.), Point 3.2.b4). 
22 Governmen Regulation No. 26/2003. (III. 4.), Paragraph 6, Section (1), Point c); Government 
Regulation No. 27/2003. (III. 4.), Paragraph 6, Section (1), Point c); MeHVM Regulation No. 
4/2003. (V. 8.) Paragraph 6, Section (1), Point c); MeHVM Regulation No. 5/2003. (V. 20.), 
Paragraph 6, Section (1), Point c). 
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f) Finally, a lot of ministerial regulations prescribe the compulsary knowledge of 
the cost-benefit analysis method for various professions and qualifications. 
 
As we can see, the prescriptions for the use of CBA can be found in a stochastic way. 
However, it is unquestionably the road for the public sector towards modernisation. 
A solid economic basis for spending public money is important, and is especially 
relevant for this region. It is important for EU accession and to ensure that in the 
future, decision-making will be based on principles and methods that harmonise. 
Furthermore, it enforces the spirit of democratic thinking and directs the decision-
making process of public policy actors into a rational channel as they debate 
important issues that affect the society. 
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III. THE HISTORY OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TOWARDS VALUING A 
HUMAN LIFE 
 
In this chapter I try to follow in the wake of the road, on which economics went 
through in concerning the concept of the value of a human life. During this I also 
refer to the relevant philosophical problems. 
 
III.1. The road to establishing the concept of statistical human life 
 
L. I. Dublin and A. J. Lotka [1934] first attempted to specify the ‘economic value’ of 
human life. According to them, the adequate method is to specify the discounted 
present value of the given individual’s net future earnings (which is the difference of 
his anticipated future earnings and his anticipated future consumption 
expenditures).23 Although they were also aware that certain ‘intangible’ 
(‘sentimental’ or ‘esthetic’, etc.) factors also have a role in the value of human life, 
only D. J. Reynolds [1956] attempted to explicitly display these factors years later. 
 
In his study, he examined what kind of costs the society should take into account for 
traffic accidents, which can be fatal in extreme cases.24 He specified two, well-
definable categories: 
 
a) pain, fear and suffering imposed by the accident (or the risk of occurence!); 
b) concrete and ascertainable costs: (1) the loss of future output of goods and 
services because of the death or injury; and (2) the expenditure of resources spent 
on repairing the consequences of the accident: e. g. medical expenses, material 
damages in the vehicle and other properties and administrative expenses. 
                                              
23 This is equivalent to the present value calculation process well known in finance. Its difficulty is – 
in addition to assessing the incomes – to specify the probability of incomes and select the applied 
discount rate. 
24 In Hungary, the Institution of Traffic Science has made calculations about the social costs of road 
accidents for decades. According to the results of the year 1998, a light injury costs 0.5, a heavy 
injury costs 4, and a fatal accident costs 42 million forints for the society. It is important 
mentioning, that the institution uses the so called human capital approach at their calculations. (For 
details see Holló [2001].) 
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According to Reynolds, examination of the first category is beyond the competence 
of economists. R. F. F. Dawson [1967] had a similar opinion, although he made a not 
too significant difference – he considered the potential victim’s future earnings rather 
than his future output as the adequate basis of the present value calculation. 
 
C. Abraham and J. Thedié [1960] separate the costs and distinguish ‘economic 
elements’ and ‘subjective elements’. They follow the categories of Reynolds in 
connection with the economic elements; however, they classify the subjective 
elements and define them numerically. They specified the following five categories: 
 
(1) suffering of relatives; 
(2) subjective costs to society; 
(3) suffering of non-fatal accident victims; 
(4) diminution of the capacity of non-fatal accident victims to enjoy life; 
(5) anxiety of individuals concerning the possibility of their own future involvement 
in accidents. 
 
They chose a surprising method to evaluate these elements: they consider the court 
awards as an adequate basis. Of course, the second and the fifth categories are not 
considered by the courts: the authors specify the value of the former in a completely 
subjective way (this way, this category is always subject to the personal judgement 
of those who carry out the research), while they specify the value of the latter 
category as the sum of the values of the first two categories. Dawson criticized this 
method in the abovementioned study. He believes that the courts only deal with cases 
that are more serious than average; thus, the received values are not typical. He also 
rules out separation of payment made for subjective costs incurred. 
 
The abovementioned four studies belong to a class of professional literature whose 
common aspect is concentrating mainly (or solely) on the loss of net income 
produced by the victims or the actual material damages: these we can call, using M. 
W. Jones-Lee’s [1976, p. 47] expressions ‘losses of net output’ and ‘real resource 
costs’. They also mention what they call ‘subjective costs’. Their attempts to 
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measure them are interesting intellectually; nevertheless, they were not able to 
provide a real solution to the correct handling of these subjective elements. 
 
As a matter of curiosity, it is interesting to take a look at the numerical results the 
researchers got in terms of the value of human life. Dublin and Lotka calculated 
9,802 and Reynolds 2,000 dollars (of that period), Abraham and Thedié 110,000 
French francs and Dawson 3,430 English pounds.25 
 
In a more recent paper of Dawson [1971], he came up with a new consideration. He 
argues that theoretically it is more reasonable to move from a net to a gross loss of 
output, where the potential future consumption of the victim also takes part of the 
costs. The basis of his argument is that the consumption of the victim is also a part of 
the social wealth, because we have to make the calculations about the social loss as a 
result of an accident comparing with the situation without the accident. Without the 
accident that needs to be costed the victim would have stayed alive, thus he or she 
would have consumed in the future. If we calculate with net output, we will see the 
loss of the society from a viewpoint after the accident, thus we ignore the loss of the 
victim. Jones-Lee considers this way of thinking acceptable only if the goal of all 
programs and projects is to contribute to the maximisation of GNP, which is – on the 
other hand – not compatible with the potential Pareto criterion used by CBA.26 
 
Dréze [1962] was the first who approached the issue from a completely different 
angle. By doing this, he laid the theoretical foundation of a methodology that is now 
widely accepted. His analysis has two steps: first he examined the value of increasing 
safety at the level of the individual. Then he put this evaluation problem into a 
collective decision-making context. His reasoning was that if decisions that 
individuals make in situations when uncertainties are present satisfy the requirement 
of regularity and consistency, then economic tools are perfectly adequate for 
specifying how much individuals are willing to spend to affect certain improvements 
                                              
25 Of course, these data can only be comparable to today’s monetary values after some calculations. 
We can still say that their values were quite low. 
26 This problem will be analysed in details in the next subchapter in connection with Mishan’s 
contributions. 
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in their safety. Furthermore, he believed that if certain conditions are met, these 
individual cardinal utilities can be summed up in terms of society in such a way that 
we weigh each individual’s utility function based on how much the community 
appreciates the opinion of the given individual, then the weighted individual utilities 
are added up. Thus, we can get the collective utility of each program that is 
responsible for increasing safety. 
 
T. C. Schelling [1968] also did not concentrate on human life as such, but rather on 
the prevention of death. According to his reasoning, since it is not known exactly 
whose life would be saved by a given safety equipment, therefore the right question 
is how much a decrease in the probability (i.e. risk) of death is worth for the 
members of the given population. In this sense, this is statistical death, i.e. we can 
only measure the value of the statistical life. 
 
His opinion is that when a person dies there are negative effects on the GNP. (These 
‘damages’ are mentioned in the writings of earlier researchers, such as Reynolds.) 
Schelling’s fundamental contribution to the economic literature was the concept of 
evaluating death by individuals, as customers. When an individual, as a customer, 
evaluates the increase of safety, then he evaluates his own life and not the loss of 
income or GNP of the society, and not even the damages caused to the financial 
situation of the family of the victim. These factors, of course, contribute to the 
evaluation of a life; nevertheless, they are not equivalent to it. 
 
In one of the most important studies in this field, E. J. Mishan [1971b] makes an 
attempt to give a short theoretical summary then a crushing critique of all of the 
methods that come up when the value of human life (or a limb, which is of a similar 
nature) is specified. Thereafter, he describes his own viewpoint of the problem. He 
examines four basic methods. 
 
1) We can specify the value of human life as the sum of the discounted value of the 
future earnings of the given person. This value is modified by such factors as 
‘premature burial’, because the earlier it happens, the higher the present value of 
the cost (Mishan [1971b], p. 688). This method can be rationalized only if the 
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value of every economic reorganisation is specified based on their contribution to 
GNP.27 
 
2) By slightly modifying the first method, which can be called the ‘gross output’ 
method, we get the second method. In this, we deduct from the earnings of the 
given person the part that he consumes and only the difference is discounted. 
This way we receive results calculated on the basis of ‘net output’.28 This method 
assumes that the only ‘interesting’ thing for society is what they get from the 
earnings of the person. This term might seem logical at first glance, but it has 
great risks. What about, for example, those people who do not produce earnings, 
but still consume? In the case of a simple calculation, the values of these people’s 
life are negative for society. Therefore, their death would be desirable in order to 
decrease the negative value and gain a net benefit. This idea sounds quite absurd 
and dangerous. 
 
3) The third method is built on faith in the effectiveness of political methods.29 
According to this method, the society does in fact take decisions on investments 
that are supposed to save human life. Thus, the society evaluates them in an 
implicit way. This logic is entirely contrary to the train of thought of our present 
research, because we believe that we need to specify the value of human life 
(deriving quantitive values from an independent economic criterion) in order to 
help the – more or less political – decision-making about the investments. We do 
not and cannot assume that society’s real evaluation ’automatically’ appears in 
these decisions. 
 
4) Finally, the insurance principle also offers a possible method: we know how 
much premium a person is willing to pay concerning certain risks that endanger 
his life with a specifiable probability. From this, the evaluation of his own life 
                                              
27 Several researchers came to the conclusion during their empiric researches that the value of statistic 
life specified according to WTP exceeds the present value of future incomes. (Low-McPheters 
[1983], p. 278). 
28 Cf. Dawson [1971]. 
29 Cf. Ghosh-Lees-Seal [1975]. 
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can be calculated.30 There are a number of problems with this method, the most 
serious one is a logical error: we do not decrease the risk of our death by life 
insurance, we only decrease the financial problems of our loved ones and 
relatives after we have died. Therefore, when we sign the insurance (and specify 
the amount), we don’t try to evaluate our life, rather we try to influence the 
financial situation of others after our death. A bachelor who lives alone does not 
have any reason to sign life insurance, even if he may consider himself as 
’valuable’ as any other member of the society. 
 
There is a single, very serious charge against these four methods: none of them are 
consistent with the basic rationale of the economic calculus used in cost-benefit 
analysis. The reason for this, in short, is that this requires the use of the potential 
Pareto criterion as a decision rule for each allocation decision.31 
 
With the help of any of the above four methods, we can specify the value of each 
human life, at least in theory. Therefore, we can say that if an investment is expected 
to require the death of 100 people32, the value of this 100 people will be part of the 
costs of the investment. If the benefits will still exceed the costs, then it is worth it to 
start the investment. However, the potential Pareto criterion does not allow this. No 
amount can compensate people who will die as the result of the investment; 
therefore, there is no way that this investment can complete the Kaldor-Hicks test. 
 
What if we cannot tell which 100 people will die during the investment (this will be 
the situation in the majority of cases)? In these cases we can only specify the value of 
each person ex post, as costs. Therefore, we can only calculate the net benefit of the 
investment ex post. It is obvious that this is not what we need in general: we need an 
ex ante decision criterion. 
                                              
30 By using a very simplified example, if we sign up for a one million forints life insurance for a 
single 2% risk (this is an enormous risk!), then we evaluated our life at (1 million × 1 / 0.02 =) 50 
million forints. 
31 See Chapter II. 
32 Here I am talking about an investment which costs human life instead of saving it. We have to see 
that the entire train of thought is valid for both cases, with, of course, opposite signs, since what is 
cost in one case is benefit in the other. 
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Before the investment, we can only make statements about probabilities and risks. 
We do not have the knowledge about the future events. We can only say in advance – 
using the previous example – that as a result of the investment, if we consider – for 
the sake of simplicity – a ten thousandth probability of death to everyone, a hundred 
people from one million people is expected to die. We have to calculate the deaths of 
these currently unknown people as costs. We can say that we would like to know the 
value of 100 statistical human lives in a population of one million people. 
 
In such conditions, we can talk about potential Pareto-improvement, since here 
everybody can actually be compensated in exchange for the risk undertaken. The 
compensation of future victims is also possible, since they do not yet know that they 
will become victims; therefore, it is the risk of death rather than death itself that 
appears for them as cost that can be compensated. Therefore, compensation is 
possible even if later on some of them unfortunately will come to grief – the risk of 
this is exactly what we compensate. 
 
We have to cover one thing in connection with Mishan in more detail. There is 
agreement among most of economists33 on accepting the principle that people 
themselves are most aware of their own interests. Therefore, if a person claims that 
he is indifferent whether he will not be put in a certain risk or he will be put in this 
risk for x compensation, then economists must consider the cost of the risk to that 
particular person to be x. 
 
It is possible that the given person’s risk detection is imperfect (more or less 
everybody’s risk detection is imperfect) or he doesn’t consider important factors 
when x is specified or his evaluation mechanism is ‘faulty’. However, all these 
factors also exist at consuming and valuing other goods such as shoes, and we are 
                                              
33 There are exceptions. For example, the recently Nobel prize winner Amartya Sen [1990] believes 
that despite the fact that in Indian society women who live in an inferior, disadvantageous situation 
do not envy the better position of men (this fact can be proven), their specific situation still cannot 
be accepted. He believes that freedom cannot be evaluated by utilitarian calculations; therefore, we 
have to reject it. ‘The protectors of status quo may be able to find peace and justification in some 
versions of the utilitarian calculus; nevertheless, this justification is indefensible if we really 
consider personal freedom a social obligation.’ (Sen [1990], p. 35) 
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still ready to accept the price of shoes as their value without questioning. We have to 
accept the same mechanism in connection with risks and, through them, human life. 
 
III.2. The most important critique of the concensual method 
 
The society of economists use the concensual method in evaluating human lives 
worked out by Schelling, Mishan and their advocates. J. Broome [1978b] passes 
judgement on these methods, which gained solid ground.34 With his article, he stirred 
a wild debate at the end of 1970s and the beginning of 1980s in well-known 
American and Western European journals.35 
 
John Broome resolutely refuses the conclusions of Mishan, who claims that we only 
ex ante know how many victims a project is expected to have, but we do not exactly 
know the number and the identity of victims; therefore, the project’s cost is the 
increase of risk of death (and people must be compensated for this) and not the death 
itself. We are, however, able to measure the level of this increase. According to 
Broome, from the point of view of decision-making, the time when it becomes 
known who will die is irrelevant. Whether we know or not who will die, the point is 
that how many will die. He cited the following absurd examples to illustrate his 
argument. 
 
a) A computer in a locked box stores the names of those who will die during a 
project. If we open the box, we have to cancel the project immediately according 
to Mishan, because the name of the victims will become known. However; the 
project can be approved as long as it is not opened. (An even more extreme case 
for this example: the government knows the name of the victims but does not 
disclose it.) Broome considers it prima facie absurd. 
 
                                              
34 Cost-benefit analysis is actually often the target of various, nevertheless generally well-founded, 
critiques. We believe that this fits well in that general process where principles and mentalities of 
economics expand and penetrate into previously untouched spheres of life, which creates 
considerable debate. 
35 See Buchanan-Faith [1979], Jones-Lee [1979], Mishan [1981] and Williams [1979] among others. 
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b) People cannot assess very small probabilities, or they assess them as zero. For 
example, if in a country whose population is 100 million people, the risk of a 
program is one twenty millionth for each person, then the government can 
consider the related cost zero, because nobody would individually require 
compensation for this extremely small increase of risk. In reality, five people are 
expected to be killed! 
 
c) Imagine that we have to compare two alternative projects. One of them will 
surely cause the death of a single person, and we know who it will be. The other 
will cause the death of a thousand people, but we do not know which thousand. 
According to Mishan’s method only the latter project can be accepted if the 
benefits are high enough. 
 
’These examples help us to see how Mishan has gone wrong.’ (Broome [1978b], p. 
93) The theoretical basis of Mishan’s argumentation is that we have to accept that 
each person knows his own interest best. Since we do not know the future – argues 
Broome –, we necessarily do not know our own interest accurately. It doesn’t matter 
whether we do know or do not know the victims, the fact is that there will be some 
people who will die as a result of the project. Their interest is to refuse every 
compensation, but they do not know this, thus they are not able to make this 
decision. They can only make a right decision ex post, but ex post we cannot measure 
the costs, because the willingness to pay of the victims is senseless. 
 
According to Broome, we should specify the value of life by evaluating the 
anonymous human life36 (because this indicates that loss of life is sure). However, 
this is theoretically incorrect; as the society cannot evaluate as an axiom the state of 
the world that will result after the death of an ex ante known, but anonymous human 
life (similarly, the loss of value because of death, i.e. the value of life) differently 
from the ex ante evaluation of the ex post state (and therefore not anonymous) of that 
                                              
36 We will give an exact definition to this concept in Chapter V. 
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same death.37 However, the latter evaluation is – as we have already seen – 
theoretically impossible. 
 
III.3. An attempt to synthesize 
 
A. Ulph [1982] tried to make a synthesis in this controversial topic. The author thinks 
that at the heart of the debate between Broome and his critics is the issue whether it is 
adequate to use ex ante or ex post welfare judgements when we decide about 
programs that may kill or save human lives. The conclusion of Ulph seems 
surprising: ’neither criterion is likely to be appropriate; rather, welfare judgements 
should be based on a mixture of ex ante and ex post considerations’ (Ulph [1982], p. 
266). 
 
Let us suppose that society is faced with a choice amongst D possible decisions (d = 
1, ..., D). There are S possible states of the world (s = 1, ..., S), and since Ulph wants 
to ignore problems of imperfect perceptions of risks in his analysis, he assumes that 
the probabilities of each state occuring, πs > 0, ΣSs=1 πs = 1, are agreed by everyone. 
Finally, there are I individuals in the society (i = 1, ..., I), and if decision d is taken it 
will yield utility Uisd to individual i in state s. Individual behaviour is supposed to be 
consistent with expected utility maximisation, so let 
 
Vid = ΣsπsUisd 
 
denote expected utility for individual i if decision d is taken. Suppose that there 
exists a W(.) social welfare function that represents a well-behaved social preference 
ordering over the decisions d = 1, ..., D, where 
 
W(d) = W(U11d, ..., UISd, π1, ..., πS).          (1) 
 
                                              
37 This, of course, depends on what axioms we accept concerning the social evaluation or the social 
welfare formula. For the detailed analysis of the issue, see the study of Ulph [1982] in the next 
subchapter. 
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What properties should this function satisfy? Harsányi [1955] proposes two 
restrictions which are relavant in the value of life debate. The first is that W should 
be written as an increasing function of individual expected utilities. This is the ex 
ante restriction that requires W being able to be written as 
 
W(d) = W1(V1d, ..., VId).          (2) 
 
Thus, the social welfare function should reflect private tastes and preferences as 
these exist at the time of the social decision. As we have seen before, the advocates 
of this characteristic of W are those who prefer ex ante decisions. 
 
The second restriction is that social welfare should be based on the axioms for 
expected utility maximisation, which Ulph calls the ex post rectriction, since it 
requires the existence of an ex post welfare function W2 such that 
 
W(d) = ΣSs=1πsW2(U1sd, ..., UIsd).          (3) 
 
The most important assumption we require for social welfare to be consistent with 
the axioms of expected utility maximisation is the ’sure-thing’ principle, or the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption. This means the following. 
Suppose decision d yields the same utilities in all state of the world as decision d’, 
except in state t. Then if society ex post is indefferent between the distribution of 
utilities in state t as a result of decision d and decision d’, it should be indifferent 
between d and d’. It is exactly the principle that Broome is appealing to when he 
argues that a project which involves the certain death of one person of a number of 
identical individuals, where the only uncertainty concerns the name of the individual 
who is to die, should be treated as equivalent to an identical project where the name 
of the individual who is to die is known a priori. Thus we must evaluate the 
statistical death equivalent to the certain death. 
 
The ex ante and ex post restrictions need not be in conflict, but it is now well known 
that the only welfare function which satisfies both restrictions is the utilitarian 
function 
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W(d) = ΣiαiVid = ΣiαiΣsπsUisd = ΣsαsΣiπiUisd,          (4) 
 
where αi is the weight of individual i in the calculations (Σiαi = 1) (Harsányi [1955], 
p. 314). Both of the restrictions can be applied under certain circumstances, but not 
always together. The welfare function (1) should embody a mix of ex ante and ex 
post considerations. After this, Ulph illustrates his viewpoint in the debate with the 
help of an example with real numbers. Now we present only the summary of his 
conclusion (Ulph [1982], pp. 269-270). 
 
a) If social welfare can be represented by the utilitarian function (so we consider 
this type of function adequate), it would be appropriate to use the cost-benefit 
approach of evaluating compensation for the risk of death. Since in this case 
society treats statistical and known death equivalently, the same method should 
be used, i. e. one treats known deaths as if they were statistical deaths. 
 
b) If social welfare satisfies only the ex ante criterion then the conventional cost-
benefit approach will be appropriate only in case of statistical death. In this case 
one would need to incorporate society’s distributional judgements to evaluate 
how much of an increase in the incomes of those who live is required to 
compensate for the loss of life. 
 
c) If social welfare satisfies only the ex post criterion then society wants to treat 
known and statistical deaths equivalently. In this case, however, the conventional 
cost-benefit approach will not be relevant. 
 
d) Finally, if both restrictions are unsatisfied by the social welfare, then the 
conventional cost-benefit approach will not, in general, be appropriate, and the 
society doesn’t wish to treat known and statistical deaths equivalently. 
 
Thus if social choice will be reflected ’only’ in the general social welfare function as 
in (1), rather than the restricted form of (2), (3), or (4), then it will be inappropriate 
both to judge decisions involving death solely on whether ex ante welfare will 
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increase and to treat statistical and known deaths equivalently, although both of these 
considerations form part of society’s judgement. 
 
III.4. Summary of Jones-Lee in the problem of value of human life 
 
In the following sections I present some ideas of the well-known book of one of the 
leading experts in this field, the Englishman M. W. Jones-Lee. The goal of Jones-Lee 
[1976] was to summarize all the knowledge of this field for the readers who want to 
see this problem with an economist’s eyes. The author pays attention to the 
mathematical and statistical basement of the problem and to other branches of 
science that deal with it (mainly to psychology, sociology and decision theory). I 
dont’t have the intention to write about all of these aspects, but in my opinion it is 
worth mentioning one thing in connection with the above considerations: the 
synthesis of Jones-Lee about the question of what benefits (or costs) should be 
incorporated in the calculations in case of saving (or losing) a human life. 
 
According to Jones-Lee when an investment improves the safety of human lives, the 
social benefits per life saved (V) of this improvement can be divided into at least 
three components (Jones-Lee [1976], p. 118.): 
 
a) the (average) value of avoided real resource costs per life saved (V1), 
b) the (average) value of avoided loss of net output per life saved (V2), 
c) the (average) value of human life per se (V3). 
 
V1 and V2 reflect the economic losses occasioned by death, whereas V3 component is 
due to society’s aversion to the event of death per se. The total benefit (B) in case of 
saving s human lives is the following: 
 
B = s×V = s×(V1 + V2 + V3). 
 
The researcher puts the question how the essentially non-marginal concept, V3, is 
related to the marginal value of change risk. (Earlier on we declared that only the 
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evaluation of the marginal change in the risk of death is consistent with the potential 
Pareto criterion.) Jones-Lee proves that V3 and the marginal value of a change in risk 
can be very simply related. Leaving now the mathematical details, the key point is 
that if all members of a group of N people evaluates the improvement in safety 
 
(s/N)×(marginal value of safety) 
 
(supposing that on one hand the subjective decrease in risk is equal to the objective 
level and on the other hand s is very small in relation to N), then the value of the 
improvement in safety is 
 
(s/N)×Σ(marginal value of safety) 
 
for the given group of people, thus – according to our approach – it is eual to the 
value of s human lives, and so the value of one human life is: 
 
V3 = (s/N)×Σ(marginal value of safety)/s = Σ(marginal value of safety)/N. 
 
In this way the disparities of the concepts of a ’value per life saved’ and the 
’marginal value of a decrease in risk’ are eliminated. 
 
Instead of mentioning all the topics that the book deals with, let me write about the 
limitations of the researches and the results. The most apparent restriction is that we 
consider the individuals displaying sufficient order and consistency in choice 
situations to make expected utility maximisation a legitime hypothesis for our 
purposes. The reality of this hypothesis has been questioned many times by many 
experts. Hereby we only mention the most important efforts. 
 
H. M. Markowitz supposes in his classic portfolio theory that investors are not neutral 
to risk (that would come from the expected utility theory), rather, most of them are 
risk averse (Markowitz [1952], Neumann-Morgenstern [1944]). Thus, in the process 
of drawing up an effective prortfolio the expected yield is not the only factor to 
involve, the risk of the portfolio also counts. 
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Kahneman and Tversky presented a powerful critique of expected utility theory as a 
descriptive model of decision making under risk, proving that the axioms on which 
the theory of János Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern is built are not valid. They 
developed an alternative model, called prospect theory, in which value is assigned to 
gains and losses rather than final assets and in which probabilities are replaced by 
decision weights (Kahneman-Tversky [1979]). 
 
Some of the theories did not reject the theoretical basis of expected utility theory, but 
made a few modifications on them in order to elimininate the paradoxes it resulted. 
One of the most promising attempts is undoubtedly the regret theory of G. Loomes 
and R. Sugden (Loomes-Sugden [1982]).38 
 
According to Jones-Lee ([1976], p. 152.), the expected utility maximisation 
hypothesis scores well in any sensible overal weighting of the desirable performance 
criterion of such a theory (e. g. explanatory power, generality, predictive capacity), 
thus it is the most popular theoretical foundation for the analysis in choice under 
uncertainty. There are, however, important limitations that should be considered. We 
cannot investigate the connections between subjective and objective probabilities. 
The expected utility theory deals with subjective interpretation of probability. At 
least two difficulties arise. When we quantify the probabilities we assume that 
subjective probabilities could be identified with relative frequences (s/N). According 
to Jones-Lee, there is no reason to suppose that over a large sample of individuals, 
there will be a systematic divergence between the two when information concerning 
the frequencies is available. The more alarming assumption is that each member of 
the relevant population will adjust his degree of belief in the event of his own death 
to an extent which can be precisely described as a reduction of s/N in the subjective 
probability of the event. It seems rather unlikely. 
 
An other problem appears from the fact that individuals can feel having the 
opportunity to influence their own safety by e.g. expenditure on marketed safety 
                                              
38 Unfortunately the description of the intellectually really interesting theory is beyond the frame of 
the thesis. 
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instruments. The existence of such opportunities may mean that an individual will 
react to risk reduction showing less willingness to pay, because by spending money 
on private safety improvement he can reduce the risk cheaper for himself. This effect 
causes a downward bias in our calculations.39 
 
Finally, the researher mentions two phenomena that will be described in details in the 
next chapter. One of them is perhaps the most serious limitation of the contingent 
valuation method, namely, the estimates concerning the willingness to pay for risk 
reduction are derived from responses to hypothetical situations. Its relation to the real 
world is at least not unambiguous. The other problem comes from the treatment of 
the death. Throughout the discussion, at the theoretical as well as the empirical 
analysis, death is treated as a unique event. However, beside the fact of a death, the 
way of it is also important. Most people presumably prefer to die quickly and 
painlessly, and thus evaluate the risk of this death less.40 
 
                                              
39 We do not have to calculate with this effect in the other direction. If the use of a private equipment 
to reduce the risk is more expensive then the individual will not change his willingness to pay to a 
given risk reduction. 
40 Jones-Lee probably did not know the famous Hungarian poet, Sándor Petőfi, who in his famous 
poem (‘Egy gondolat bánt engemet...’) undoubtedly assured the reader that people can evaluate the 
different way of death quite differently. 
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IV. THE COLOURFUL METHODOLOGY 
 
In the previous chapters I analysed all the theoretical considerations and questions 
that assure adequate basis to the empirical work. The next chapters are devoted to 
empiry. During the previous decades, three main branches of the evaluation of 
statistical human life gained ground. The first is the so called consumer or other 
market approach, the second is the labor market approach41 and the final one is the 
contingent valuation method. 
 
The first subchapter describes the method, in which researchers investigate market 
behaviour, thus real, revealed preferences, but these markets are not the labour 
market (that is why it is often called other market approach). The labour market 
approach is an independent direction of researches, the second subchapter deals with 
it. Finally, the experts of this field can lean on the result of researches which try to 
map the preferences with the help of building up hypothetical situations (markets). 
The third subchapter is about this method. The latter two methods (i.e. the hedonic 
price and the contingent valuation method) are applied in my researches, as I know, 
for the first time in Hungary. The review of these researches can be found in Chapter 
V and VI. 
 
IV.1. The consumer market approach 
 
The common feature of the other market or revealed preferences studies is that they 
specify the risk-money trade-off by examining real market decisions. The main 
problem is that risks are not directly traded in the markets; thus – as an alternative – 
the market of such products can be examined that are closely related to risk or life-
threatening danger. However, customer decisions are fairly complex in these cases as 
well, and it is hard to isolate the effect of one single factor (usually the intention to 
increase safety). Additionally, there are few products whose risk (or ability to reduce 
                                              
41 Also called compensating wage differential studies, wage-risk studies or hedonic price method. We 
can consider these concepts as synonyms. 
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risk) is relatively accurate known by the general public, and this is a basic 
requirement for such a study. 
 
Another solution is to examine market decisions – in connection with some kind of 
activity or service, rather than a product – where considerations of security are 
important (e.g. use of pavement or safety belt, the selection of adequate vehicle or 
speed limits). The problems with research projects in this category include the – 
previously mentioned – isolation problem, the lack of accurate knowledge 
concerning risks and the fact that it is generally hard to assign money values for 
factors that play a part in decision-making or reduce risk. For example, the benefit of 
the decision in connection with the use of safety belts is reduced risk. In exchange, 
they require a certain amount of time and they are a little inconvenient. However, 
how much is the loss of time and the inconvenience worth to people? We can try to 
specify this; nevertheless, we should handle the results carefully. 
 
Because of all these reasons, research projects such as these generally provide less 
reliable results for the value of risk to people. They should rather be considered as 
interesting – but valuable – intellectual exercises. For this reason, I do not apply this 
method at my empirical researches and also strive after concision in describing the 
most important studies in the following subchapter. 
 
IV.1.1. Investigating the optimal motorway speed 
 
The authors of this pioneer study, D. Ghosh, D. Lees and W. Seal [1975] built their 
research on the assumption that there exists a socially optimal speed on motorways, 
at which the marginal social benefit from increased speed (coming from the saving of 
time) is equal to the marginal social cost (coming from the increased fuel 
consumption and the increased risk of accident). 
 
The trio dertermined the relationship between speed and time-saving, speed and fuel-
consumption and speed and casualty (the first is based on a simple function, the latter 
two are based on statistics). Then they expressed the optimal average motorway 
speed as a function of (among others) 
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a) the total traffic volume in miles per month, 
b) the value of time, 
c) the price of fuel, 
d) the average cost of accidents. 
 
If we put a numerical value to n-1 variables in the equation that can be created, the 
value of variable n can be calculated. The authors employed 0,35 pounds per gallon 
as the price of fuel, 2.445 pounds as the social cost of accident derived from the work 
of Dawson [1971]. Using these data they obtain the following optimal average 
speeds corresponding to various alternative values of time: 
 
at 1,00 pound/hour42: 67,45 mph, 
at 0,50 pound/hour:   47,69 mph, 
at 0,25 pound/hour:  33,72 mph. 
 
From our viewpoint that part of the study is much more interesting when the 
researchers assume that the actual average motorway speed was in fact optimal as 
well. The value of time of 1,00 pound/hour and the price of petrol of 0,35 
pound/gallon are then shown to imply a value of life (the cost of a death caused by a 
motorway accident) of 94.000 pounds. It must be mentioned that this value is very 
sensitive to the price of petrol and also to the (shadow) price of time. For instance, if 
we decrease the value of time ceteris paribus to 0,63 pound/hour, the calculations 
will result zero value for a human life. 
 
IV.1.2. Investigating the market of smoke detectors 
 
The basic assumption of the study of R. Dardis [1980] is that individuals know the 
probability of domestic fires and also the reduction of the possibility of injuries or 
                                              
42 In that time it was the level of wages approximately. The whole interval of saving time is not so 
valuable, that is why it is necessary to make the calculations with lower figures as well. 
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deaths resulted by using a smoke detector.43 With the help of the probabilities and the 
price of smoke detector, the value of a stitistical life can be calculated. Those people 
who purchased the equipment in the given interval (it was 13 percent of the whole 
population in 1976) evaluated the human life more, because they would probably pay 
more money for the smoke detector (because market price is equal to the marginal 
willingness-to-pay of people who purchase). Among them, we are able to give only 
the lower bound of their evaluation. Those who did hot purchase the equipment 
evaluate the human life less, because the market price is probably not the lowest 
price that they wouldn’t give for the detector. Among them, the market price is an 
upper, and zero is a lower bound of their willingness-to-pay. 
 
As always, a few difficulties arise. The benefit of the smoke detector is not only the 
saving of lives but also the reducing of the probability of injuries. As we are only 
interested in the former one, we have to know the ratio of the two. There does not 
exist any procedure to gain the information about the relative importance of the two 
effects, thus the researcher applied three different weighting schemes. She put 50 
percent, 10 percent and 0 percent respectively to injury.44 The level of the applied 
discount rate for evaluating the cost of the replacable batteries was also questionable. 
Dardis used both 5 and 10 percents. Finally, the price of the equipment showed a 
considerable fall during the time priod 1974-1979, thus the calculations were made 
for every year then an average value was determined. Table 1 shows the results. 
 
Table 1. Implicit value of human life (time period 1974-79, in dollar). 
Discount rate  Weight of injury  
 0,5 0,1 0 
  5% 189.049 239.239 256.652 
10% 217.273 274.956 294.968 
Source: Dardis [1980], p. 1081. 
 
                                              
43 Dardis chose the market of smoke detectors for his researches, because the cost of the usage is 
almost entirely the price of the equipment with the needed batteries, the benefit is – beside the 
saving of material things – the reduced risk of death and injury. 
44 According to the author, perhaps surprisingly the 0 percent scheme seems to be the most realistic, 
since campaigns have focused on the life-saving role of smoke detectors. 
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As it was mentioned above, the results provide an overestimate of the value of a life 
to the total population, since at the majority of people the estimations were upper 
bounds, and only at a minority of them are proved to be lower bound. 
 
IV.1.3. Hedonic models outside labour market 
 
Two important studies deal with the risk element of the price of certain market 
products. P. R. Portney [1981] attemted to measure the risk premium in the housing 
prices coming from the level of air pollution in the area. S. E. Atkinson and R. 
Halvorsen [1990] investigated the market of automobiles with different 
characteristics such as safety in order to determine the implicit price of risk. 
 
Both researches use similar methodology: they build up a regression model with the 
dependent variable of the price of the given thing (i. e. the house or the automobile) 
and the independent variables (such as the risk variable, the personal characteristics 
of the consumer and the special characteristics of the given purchased thing – e. g. 
the fuel efficiency, the acceleration, the comfort by cars and the infrastructural 
circumstances, the neighbourhood by houses).45 
 
The research and results of Portney needs more caution. In his summary he also 
mentions the limitations of his method. The most important one is the unreality of the 
assumption that people are aware of the approximate level of air pollution and – as a 
second step – aware of the health risk of that. The existence of the knowledge about 
the level of air pollution is doubtful, but the same assumption about the effect of it on 
the human body is rather totally unrealistic.46 And even if the purchaser knew all this 
information, it would be still questionable whether he would enforce this knowledge 
in the mechanism of price determination, or, in case of enforcing it, we still don’t 
know whether he paid attention only to the level of mortality risk or other harmful 
characteristics of air pollution. Portney received 142.000 dollars as the implicit VSL. 
 
                                              
45 See the detailed description of the method in the following subchapter. 
46 An earlier research showed that people systematically underestimate the harmfulness of air 
pollution to a considerable extent (Jones-Lee [1989], p. 73). 
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The study of Atkinson and Halvorsen ’provides the most comprehensive analysis of 
risk-dollar trade-offs outside labor market’ (Viscusi [1993], p. 1937). They 
investigated the data for 112 models of new 1978 automobiles. Unit sales by model 
varied from a minimum of 5.857 to a maximum of 401.392 dollars that shows the 
wide range of the sample and therefore the wealth situation of purchasers. The result 
they received is similar to that of other methods’: the weighted average estimate of 
the VSL for the sample as a whole was about 3,4 million dollars; it was 6,6 million 
for the lowest risk quartile and 0,8 million for the highest risk quartile. 
 
IV.1.4. The effect of a new information 
 
P. M. Ippolito and R. A. Ippolito [1984] realized that the conventional researches 
based on revealed preferences have serious restrictions which were mentioned earlier 
on. In their analysis they attempted to defend these sources of errors. 
 
It is worth mentioning that – in contrary to other experts of this field – the authors are 
not academic people, rather they work as officials for the U. S. Government. Their 
basic premise was that the receipt of information concerning the health effects of 
smoking would have a result in two ways: (a) the entire demand for cigarettes would 
decrease and (b) the consumption would switch from cigarettes of higher nicotine 
content to those of lower one. Both of these two effects are the result of the higher 
perceived risk of cigarettes, however, the compensation for a real risk reduction was 
able to be studied. 
 
They operationalized the risk of smoking as a change in life expectancy per unit 
cigarette consumption to obtain what they called annualized value of life-saving. The 
estimates for this figure was found to vary widely accross the population and to be 
highly high-skewed, with a mean of between 5.142 dollars and 16.008 dollars per 
annum in 1980 prices. The average was 8.622 dollars. In order to compare these 
estimates with the results of other empirical studies, we have to summarize for an 
entire life. This operation has lots of theoretical difficulties, e. g. choosing the 
adequate discount rate. The most serious one is that we have to assume that the 
marginal rate of substitution of wealth for life expectancy is uncorrelated with life 
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expectancy itself, thus multiplying the mean of one by the mean of the other will 
produce an unbiased estimate of the mean of their product. Simply saying we have to 
assume that this rate of substitution is independent from age.47 Bearing in mind these 
caveats, the best estimate of the authors of the VSL falls in the range 300.000 – 
600.000 1980 dollars, which is considerably lower than the previous results. 
 
IV.2. Labour market approach 
 
IV.2.1. Description of the method48 
 
The Scottish father of modern economics, Adam Smith, in his famous book Wealth of 
Nations first described the thought that specific circumstances ‘make up for a small 
pecuniary gain in some employments, and counterbalance a great one in others: First, 
the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the employments themselves. … The wages 
of labour vary with the ease or hardship … of the employment.’ (Smith [1776], in: 
Smith [1992], p. 109). This phenomenon is the basis of calculations that are based on 
the compensating wage differential for risk. 
 
According to the basic economic theory of the labour market, the prevailing level of 
wages is such that the aggregated market demand (i.e. the demand of the employers) 
is in balance with the market supply (i.e. the supply of employees). It is also obvious 
that the job held for a given wage is nothing else but a set of features or 
characteristics. Depending on these features, the employer is willing to part with a 
certain amount of money for the person who holds the job. The employee also forms 
his opinion concerning compensation based on these same features. Security is one 
of the basic features of all jobs; i.e. how much risk the work carries to human life. In 
those jobs, where the risk is higher than in ceteris paribus jobs, i.e. jobs whose other 
                                              
47 This assumption is not realistic. Theoretical and empirical evidence both suggest that this rate of 
substitution declines with age (Jones-Lee [1989], p. 74). 
48 The wage-risk and hedonic price method expressions are also used for the method of compensating 
wage differential studies that built on the labour market approach. In the followings we will treat 
them as synonyms. 
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circumstances are similar, the payment must also be higher: i.e. the wage must 
contain a risk premium. The reason for that is primarily the following: 
 
a) employees are only willing to hold a job with higher risks for higher wages; 
b) to avoid higher risk means higher expenses for the employer; therefore, they are 
only willing to pay less wages for more security. 
 
Jobs with higher risks, therefore, result in ceteris paribus higher compensation. It is 
known that in real life ceteris paribus comparisons are seldom possible, because 
behind every wage, there is an employee with specific features and a workplace with 
individual peculiarities. 
 
Our task is to specify how certain factors affect the wage rate: i.e. the dependent 
variable (wi). These factors include the personality features (xim, m = 1, ... ,M); 
various other factors, including some in connection with the given job, but not 
including risk, (zik, k = 1, ...,K); separately, the fatality risk of the given job (pi). The 
following formula is the basis of the regression calculation to be used in this case: 
 
wi = α + ΣMm=1ψmxim + ΣKk=1ξkzik + γpi + ui, 
 
where  is a constant term, ui the random error term reflecting unmeasured factors 
that influence the wage rate, and ψm, ξk and γ are the coefficients of the given 
variables. Of the coefficients, only the last one is interesting from our point of view. 
It indicates how much in terms of additional wages the increase and the decrease of 
a risk is ‘worth’ in the labour market. In the previous case, the worker accepts the 
additional risk for this amount of wage increase, while in the latter case the worker is 
ready to give up this amount of money from his wages in order to decrease the risk of 
his job by a certain level. 
 
Those who support this approach argue that the value of a statistical human life can 
be calculated by real data that have been tested by the market. 
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The model is logical and illustrative, but for its validity, we need some assumptions 
that only in some cases or never meet reality. We will discuss some of them in details 
later on in connection with a described study in this field, however, it is worth 
mentioning here the most important ones. 
 
a) We assume that we manage to find all the relevant independent variables. 
b) We assume that workers perceive their job risks well. 
c) We assume that workers are mobile so that they can move from one job to 
another, thus they are able to enforce their prferences towards risk in their wages. 
 
Other limitations of the method should also be mentioned: 
 
a) The risk variable is measured by the fatality risk, because it is equal to the risk in 
loss of life. However, the risk that is reflected in the wage rate arises in injury 
risk in many cases (e. g. in case of workers at assembly line). 
b) The independent variable is the wage rate, however, it is only one part (though 
the most important) of the compensation packet. 
c) It is questionable, whether net or gross wage rates are appropriate. The net values 
seem to be more reasonable, but in this case the change in tax system causes 
hardly solvable problems. 
d) Even if the model works perfectly, it is only able to measure the willingness-to-
pay values for the worker’s own risk. In reality, all people are altruists to a 
certain extent, so willing to pay for other people’s safety. These evaluations 
should also take part of the value of a statistical life.49 
e) Finally, a very important limitation of the use of the method is that it is only 
capable to work with one type of risk – namely the risk of work –, thus cannot 
involve the kind of the risk as a factor. 
 
                                              
49 Viscusi-Magat-Forrest [1988] investigates this problem in details. 
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In the following subchapters studies using the labour market approach or developing 
the method itself will be described. 
 
IV.2.2. The earliest important researches 
 
It is worth beginning the review of the most important studies with the work of R. 
Thaler and S. Rosen [1976]. On one hand, it was chronologically the first 
considerable attempt, on the other hand, due to its advantages and also 
disadvantages, it is the most widely quoted compensating wage differential study. 
 
The risk data employed concerned probability of death for individuals in 37 
hazardous occupations and were obtained from the US Society of Actuaries. The 
researhers used up these data and built them to an earlier database of a sample of 907 
individuals in the various risky occupations, which database contained data 
concerning variables such as geographical location, family size, nature of industry, 
unionization, nature of occupation, age, education and weekly wage. 
 
After this, they ran different (linear and semilogarithmic) regressions modifying the 
set of explanatory variables, and investigated the coefficient of the risk variable. The 
results were mixed. Out of the eight regressions only one had a risk coefficient 
significant at the 5% level and two at 10%. The VSL implied by these estimated risk 
coefficients also took place in a large interval, ranging from 5.000 to 260.000 1967 
US dollars. The lower estimates generally came from equations with interaction 
terms (e. g. age×risk, married×risk). It implies that the risk data reflected other 
factors than the riskiness of the occupation itself, e. g. the specific demographic and 
lifestyle characteristics of the people who worked in the given occupation.50 This 
phenomenon makes it possible that according to the results a bartender must face 
higher risks than a fireworker. It is obvious that this kind of risk comes from the 
lifestyle of individuals attracted to the given occupations and not the occupation 
itself. As a conclusion, Thaler and Rosen put the VSL near 200.000 1967 dollars. 
                                              
50 It can be generally stated that the early wage-risk studies used an inappropriate measure for the risk 
variable, thus they obtained estimates mainly in the low range, but sometimes in the high range 
(Fisher et al [1989], p. 91). 
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A couple of years later A. Marin and G. Psacharopoulos [1982] investigated a wide 
range of data concerning risk, individual and job characteristics for a large number of 
different occupations ranging from managerial and professional to manual workers in 
their study conducted in the United Kingdom. The novelty of their approach was the 
use of two different measures for risk. The first one (referred to by the authors as 
GENRISK) reflected the excess risk of death for members of each occupational 
group over and above the risk faced by members of the general population of the 
same age and social class. The way of calculation: the actual death rate of the 
members of the occupation minus the death rate that could have been expected given 
the age and social class structure of workers in the occupational group. This measure 
is similar to that employed by Thaler and Rosen.51 This approach was subject to the 
criticism that the excess risk may include elements that are totally independent from 
the occupation or the job. It obviously distorts the results. 
 
To eliminate this, the authors defined a second risk measure, ACCRISK, which was 
based upon the excess risk of a fatal accident at work in each occupation, over and 
above the average risk of such an accident for workers as a whole, taking account of 
the age pattern of the group. 
 
The researchers ran a regression analysis on the entire sample and also on 
subsamples of managers and professionals, non-manual workers and manual 
workers. The estimated coefficients were positive in all cases, significance tended to 
increase moving from the managerial to the manual end of the spectrum. (According 
to Marin and Psacharopoulos the relative lack of significance in case of managerial 
workers is not surprising, because for most managers and professionals there is a 
zero or negative excess risk of accidental death at work.) Using the preferred 
ACCRISK variable, the duo gained 650.000 1975 English pounds for the VSL. This 
value is a bit lower among manual workers, but considerably higher, about 2,2 
million pounds among managers and professionals.52 When they made the same 
                                              
51 As I mentioned above, it is common in the literature of this field to compare all wage-risk studies to 
that of Thaler and Rosen. I don’t want to disregard this tradition. 
52 This fact seems to underpin the argument accepted widely that safety is a superior good. 
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calculations by the traditional GENRISK variable, results became lower, as it was 
expected. 
 
Finally, two subsidiary regressions were also run. At the first, the risk variable was 
put in the model in a quadratic form. In this case, the risk coefficient was not 
significant. The second regression was run for a subsample comprising the top third 
of the jobs in terms of risk. The risk coefficient in this case was not markedly 
different from that for the whole sample. These results therefore did not support the 
hypothesis that the wage-risk function in equilibrium is concave, so that workers 
having the most risky jobs are less risk-averse than others. 
 
The study of V. K. Smith [1983] had a lot of novel considerations. First – according 
to Smith – among the independent variables not only the demographical and 
occupational or work-related features should be represented, but also the 
characteristics of the neighbourhood where the workplace (and often the living place) 
settles down such as crime rate, air pollution, cultural and infrastructural facilities, 
unemployment rate and weather. The approach is based on the hypothesis that 
household’s choice of residential location will also be reflected in wage rates. (This 
hypothesis is much more realistic in the United States than in Hungary.) Cost of 
living which varies with regions is also an important factor in the researcher’s model. 
That kind of factors like the industry index of exposure to carcinogenic materials 
must also be compensated in the wage rate. 
 
The common feature in the regression models of Smith is that the dependent variable 
is the natural logarithmic form of the ratio of the nominal wage rate and the cost of 
living index. The results showed the risk coefficient significantly positive in all cases 
and broadly the same order of magnitude. However, inference of a value of statistical 
life from these estimates is complicated by the fact that the risk variable included 
fatal and non-fatal accidents as well. In a situation like this we must make an 
assumption about the proportion of wage premium that applies to fatal as opposed to 
non-fatal accidents. We can hardly determine a ’good’ proportion, the best estimates 
are between 30% and 50% for the fatal part (Jones-Lee [1989], p. 65). According to 
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the calculations on the sample of approximately 16.000 individuals the VSL is put in 
the interval of 400.000 and 700.000 1978 dollars. 
 
If we assume that, because of the existence of insurance or workers’ compensation, 
there are no compensating wage differentials for non-fatal injuries so that the entire 
wage premium applies to fatalities. In this case the estimates yield 1.400.000 dollars 
for the VSL. 
 
R. J. Arnould and L. M. Nichols [1983] also attempt to take the effect of insurance 
into account. They think that previous researches made a mistake when they used 
only the level of wage rate as the dependent variable in the model. There are other 
parts of compensation for the work such as the different kind of insurances, mainly 
the accident, health and life insurances paid by the employer. The failure to take 
account of such compensation will tend to bias estimated wage premia for risk in a 
downward direction. 
 
The authors wanted to reproduce the regressional calculations of Thaler and Rosen, 
so they used the same database and the same form of regression model. The 
difference was that they presented the annual value of insurances for the workers, but 
not as dependent, rather independent variable. Thus, the negative coefficient 
concerning the insurance variable shows the decrease in wage rate as a result of the 
increase in the value of insurance by one unit. As a result, the VSL was 200.000 
dollars in 1970 prices where no workers’ compensation insurance exists. However, 
taking into account wages an individual is observed to be willing to forgo for 
insurance coverage of wages lost due to work-related injuries, 23.000 dollars, the 
VSL grows up to 223.000 dollars. 
 
IV.2.3. Are workers Bayesian decision makers? 
 
W. K. Viscusi and C. J. O’Connor [1984] investigate the question whether workers 
are Bayesian decision makers or not, in their study. In other words, the question is 
whether we have the right to assume that a worker goes through the following 
procedure in choosing a job that involves risk. When workers accept jobs whose 
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risks are not fully understood, learn about these risks based on their on-the-job 
experiences, and then quit if these experiences are sufficiently unfavorable given the 
wage for the job. Thus, the worker gives an adaptive response. 
 
The researchers investigate a simplier assumption. Can we state that workers do a 
minimal effort to revise their reservation wage rates according to the changed 
perceived risk on the job? It is important to emphasize that it is a basic question 
concerning the validity of the compensating wage differential researches. 
 
The results of the survey research among workers in chemical industry service a 
reason for optimism for researchers using this method. The assumption was 
confirmed that after a period of imperfect risk perception most of the workers revise 
their past decisions and – according to the adaptive model – try to enforce the new 
perceived risk in their wage rate if needed and in case of failure quit the company. 
 
IV.2.4. Calculations by perceived risk 
 
D. Gegax, S. Gerking and W. Schulze [1991] broke the ’tradition’ when they obtained 
the risk data from a postal survey instead of an existing database. Though these 
surveys also have their own restrictions and disadvantages, it is unquestionable that 
this method is more adequate to scan the perceived risks than purely displacing them 
by the objective measures from data of the occupation or industry.53 
 
The other novelty of the research is that they ran the regression analysis for different 
categories of workers and gained surprising results. The two dimensions in selection 
of the categories was the white collar – blue collar axis and the labour union 
membership. They found the coefficient of the risk variable significant in the group 
of blue collar workers (with a value of 1,18 million dollars for the statistical life) and 
in the group of union members (the VSL was 1,58 million dollars among them), but 
not in the two supplemental categories. When they applied the two dimensions at the 
                                              
53 Of course the result of the research of Viscusi and O’Connor [1984] was known by the authors, 
however, in this latter research only the risks of illnesses and injuries were tested, but in the study of 
Gegax et al. the risk measure is the perceived probability of fatal accidents. The authors don’t feel 
the optimistic statements of Viscusi and O’Connor automatically generalisable. 
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same time, only among the union member blue collar workers showed the risk 
coefficient significancy, resulting a 2,1 million dollars value for a statistical life. 
 
These results highlight – as a possible explanation – the role of unions in securing a 
compensating wage differential for fatal accident risks common in the empirical 
literature (see e. g. Marin-Psacharopoulos [1982]). However, the causality is not 
proved. The trio claimed for instance that the mean level of risk in the subsample of 
the union members was considerably higher than among non-union members. That 
can also cause differences in the results. 
 
The fact that certain risk coefficients did not differ from zero significantly (and thus 
resulting a zero or very low VSL) probably comes from the deficiency of the method 
rather than the fact that these groups of workers really do not enforce the level of risk 
in their wage rate, or what is even more absurd, do not evalute their life ’so much’. 
(This statement seems to be valid despite the fact that among white collar workers – 
and the non-union members are tipically from this group – the received risk measure 
was almost zero.) 
 
IV.2.5. Wage-risk inequilibrium 
 
The basic theory of compensating wage differentials suggests that the WTP of the 
individuals for risk reduction is equal to the marginal cost of risk reduction at the 
equilibrium level of risk. H. W. Herzog and A. M. Schlottmann [1990] showed that 
this is not the case within the manufacturing sector where the willingness-to-pay 
values exceed the marginal cost of risk reduction. The reasons for that are imperfect 
information, ineffective bargaining, and transactions costs. 
 
The results of the research indicate that additional investment within manufacturing 
to reduce workplace hazards would likely increase social welfare, because workers 
are willing to forgo a part of their wages with higher present value in exchange for a 
risk reduction than the cost of the achievement for the firm would be. 
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In addition, the authors state that the VLS estimates derived from hedonic equations 
assuming the above equilibrium are likely to be downward biased by perhaps more 
than 50 per cent. 
 
IV.2.6. The value of life expectancy 
 
Studies at the end of the 1980s investigated the value of human life from a ’more 
economic’ viewpoint than before. Namely, they considered human life as an 
existence in a certain time interval (or in an interval of certain number of years) 
instead of a unit entity. As a result, the risk of death cannot be described as a variable 
with two discrete outcomes, instead, it is a factor in the discount rate of the 
decreasing value of life years of a life which considered as a variable of life 
expectancy. 
 
The previous studies used a single-period model when searched for the compensation 
for the work-related risk in the wage rate. S. Rosen, W. K. Viscusi, M. J. Moore 
(Rosen [1988], Viscusi-Moore [1989], Moore-Viscusi [1990]) and others thought, 
that it was more reasonable to take into account the loss in the duration of life, thus 
to consider risk as a continuously existing danger. Individuals in these models face a 
multi-periodical problem. The sooner the unexpected deaths happens, the larger the 
loss for himself and his family and relatives is. 
 
The researchers used different models to analyse the problem. One of the most 
simpliest is when the standard hedonic wage equation of 
 
Wage = α + ß’X + γ×(Death Risk) + ε 
 
is replaced by the following formula: 
 
Wage = α + ß’X + γ×(Discounted Expected Life Years Lost) + ε, 
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where α is a constant, γ is the investigated coefficient, ß’ is a coefficient vector, X is 
a variable vector of job and worker attributes and ε  is a random error term. 
 
There were also attempts to analyze how the value of a change in the survival 
probability varies with the age of the individual. For instance, Per-Olov Johansson 
[1996] pointed out that when people determine the ’utility’ of their remaining years 
in terms of discounted value of their consumption and health (’health capital’), the 
marginal rate of time preference is the dominant factor in the applied discount rate 
for young people, while the conditional death probability is the central factor for old 
people. 
 
A common feature of the models is the assumption that the value of a young person’s 
life is ceteris paribus larger than that of an old person. While the calculations are 
built on this assumption, the results become valid and applicable in public policy 
decisions only if we accept this assumption. This is not easy from moral point of 
view. The question is whether public decision makers declare the ’more years – more 
value’ principle when they apply the results coming from this assumption or not. 
Another question is whether they have the ’right’ to do this or not. Also a 
consequence of this principle is that in case of evaluating public programs, the 
expected saved lifetime and its distribution can be considered as benefit, i. e. not the 
expected number of saved lives. From this point the value of a program that saves 
mainly young people (e. g. building safety equipment along motorways) will differ 
from the one that saves the same number of old people (e. g. a health care program). 
Clarifying all these questions cannot be the task of economists alone. 
 
IV.3. The contingent valuation method 
 
IV.3.1. Description of the method 
 
There is a huge disadvantage with labour market approach – despite the 
mathematical clearness of the regression model, it is not sure whether it can 
adequately describe reality. The cause and effect relationships are also questionable. 
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The method that we will discuss in the following subchapter is able to solve these 
problems. However, at the same time it brings up new difficulties. 
 
Contingent valuation is a kind of survey approach, at least technically a 
questionnaire is used. The basis of the ‘real’ survey method is that interviewers do 
not give information to the interviewees, they only want to know how the 
interviewees react to the questions based on information available at the time of 
questioning. On the other hand, the contingent valuation method combines this with 
features characteristic to the method of trying to make decisions mainly by 
information flow in both directions (Csontos-Kornai-Tóth [1996], p. 9). 
 
The point is that the interviewers set up certain hypothetic market or other decision 
situations for the interviewees, who have to decide: how much they would be willing 
to pay (or how much compensation they would be willing to accept) for a (generally 
very small level of) decrease (or increase) of physical risk. For example, how much 
money they would be willing to pay to travel to Greece by a bus that is provably 
safer. In theory, the value of statistical human life can be easily specified from the 
answers. 
 
However, in practice, we have to consider all the problems related to the survey 
method on one hand, and the characteristics of the specific subject on the other hand. 
It would take long even to list them; however, two limits are most often mentioned. 
 
One of them is the result of the hypothetic nature of the situation: there is simply no 
guarantee that the interviewees’ answers reflect reality. This is true even if the 
respondents are helpful and try to be honest – we simply do not know whether they 
would really behave that way in real situations (Fisher-Chestnut-Violette [1989], p. 
94). We are not interested in what they say but rather in how they would act. 
However, we can only measure the former with this method. 
 
The other main problem originates from the fact that most people are simply unable 
to adequately understand and comprehend the concept of probability. As a result they 
are unable to adequately calculate the – mainly small – probability values in their 
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decisions (Viscusi [1993], p. 1942).54 That is why it is so hard to prepare such 
questionnaires and carry out such surveys. 
 
This method is described through the most important studies, too. 
 
IV.3.2. The techniques of questioning 
 
There are three main techniques in CV, these are the followings: 
 
a) Direct method. In this case the respondents face a question that directly asks, for 
instance, how much money they would require to accept a given risk increase. A 
variant of this is to proceed in iterative fashion. Rather than seeking a response to 
an open-ended question, the willingness-to-pay value may be adjusted until the 
respondent indicates indifference. 
b) Pairwise comparison. Respondents are asked to compare two two-dimensional 
(wage, risk) situation. (E. g. to compare Job A characterised by 50.000 forints net 
wage and 5/100.000 fatal risk with Job B characterised by 55.000 forints net 
wage and 10/100.000 fatal risk.) Subjects could indicate their preferences 
between these two situations, and the packages could be manipulated until 
indifference is achieved. 
c) Method of lotteries. In this case we try to ascertain the equilibrium probability, p, 
that establishes indifference between a given positive thing and a lottery on life 
and death, where the probability of death is p, and thus the probability of life is 
(1-p). If we consider the utility of death zero than the utility (i. e. the value) of 
life is equal to the utility of the given negative thing multiplied by 1/p. 
 
There is no priority among the three techniques, none of them is preferred in theory. 
However, the most often applied technique is the pairwise comparison or a similar 
iterative method. 
 
                                              
54 Human mentality cannot, for example, include the difference between 0.006% and 0.01% into the 
decision system. 
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IV.3.3. Limitations of the CV method 
 
M. Hammerton, M. W. Jones-Lee and V. Abbott [1982] attempt to conduct a 
feasibility study to establish many features of the CV method.55 The present 
dissertation doesn’t give an opportunity to describe the interesting study in details, 
the most important statements are as follows. 
 
1) People would generally be both willing and able to answer the kinds of questions 
that it would be necessary to ask. 
2) People would not systematically mispresent their ’true’ preferences in answering 
questions concerning their attitudes to death or injury. 
3) 90 per cent of the respondents showed conformity with the standard axioms of 
choice under uncertainty that form the basis for the expected utility theory.56 
4) Answers by the respondents seemed surprisingly stable.57 
5) The aswers for different kind of questions did not always show consistency. 
However, according to the researchers, the level of this inconsistency did not 
service reason for giving up the method. 
6) People seem to be rather bad at perceiving relatively unfamiliar activities in 
terms of risk, they are much better on everyday activities such as transport. 
Another conclusion is that there is a wide dispersion in assessments of ratios of 
riskiness, but the average subjective assessments are of a broadly similar order of 
magnitude to the objective ratio. 
 
IV.3.4. Early contingent valuation researches 
 
It was the mid-70s when CV method was first applied for determining the VSL.58 It 
is quite difficult to access these studies, however, we don’t have too many reasons to 
                                              
55 It was only a secondary goal to give an estimate to the VSL. 
56 It is often referred to as coherence. 
57 It is often referred to as reliability. 
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deal with them in details, because due to the beginning status of the method, they 
suffer in teething troubles. 
 
According to the critique of A. Fisher, L. G. Chestnut and D. M. Violette, the samples 
tended to be nonrandom or too small for providing estimates applicable in public 
policy questions (Fisher-Chestnut-Violette [1989], p. 94). For instance, J. P. Acton 
[1973] used samples of 36 and 21 individuals, S. J. Melinek et al [1973] had a sample 
of 836, but appears to be self-selected and non-random. Other limitations were that 
the scenarios and payment mechanisms were not well defined, the change in risk 
being valued was not presented clearly, and there was little checking for ’problem’ 
bids or inconsistency across bids. Researchers generally did not emloy interviewers. 
 
Despite the methodological weaknesses it is worth mentioning what results these 
investigations gained. In the questions of Acton two different expected reductions in 
mortality were considered, namely the expected saving of 10 and 20 leves 
respectively in a community of 10.000 people. Acton varied the situation accross 
questions. The different questions resulted different implicit VSL, but generally at a 
lower level than in case of revealed preferences studies. The minimal result was 
7.400 dollars, the maximum was 47.000 dollars in 1970 prices. Melinek et al 
measured the WTP values for a smoke detector that reduces the risk of death to a 
known, and informed extent and for a hypothetical ’safe’ kind of cigarette. Responds 
for the first question implied a VSL of 55.000 English pounds and for the second 
question 17.200 pounds in 1972 prices. 
 
IV.3.5. The most important CV research 
 
In 1982 perhaps the most sophisticated and comprehensive research was conducted 
in the United Kingdom. The three-stage stratified random sample was drawn from 93 
parliamentary constituencies in England, Scotland and Wales and produced 1103 full 
and 47 partial interviews. The study of M. W. Jones-Lee and his colleagues was 
                                                                                                                                
58 For a good summary, see Jones-Lee [1989], pp. 74-88. 
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commissioned by the UK Department of Transport.59 The study was designed to shed 
light on a range of issues concerning individul perception and valuatuion of transport 
safety and thus to determine the value of a statistical human life and also the value of 
health. 
 
The 60-page questionnaire, which took on average 45 minutes to complete with the 
help of professional interviewers, contained 37 questions that fall into three broad 
categories: 
 
a) Valuation questions. They intended to provide estimates of relevant marginal 
rates of risk-money substitution and the relative valuation of fatal and non-fatal 
accidents among others. Respondents had to evaluate not only the risk 
concerning themselves but also risks concerning other people (e. g. relatives and 
friends). Questions were made about private and public goods, too. 
b) Perception/consistency questions. They intended to test the quality of individual 
perceptions of transport risks, the ability to handle probability concepts, the 
veracity and stability of valuation responses, and finally the conformity with the 
standard axioms of rational choice under uncertainty. 
c) Factual and other questions. They intended to ask important facts and 
demographic parameters for the research, such as vehicle ownership, annual 
mileage and age, income etc. 
 
In order to test the temporal stability of responses, a follow-up survey with a 
selection of the original questions was also conducted about a month after the main 
survey on a subsample of 210 respondents. 
 
From our viewpoint the most important questions and answers are those that 
measured the WTP values for (1) a safety equipment which reduces the risk of death 
by a certain amount and (2) the increase of the safety of a bus with which a foreign 
                                              
59 See the summary about the research in: Jones-Lee et al. [1985] and Jones-Lee [1989], Chapter 4. 
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trip is made. The level of risk was always measured by the number of saved lives out 
of 100.000 people due to the construction.60 
 
The main findings of the research are as folllows. 
 
a) A substantial majority of respondents were willing and able to provide answers to 
the various questions. 
b) While a part of the respondents gave apparently inconsistent answers to a few 
questions, and had difficulties with the concepts involved, it was the researchers’ 
opinion that the quality of perception of transport risks, the ability to process 
probability information and the veracity of responses were sufficient to justify the 
inference of at least broad orders of magnitude of the VSL for transport risks. 
c) Leaving out the ’suspicious’ responses, the VSL by mean responses – which is 
supported by the theory – ranged from 1,2 to 2,2 million 1982 English pounds, 
while values based on median responses ranged from 0,5 to 1,2 million pounds. 
d) The regression analysis showed that the valuation of safety is significantly 
affected by income and age. In the regression equation with the dependent 
variable of marginal rate of substition of wealth for risk of death the coefficient 
of the linear income variable implied an income elasticity of about 0,3, that can 
be considered quite high. 
e) The value of avoiding a serious injury was at least one-hundredth of the VSL. 
 
Finally, Jones-Lee, Hammerton and Philips compared their results to that of Marin 
and Psacharopoulos [1982], which was conducted also in the UK, but applied the 
labour market approach. They consider the highly similar estimates very powerful 
evidence in favor of the credibility of these estimates, and that the majority of people 
would tend to be more or less equally averse to the prospect of dying in a transport 
accident or in an accident at work. 
 
                                              
60 In order to help the respondents in perceiving the level of risk, all probability statements were 
supplemented by a pictoral representation in which the appropriate number of squares had been 
blacked out on a piece of graph paper containing 100.000 squares. 
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IV.3.6. A comparison of the hedonic price and the contingent valuation 
method 
 
D. S. Brookshire, M. A. Thayer, W. D. Schulze and R. C. d’Arge [1982] attempts to 
compare the most common methods of evaluating public goods, the hedonic price 
method and the contingent valuation. According to the authors the results of the latter 
method apears to be internally consistent, but the external validity is still 
questionable. They thought that this external validity was ’receivable’ by conducting 
two parallel researches for the same problem applying the two approaches and 
gaining consistent results with the theoretical considerations. 
 
The authors investigated the behaviour of hundreds of households in Los Angeles in 
two ways. On one hand, they searched for the rent differential paid by households for 
cleaner air at their homes (hedonic approach). On the other hand, households were 
asked to provide their willingness to pay for an improvement in air quality at their 
current location (CV approach). 
 
The quartette proves in the study that the results coming from the hedonic method 
have to be greater than that of CV method.61 For the empirical research they build up 
two hypotheses: 
 
1) Results of hedonic approach exceed the similar results of survey approach. 
2) Results coming from the survey method are also greater than zero. 
 
The empirical results did not allow the rejection of either of the two hypotheses, 
thereby providing evidence towards the validity of survey methods as a means of 
determining the value of public goods,62 so it is recommended to use this method in 
                                              
61 On the basis of the researches described in the study, the results of the contingent valuation method 
might be biased downward by 55 to 67 percent (Brookshire-Thayer-Schulze-d’Arge [1982], p. 175). 
62 Perhaps it is not necessary to add that one has to be cautious in generalization of this statement. The 
speciality of the research, the understandability and perceptibility of the air pollution problem and 
other factors all put us on guard in the question of extensibility. 
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every case where no well-developed hedonic market exists, thus hedonic price 
method cannot work. 
 
IV.4. Empirical results of the most important researches 
 
After this short overview on how the literature of economics deals with the value of 
human life, let us take a look at the empiric results of the more significant researches 
(see Appendix 1). It can be seen that these were conducted mainly in the United 
States and the United Kingdom during the last few decades. The variation in the 
numerical results is quite extensive, however, leading economists agree that the 
best estimates for the value of a statistical life are between two and four million 
dollars. 
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V. HYPOTHESES, CONCEPTUALIZATION, OPERACIONALIZATION 
 
V.1. Hypotheses of the research 
 
In our case, building up classic research hypotheses is not the most important task, 
since the research, due to its nature, aims at examining quantity relations rather than 
the existence of these relations and the truthfulness of certain statements. 
 
Basic question 
What is the value of a statistical human life in Hungary? 
 
I attempt to answer this question with the help of both methodological approaches I 
use. It is the most important goal of my research to calculate a numerical value. 
Since Hungarian incomes and wealth circumstances are significantly different from 
American and British (and presumably there are significant differences between the 
preference-map of the people as well), it is not worthwhile to make preliminary 
guesses in connection with the value of Hungarian human life. Thus, I do not intend 
to build up a hypothesis concerning this. 
 
The basic hypothesis of the labour market approach can be formulated in the 
following section. 
 
Hypothesis 1 
The riskiness of work performed by the employees influences the level of the wage. 
The direction of this connection is positive: more risk means ceteris paribus higher 
wages. 
 
We have to examine this hypothesis if we want to know whether in Hungary it is 
possible to measure the value of statistical human life through analysing wages and 
whether the necessary mechanisms are operational. If we have to discard the 
hypothesis, then this method cannot be used in Hungary. If we find the hypothesis 
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true, then the method can be used. In that case, however, it still has to be examined to 
see whether the numerical figures really indicate what we expect them to indicate. 
 
Therefore, in connection with the regression model that will be build up later on, we 
have to subject the facts to a statistical test. This will determine whether the 
coefficient that belongs to the explanatory variable, which includes risk, significantly 
differs from zero and whether its sign is positive. 
 
Nevertheless, proving the basic hypothesis is not the most important, although it 
would be reassuring from the point of view of the usability of the method. 
 
The other direction of the empirical work, the contingent valuation approach, gives 
us wider possibilities for hypothesis testing and opportunity to clarify (or at least to 
make statements based upon empirical data) those questions that arise in the 
international theoretical debates.63 
 
Hypothesis 2 
The value of a statistical life exceeds the value of an anonymous life. 
 
If the empirical results justify this hypothesis, then this will weaken the 
considerations of Broome we described in Chapter III. Because it is possible that we 
make a failure in determining the VSL in a way that some branches (with Broome on 
the first place) of theory refuse. However, in connection with principles reaching 
entire consensus is almost impossible in this ’swampy’ field of economics. If we 
show that the VLS is larger than the value of an anonymous life, from this point, 
Broome and his followers should have the opinion that valuing the statistical human 
life results too large estimates. It would be obviously against their purposes. 
 
                                              
63 Because of the above mentioned fact that I did have opportunity only to make researches on small 
and not representative samples, thus the test of the following hypotheses are only prepared here, the 
large sample survey will give opportunity for the real and valid investigation. 
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On the other hand, discarding the hypothesis would leave the dilemma open, in 
which the arguments of Broome would grow stronger, and the arguments of Mishan 
would become weaker. 
 
Hypothesis 3 
People are indifferent about the same level of workplace and transport risks that 
threaten their life. 
 
With testing this hypothesis, in fact the validity of the methodology in which the 
value of life comes from the evaluation of the change in risk is tested in some way. If 
we have to reject the hypothesis, it means that the kind of risk affects the evaluation 
of the ceteris paribus change in the level of it. If it’s true then the WTP for change in 
risk measures (and thus the VSL measures) will depend on the kind of the risk. 
However, the value of life should obviously be independent from the method we use 
to determine it. Thus, rejecting the hypothesis means rejecting the method, too. 
 
If we find the hypothesis true, we will have the possibility to choose from different 
type of risks in our researches.64 
 
Hypothesis 4 
The level of WTP for risk depends on the absolute level of risk. 
 
With this hypothesis we test the statement of Jones-Lee [1976], that the marginal rate 
of WTP is not a constant, rather a growing function of risk. If the statistical tests with 
the empirical data support the acception of the hypothesis as true, then the validity of 
the concept of statistical human life will suffer damage, because in this case there 
isn’t a robust value for a statistical life in the preferences of the people, rather, this 
value depends on the chosen level of risk in the research. 
 
                                              
64 Of course the ’methodological indefference’ between the different kinds of risk can only be stated 
in case of that particular kinds that we use in the test. 
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If the rejection of the hypothesis is possible, then we will have the right to say that 
the level of risk in the research does not have an effect on the received value of 
statistical human life. 
 
V.2. Conceptualization and operationalization of the key concepts 
 
In this subchapter the conceptualization and – if needed – the operationalization of 
the key concepts of the field comes. 
 
Risk 
We define any risks that endanger human life as a mathematical probability of losing 
life (i.e. the occurrence of death). 
 
Identifiable human life 
The identifiable human being is a person, who exists or existed and can be well-
identified in the present, such as the writer of the present study. We do not aim to 
specify the value of such human life, the philosophical considerations and economic 
logic that we follow do not allow it either. Therefore, it is clearly out of the question 
to deal with the value of an identifiable human life in any way. 
 
Statistical human life 
A statistical human being is a fictive human being who does not exist, never existed 
nor will exist (as opposed to the anonymous human beings!). It is only a sum of 
probabilities. A statistical human life can only be interpreted in a given population, 
or group of human beings. Its concept is closely tied to the concept of death: when 
the sum of the possibilities of death that endanger each member of the population 
independently (within a given time interval) is equal to one, then it is equal to one 
statistical human life. 
 
This is easier to understand through an example. If in a given year a piece of safety 
equipment decreases the probability of death for every member of a population of 
1,000 individuals from two per thousand to one per thousand (i.e. by one 
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thousandth), then we can say that the safety equipment saved one statistical human 
life during the year under review (since 1000×(1/1000)=1). In other words: the 
expected number of the saved lives is equal to one. 
 
Value of a statistical human life 
We never deal with statistical human lives by themselves. The value of statistical 
human life is much more important for us. This value is equal to the amount of 
money that all the members exposed to life-threatening risks are willing to pay to 
decrease the possibilities of death that endanger all members individually, by a little 
for each member and altogether by one (WTP approach). From the other viewpoint: 
the value of statistical human life is equal to the amount of compensation that all the 
members exposed to life-threatening risks are willing to accept to increase the 
possibilities of death that endanger all members individually, by a little for each 
member and altogether by one (WTA approach). 
 
By using the previous example: if, for the sake of simplicity, all the 1,000 people are 
willing to pay 10,000 Hungarian forints towards the safety equipment (i.e. to 
decrease the risk by one thousandth), then the value of the statistical human life is 
1,00010,000=10,000,000 forints in this population. 
 
Anonymous human life 
As opposed to the statistical human life, the anonymous human life is not a fictive 
life, but an existing or existed person who – only because of the time factor – cannot 
be identified; however, in the future he can be identified. Basically, it is a probability 
variable in a mathematical sense which, due to its nature, a priori does not receive a 
concrete value, but only a posteriori. 
 
In our example, the safety equipment saves an anonymous human life if without the 
equipment exactly one person, whose identity we do not know yet, would die in the 
given year. 
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Value of an anonymous human life 
The value of an anonymous human life is similar to the value of a statistical human 
life, with the exception that now the members of the population must evaluate the life 
of exactly one person (whose identity is not known yet). In other words, its value is 
equal to the aggregation of the money that the members of a population are willing to 
pay to avoid the one occurrence of death that endangers everybody at an equally low 
level, nevertheless, that would surely happen. From the other viewpoint: the value of 
anonymous human life is equal to the amount of compensation that all the members 
exposed to life-threatening risks are willing to accept to bring about the one 
occurrence of death that endangers everybody at an equally low level, nevertheless, 
that will surely happen (WTA approach). 
 
It is important to emphasise again that the present study only examines the value of 
statistical human life. It is still important to emphasise that, although it follows from 
the concept’s definition, the only things considered are the risk of losing life and the 
subsequent evaluation. The life to be evaluated, therefore, is an ‘exist/not exist’ two-
value variable. The parameters concerning quality of life are not included in our 
calculations (such as health, general condition and happiness or a useful or useless 
role in the society). The reason for this is not because they are unimportant.65 The 
concept of the value of a statistical human life, which has been developed in 
economic theory and is based on consensus, cannot and does not want to include 
these types of parameters into its system of thought and calculation. 
 
However, we cannot claim that this consensus is incontestable. On the contrary: 
exactly because of the sensitivity of the issue, it is easy to contest it upon good 
grounds, and this is often done. We discussed some of these contests and critiques 
above. 
 
In my thesis I do not intend to take sides in these debates. Or to be more accurate, I 
take sides only by accepting the methodology recommended by the developed 
consensus, and I will make our calculations accordingly. I believe that even 
                                              
65 A number of economic schools study calculations where the evaluation of the quality of life is at 
their focus. 
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calculations that use methods based on unsure and assailable principles provide 
valuable and usable results for decision makers who want to spend public fund 
efficiently.66 
 
                                              
66 Let us just imagine where the economic would have developed by now along with the micro and 
macro economies that are based on it if this discipline had only been built on ‘incontestable’ 
principles and methods during its hundred-year history. 
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VI. EMPIRICAL RESEARCHES CONDUCTED IN HUNGARY 
 
VI.1. The research based on hedonic price approach67 
 
The following research was conducted in 1999, using the labour market approach in 
this issue for the first time in Hungary to my knowledge. 
 
VI.1.1. Databases used in the research 
 
Most of the data used for the regression calculation originates from the 1998 TÁRKI 
Household Monitor survey.68 After adequate selections69 I received a sample of 
1,287 elements, which was weighed according to Mikrocenzus ’96. This represented 
the full-time employed adult population in March 1998. 
 
There are two reasons why I chose this sample for my examination. First, this sphere 
of society is made up of taxpayers, and the majority of state income originates from 
their work. That is why it is recommended to judge the use of public money based on 
their preferences.70 Second, our method requires information on the sectors where the 
individuals in the sample worked (in order to specify the risk level that can be 
assigned to the jobs), and also their wages. These two pieces of information were 
available exactly in this sample. 
 
                                              
67 See the following publications about the research: Adorján [2001] and Adorján [2002]. 
68 Source: TÁRKI Adatbank. 1999. ‘TÁRKI Háztartás Monitor 1998 adatbázis.’ (1.0A. CD-ROM 
version) Budapest: Társadalomkutatási Informatikai Egyesülés. 
69 I carried out the selection in four steps. First, I separated those who answered the personal 
questionnaires (3,827 records remained), then I separated those who were working on May 31, 1998 
(1,504). Eventually, I left those people in the sample who worked full-time in March 1998 (1,303), 
and those whose sector could be clearly specified (1,287). The latter selection was necessary for 
practical reason. I believe that its distortion effect on my examination is negligible. 
70 This statement is contestable. The issue of standing, i. e. whose and which preferences count in an 
analysis is one of the most important theoretical problems in CBA. Here I do not want to go into 
details. 
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Almost all variables included in the model come from the Monitor research: I 
obtained them by modifying their variables to a greater or lesser degree. The only 
exception is the variable of workplace risk, which has a key importance in our 
analysis: I specified it from other sources with the help of data collected and 
recorded by the Central Statistical Office (KSH), the Hungarian Labour Inspectorate 
(OMMF) and the Hungarian Mining Office (MBH).71 
 
VI.1.2. The independent variables 
 
As I have mentioned, a number of researchers in Anglo-Saxon countries have carried 
out calculations similar to ours during the last few decades. Table 2 shows the most 
common explanatory variables. 
 
                                              
71 Data like the number of employees and the number of accidents are needed for specifying the risk 
indicator (see later in detail). The source of the former is KSH. (For years 1994-1996: 
Foglalkoztatottság és kereseti arányok 1996-1997 (Munkaügyi adattár), KSH, Budapest, 1998, p. 
20; for years 1997-1998: Időszaki Tájékoztató: Főbb Munkaügyi Folyamatok 1998. I-IV. negyedév, 
KSH, 1999. március, p. 18) The sources of the latter are such statistics and reports of OMMF and 
MBH that are not available in publications. I hereby would like to thank Károlyné Tokaji and István 
Harcsa (KSH), Sándor Galló (OMMF) and György Lukuca (MBH), who provided great help in 
data collecting. 
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Table 2. Explanatory variables that were included in most cases. 72 
 
Explanatory variable Number of cases 
Education 16 
Union membership 15 
Race 12 
Job category 11 
Age 10 
Gender 10 
Time spent working 10 
Marital status 10 
Region 9 
Health problem, existence of handicap 8 
Time spent in the particular workplace 6 
Number of staff in the workplace 5 
Number of children 4 
Participation in work training/course 4 
Educationeducation 4 
City - country 4 
 
Source: The compilation is based on the following researches: Arnould-Nichols [1983], Brown [1980], 
Dillingham [1985], Garen [1988], Gegax-Gerking-Schulze [1991], Herzog-Schlottmann [1990], 
Leigh [1987], Marin-Psacharopoulos [1982], Moore-Viscusi [1988a], Moore-Viscusi [1988b], 
Moore-Viscusi [1990], Olson [1981], Sandy-Elliott [1996], Smith [1983], Thaler-Rosen [1976], 
Viscusi [1979]. 
 
It can be seen that some of the variables are demographic parameters, others are 
connected to the job, workplace or economic sector. Union membership as an 
explanatory variable is almost always included in surveys. Currently in Hungary this 
is pointless. In fact, according to Sandy-Elliott [1996], it is pointless in other 
researches as well, because unions usually lobby for decreasing risks and not ex ante 
compensation for increased risk. 
 
In addition to the variables listed, there are about fifty other variables in the studies. 
Some of these variables in the explanation of the income level are unusual (e.g. the 
desirability level of the profession in Marin-Psacharopoulos [1982]). It is also 
common to include, as a new variable, the multiplication (e.g. education×age or 
                                              
72 Table 2 contains only those variables that can be found in at least 4 out of the 16 researches in a 
similar way. The risk variable is part of every model, of course. 
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gender×marital status) of certain variables or their square (e.g. education2, staff 
number2, age2). 
 
In addition to traditions, the limitations on possible explanatory variables were, of 
course, the bundle of data of the Monitor study. The widest model contains the 
following independent variables:73 
 
HALKOCK = Risk of mortal work accident in the given sector, in (1/million)/month 
(see later in more detail). 
BALKOCK = Risk of work accident in the given sector, in (1/million)/month (see 
later in more detail). 
VAROS = Is your residence in a city, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
BUDAPEST = Is your residence in Budapest, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
DUNANTUL = Is your residence in Transdanubia, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
HAZAS = Are you married, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
NEM = Gender, dual value (1=man, 0=woman). 
KOR = Age in years. 
ISKOLA = Education expressed by the number of years up to the highest education 
level. 
GYERMEK = Number of household members under 18 years of age. 
IDNYELV = Do you speak any foreign languages, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
BETEGSEG = Do you regularly take pills because of an illness, dual value (1=yes, 
0=no). 
MELLEK = Do you have a supplementary job, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
MEZOGAZD = Does your workplace belong to the agricultural sector, dual value 
(1=yes, 0=no). 
IPAR = Does your workplace belong to the industrial sector, dual value (1=yes, 
0=no). 
ONALLO = Are you independent or an entrepreneur, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
VEZSZELL = Are you a white collar worker, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
                                              
73 Appendix 2. contains the descriptive statistics of the variables. The variables were operationalized 
based on the answer options to be given to the questions of the original study. Since they were 
mainly closed questions; thus, the operationalization was unambiguous every case. 
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CEGMERET = How many people work in your company, dual value (1=10 or more, 
0=less). 
ALLAMTUL = Is your company state or municipality-owned, dual value (1=yes, 
partially or fully, 0=no). 
MAGYTUL = Is your company fully Hungarian, dual value (1=yes, 0=no, partially or 
fully foreign). 
KIEGJUT = Did you received at least one of the following from your company 
during the last 12 months: life insurance, retirement insurance, official car, 
car maintenance refund, gas money, shopping or transport discount, 
workplace healthcare or discount holiday possibility (1=yes, 0=no). 
MAGYAR = Which ethnic group do you consider yourself part of, dual value 
(1=Hungarian, 0=other). 
CIGANY = Which ethnic group do you consider yourself part of, dual value 
(1=gypsy, 0=other). 
UJSAGOLV = Do you regularly read newspapers, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
KONYVOLV = Do you regularly read books, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
SZINHAZ = Did you go to the theatre during the last twelve months, dual value 
(1=yes, 0=no). 
HANGVERS = Did you attend a concert during the last twelve months, dual value 
(1=yes, 0=no). 
MUZEUM = Did you visit a museum during the last twelve months, dual value 
(1=yes, 0=no). 
SPORT = Do you play a sport, dual value (1=yes, 0=no). 
BARATOK = Number of good friends. 
SZELSPOL = Do you consider yourself politically extreme, dual value (1=yes, 
0=no). 
 
Only the last eight variables may require a short explanation. Brown [1980], among 
others, criticized the research in this field for leaving out – in the lack of adequate 
data – a large number of potentially important personal parameters. These are factors 
that are characteristic to the individuals, do not change in time but cannot be included 
in the conventional variables. Low and McPheters [1983] chose a different method to 
achieve the same thing: they examined only city policemen. Because this social 
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group can be considered homogenous in several aspects, they reduced the distortion 
resulting from differences of risk recognition, education and several other 
characteristics. 
 
By including the last eight variables in the list, my goal was to decrease the 
distortions due to personal differences and also to control this in some way in the 
regression formula. The assumptions behind it include that, for example, the reading 
habit of a person is a good indication for an internal characteristic that can help the 
explanation of income although it is not covered by the other variables. Of course 
cause-effect relations are not unambiguous, but I still consider it better to ‘try’ the 
variables in the first round. 
 
VI.1.3. Risk variables 
 
The risk in connection with a concrete job (which can be described from our point of 
view by the workplace and the work to be carried out there) appears in two 
dimensions.74 It endangers the worker’s life and his health. From the point of view of 
evaluating statistical human life, only the first type of risk is relevant; however, the 
second type of risk can also influence the amount of income, which is why it is 
recommended to also include among the explanatory variables. 
 
We described life-threatening risk with the HALKOCK variable. We created its value 
as follows: every year, OMMF sums up the number of deadly work accidents broken 
down by sector, based on the current publication of the head of KSH.75 The ratio of 
this value and the average annual number of the employees in the given sector (this 
data is published by KSH) can define the level of a certain kind of ex post life-
threatening risk for the given year. This, of course, changes every year; it is therefore 
recommended to use an average value. Because the Monitor study was conducted in 
1998, I used the average value of the data of the previous five years (1993-1997). I 
calculated the monthly risk for one million people, because we would like to know 
                                              
74 Risks such as the danger of losing a job are not applicable here, even if it is obvious that the 
possible knowledge of data like this would improve our regression model considerably. 
75 The only exception is mining: the accident statistics are from MBH. 
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the effect of risk on monthly income. Therefore, the HALKOCK variable indicates 
the average monthly number of people who died due to work accidents during the 
five years, out of one million people. I consider this risk level to be the basis of 
financial compensation in the regression calculation. 
 
I defined the BALKOCK variable very similarly for the risk of work injuries. The 
only difference is that the numerator of the ratio is not the number of deadly 
accidents, but the number of all work accidents. Here I would like to note that 
measuring risk is, without doubt, the most critical point of the method. We will 
describe this in detail in the section that deals with the sources of the problems.76 
 
VI.1.4. The dependent variable 
 
The aim of our research is to specify the marginal money-risk exchange; therefore, 
the dependent variable must be some kind of income data that is logically in a cause–
effect relationship value with the level of workplace risk. That is why I did not deem 
it advisable to use the monthly net total incomes from the Monitor survey. Income 
from full-time jobs seemed to be more appropriate for our goal. However, it is 
questionable whether things like bonuses, remunerations, 13th month wages, profit 
sharing, profit from enterprises, dividend and shares should be included in this value. 
On one hand, these elements are unsure, i.e. they cannot be considered steady 
income. On the other hand, in most cases they can be well estimated and are ’quasi-
sure’ part of the compensation for the job based on preliminary agreements. 
 
Accordingly, I carried out the calculations in two ways, including the more specific 
income data in the JOVED1 variable, and the wider range of compensation in the 
JOVED2 variable. By following established methodological practices, I ran our 
model using the natural logarithm of the income variable (LNJOVED1 and 
LNJOVED2) as the result variable.77 
                                              
76 Assigning the adequate HALKOCK and BALKOCK values to each element of the sample was not 
without problems. Although there was a variable which contained a sector classification for 
respondents’ workplaces, some of the categories used were not adequately specific. 
77 According to Marin-Psacharopoulos ([1982], p. 833), the use of logarithmic form is theoretically 
more justified. 
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The question might be raised whether net or gross income data should be used. I was 
lucky in this, because literature recommends the use of net data, which was the type 
that was available for us (Moore-Viscusi [1988b], p. 379). 
 
VI.1.5. The results of regression analysis 
 
In the first round I ran the regression model in four forms. Table 3 contains the most 
important results. 
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Table 3. Models of the first round. 
 
 Model 1.1. Model 1.2. Model 1.3. Model 1.4. 
Dependent variable JOVED1 JOVED2 LNJOVED1 LNJOVED2 
Number of explanatory 
variables 
31 31 31 31 
Number of explanatory 
variables that are 
significant on 5%  
8 8 12 14 
Corrected R2 0.196 0.229 0.345 0.374 
Global F-value 11.107 13.268 22.793 25.723 
BALKOCK coefficient 0.426 -0.339 1.871E-05 1.184E-05 
BALKOCK coefficient’s 
standard error 
0.640 0.703 0.000 0.000 
BALKOCK coefficient’s 
significance level  
0.506 0.630 0.059 0.051 
Pearson-correlation of 
BALKOCK with 
dependent variable 
0.030 0.025 0.058 0.050 
Partial correlation of 
BALKOCK with 
dependent variable 
0.019 -0.014 0.053 0.033 
HALKOCK coefficient 138.033 346.492 2.077E-03 3.723E-03 
HALKOCK coefficient’s 
standard error 
121.934 133.963 0.002 0.002 
HALKOCK coefficient’s 
significance level 
0.258 0.010 0.271 0.238 
Pearson-correlation of 
HALKOCK with 
dependent variable 
0.069 0.092 0.078 0.084 
Partial correlation of 
HALKOCK with 
dependent variable 
0.032 0.073 0.031 0.055 
VSL (million HUF) 138.033 346.492 77.99 146.124 
 
 
We can make the following statements: 
 
a) Based on the data from the F-function, we can establish that ‘from a global 
viewpoint’ all four regression functions explain the result variable to a level 
which is significantly different from zero (F0,95(31.1253) ≈ 1.46). 
 84
b) The explanative force of the model that was built with the wider type of income 
variable was stronger (the determining coefficient corrected by the degree of 
freedom was higher). However, in the case of both income variables, the 
logarithmic form is more explanatory. 
c) From the relatively large number of variables, only a few seemed to be 
significant; therefore, it is definitely recommended to further specify our models. 
d) At traditional levels, none of the coefficients that belong to either HALKOCK or 
BALKOCK appeared to be significant. 
e) Since risk is an inferior good (i.e. by increasing the income, the demand for it 
decreases (Jones-Lee [1976], Thaler-Rosen [1976])), it is expected that the value 
of the Pearson-type correlation coefficient between the income and risk is 
negative. The situation with the partial correlation coefficient, where we filter out 
the effect of other factors, is different. In almost all cases it is positive, but quite a 
low level of correlation can be indicated in our models. This is perhaps the most 
surprising result. 
f) The value of a statistical human life is in the range of 78 million to 346 million 
forints in the models. 
 
In the second round, I tried to filter out the non-significant variables with the help of 
backward procedure (using a 5% threshold). This is the next step towards the optimal 
model. Table 4 shows the results. 
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Table 4. Models of the second round. 
 
 Model 2.1. Model 2.2. Model 2.3. Model 2.4. 
Dependent variable JOVED1 JOVED2 LNJOVED1 LNJOVED2 
Number of explanatory 
variables 
11 12 13 14 
Number of explanatory 
variables that are 
significant on 5%  
11 12 13 14 
Corrected R2 0.197 0.227 0.343 0.372 
Global F-value 29.577 32.437 52.650 55.402 
BALKOCK coefficient - - 2.938E-05 - 
BALKOCK coefficient’s 
standard error 
- - 0.000 - 
BALKOCK coefficient’s 
significance level 
- - 0.000 - 
HALKOCK coefficient 236.075 369.320 - 5.978E-03 
HALKOCK coefficient’s 
standard error 
89.827 98.898 - 0.001 
HALKOCK coefficient’s 
significance level 
0.009 0.000 - 0.000 
VSL (million HUF) 236.075 369.320 - 234.896 
 
 
Furthermore, I calculated the Pearson-type correlation coefficient between 
HALKOCK and BALKOCK variables. The result was 0.664; i.e. the two variables 
explain each other’s variance to the extent of 44.1%. (By running regression 
calculations for each, I established that BALKOCK variable, together with the rest of 
the variables, explains HALKOCK variable to the extent of 53.4%, while this value is 
47.4% to the opposite direction.) 
 
Based on the above, the following seems to be true: 
 
a) The considerable correlation of the HALKOCK and BALKOCK variables 
introduces significant multi-collinearity in the model. Therefore, it is 
recommended to use the HALKOCK variable only.78 The results also support this: 
                                              
78 I must note here that according to the comments of Professor David Greenberg on my English 
language study (Adorján [2002]), he did not think the multi-collinearity between the two variables 
all that high that would give serious cause for dropping BALKOCK variable; although he 
understood the reason for that. 
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only one of the two variables was significant in all four models at the same time. 
The value of that variable, however, was much lower than in our original models, 
once the other variable was removed from the model. The reason for this 
phenomenon is that in reality the two variables measure almost the same thing, 
because in each sector the relative fatal and non-fatal risks were very similar. For 
our needs, the HALKOCK variable is much more useful. Nevertheless, we must 
realise that if we leave out the BALKOCK variable, then the compensation gained 
from the coefficient of HALKOCK variable, also includes compensation for non-
fatal risks. This is true even if the level of compensation for non-fatal risk is 
much less (by about two orders of magnitude) than the compensation for fatal 
risk. 
b) The corrected multiple determination coefficients barely decreased, compared to 
the previous models. We can draw the conclusion from this that the explanatory 
force of our models did not decrease when a large number of variables were not 
included. 
c) The value of statistical human life is in the range of 235 to 369 million forints in 
the different models. 
d) This time, the fourth type model, which works with the LNJOVED2 explanatory 
variable, seemed to be optimal; therefore, further on we will only deal with this 
model. 
 
Table 5 indicates the coefficients that relate to the explanatory variables of Model 
2.4., including standard errors and significance levels. Actually, only the coefficient 
that belongs to the HALKOCK variable interests us; the rest of the variables are only 
interesting from the point of view of specifying the best model. 
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Table 5. The explanatory variables of Model 2.4. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard error Level of 
significance 
(Constant) 9.058 0.082 0.000 
ISKOLA 4.825E-02 0.006 0.000 
NEM 0.192 0.025 0.000 
VEZSZELL 0.182 0.032 0.000 
BUDAPEST 0.221 0.033 0.000 
KIEGJUT 0.132 0.024 0.000 
KOR 6.180E-03 0.001 0.000 
CEGMERET 0.199 0.034 0.000 
ONALLO 0.264 0.053 0.000 
UJSAGOLV 0.108 0.025 0.000 
HALKOCK 5.978E-03 0.001 0.000 
MAGYTUL -8.930E-02 0.025 0.000 
GYERMEK 3.102E-02 0.012 0.011 
VAROS 6.132E-02 0.026 0.019 
MUZEUM 5.744E-02 0.028 0.042 
 
As was expected, income was significantly influenced in a positive direction by 
education level, gender, whether white collar worker or not, residence (in Budapest 
or countryside towns) and age. The positive direction of the size of the company, 
independence, and number of children and the negative effect of the company being 
Hungarian were not so obvious. Finally, it is important to see that in the case of a 
positive connection, supplementary allowances and size of income are not in a cause-
and-effect relationship. The reason for this is that we cannot say that wages are 
systematically increased because of the existence of possible additional allowances. 
(In the case of negative connections, we could establish a causal relationship.) 
Therefore, I removed this variable from the model. Some important characteristics of 
Model 3.1. can be found in Table 6. 
 
I tried two other specifications. First I adopted ISKOLA×ISKOLA and KOR×KOR 
variables into the explanatory variables of Model 3.1. (see Model 3.2., Table 6). 
Earlier I referred to the use of such interactions in certain researches. In the 
regression model run by the forward procedure, both variables were significant; 
however, ISKOLA and GYERMEK variables ‘lost’ their significance. Finally, I 
adopted the cross-product of all variables of Model 3.1. – except for the HALKOCK 
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variable – with every variable. These results became the new variables in a model 
that was also run, using forward procedure (see Model 3.3., Table 6). This meant 69 
((12*12)/2-3=69) new variables, because the product of the two-value variables by 
themselves results in the original variable. It is important to draw attention to the fact 
that this should be considered a ’game’ or an ’interesting effort’ rather than a serious, 
methodologically supported initiative. Out of the 82 variables, 24 appeared to be 
significant. Although the multiple corrected determination coefficient indicated the 
highest value in this model, the results should be handled with great care because of 
the ‘uncleanness’ of the model. 
 
Table 6. Models of the third round. 
 
 Model 3.1. Model 3.2. Model 3.3. 
Dependent variable LNJOVED2 LNJOVED2 LNJOVED2 
Number of explanatory 
variables 
13 13 24 
Number of explanatory 
variables that are 
significant on 5% 
13 13 24 
Corrected R2 0.358 0.368 0.404 
Global F-value 56.087 58.477 37.326 
HALKOCK coefficient 6.145E-03 6.399E-03 9.980E-03 
HALKOCK coefficient’s 
standard error 
0.001 0.001 0.005 
HALKOCK coefficient’s 
significance level 
0.000 0.000 0.034 
VSL (million HUF) 241.478 251.492 392.935 
 
 
Based on our calculations, we can establish the following: in 1998 the value of a 
statistical human life in Hungary was, to all probability, between 79 million and 393 
million Hungarian forints. The most reliable values are around 250 million forints. 
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VI.1.6. Limitations of the method, possible sources of errors 
 
I do not intend to cover here those sources of error that are common in regression 
calculations because of the method’s mathematical and statistical characteristics. I 
consider it more important to analyse whether the theoretical model is able to 
describe reality adequately. In this section I will examine the most important 
problems. Of course I do not mention those considerations that I described in 
Chapter IV. 
 
The most common critique is that, in these days, labour market conditions are not 
formed by competition factors; therefore, it cannot be expected that factors like risk 
should appear in wages. If we look at the riskiest jobs (e.g. workers who work in 
high altitudes or miners), we will see that these are not well paid. The highest wages 
are for jobs almost without any risk (e.g. in banks or consulting companies). This 
critique is easy to fend off, since the aim of regression calculation is to filter out the 
effect of other factors that influence the amount of income (these factors are 
responsible for the differences in the income of, for example, a banker and a miner). 
The level of risk is used for explaining only the remaining differences (Marin-
Psacharopoulos [1982]). 
 
One of the important statements Thaler and Rosen [1976] made in their well-known 
study is that jobs with higher risk are usually pursued by people who are willing to 
take more risks. Therefore, the willingness-to-pay value is lower in their case, which 
results in a lower value for human life than in areas with less risk. C. Olson [1981] 
also supported this empirically. This means that the applied sample must be 
representative in terms of job and workplace risk; otherwise the result will be 
distorted. (Thaler and Rosen examined particularly high-risk jobs.) 
 
The problem of which kind of risk data to use first appeared in their study. There are 
two basic possibilities: job or industrial sector data. Moreover, their job-related data 
was prepared in such a way that first the number of statistically expected deaths 
among those who had the given job was calculated. Then this value was deducted 
from the actual death values. The result was the extra number of death that can be 
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attributed to a given job. This method was often criticized (e. g. Viscusi [1979], 
Lipsey [1976]), because the extra risks specified this way are closely related not only 
to the riskiness of a job, but also to the specific characteristics, lifestyle and income 
situations of those who pursue the job.79 
 
A. Dillingham [1985] devoted himself to finding out how the risk variable influences 
the specification of the value of human life. His experience was that the reason for 
the significant differences in VSL found by other researchers can be largely 
attributed to risk definition. Estimations that are based on industrial sector data are 
significantly higher than those based on job-related data. Furthermore, calculations 
based on the additional death proportion specified by insurance mathematics are 
significantly lower than those based on work accident statistics. Since we performed 
our calculations with the help of work accident statistics broken down by industrial 
sector, we expected a distortion towards higher than real values. Leigh’s [1987] 
empiric results also supported the exceptional importance of selecting the risk 
variable. 
 
Unfortunately, our work accident data are incomplete, even from a statistical point of 
view. They underestimate the risk levels; thus, they distort the value of human life in 
a positive direction. One reason for this is the fact that these data only deal with 
accidents that happen during working hours, but we can assume that there are a large 
number of work-related accidents outside this time, as well. Another factor is that 
accidents, illnesses and deaths can originate from a previous workplace or profession 
(e.g. in the chemical industry). These obviously do not appear in the statistics 
concerning a given area. Another reason, confirmed by the employees at OMMF, is 
that companies have a strong inclination not to record accidents – often mortal – but 
settle privately with the victims or their families. In several cases, the official 
procedure was only followed when private talks failed.80 
 
                                              
79 That is why the waiters’ jobs are three times more risky than firemen, according to the data (Thaler-
Rosen [1976], p. 288). 
80 According to the statement of the National Alliance of Hungarian Trade Unions (Magyar 
Szakszervezetek Országos Szövetsége - MSZOSZ) from 2001, about one quarter of all workplace 
accidents are not declared by the employers. (Tízmilliós munkavédelmi bírság [2001].) 
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VI.1.7. Brief evaluation of the results 
 
The basic hypothesis of our research was that the risk level of work carried out by 
employees influences the wage received for that work in a positive direction. We 
assume this hypothesis to be true based on the empiric test, since in the ‘optimal’ 
regression model the coefficient of the risk variable that explains the amount of 
income was positive and different from zero at every conventional significance 
level. Therefore, using the hedonic price method to specify the value of specifically 
defined statistical human life in Hungary is not unfounded. 
 
Based on our research we received an answer to the basic question, namely what the 
value of a statistical human life in Hungary is. The ten models that yielded some 
results specified this value to be between 78 million and 393 million forints. We 
should consider the figure from 1998 of 250 million forints to be the most 
reliable.81 Accurately interpreting our results and drawing appropriate conclusions – 
taking into account the distortion effect described above – requires care and, at the 
same time, bravery. More details on this question can be found at the and of the 
dissertation. 
 
VI.2. Establishment of the research based on the contingent valuation 
method 
 
Having indicated before, the further improvement of my research lies in the 
realization of a large sampled, representative data survey among the entire Hungarian 
population based on the contingent valuation method. I consider two scenarios in 
connection with this. The optimistic version is to carry out the query of a bulkier 
                                              
81 It is questionable, that if we intend to specify the VSL for future years, what index is adequate to 
use for multiplying the 1998 year value. Using the normal inflation rate is not the best solution, 
because on one hand it measures the increase of consumer prices, and on the other hand it is an 
average value. However, this important theoretical question is out of the scope of my study. We do 
not make big mistake if we calculate by the inflation rate in a few years interval, but in long term 
the preferences and willingness-to-pay values about human life can change considerably, so that 
valid results can only be gained out of a new research. 
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questionnaire on a sample of a few thousand people. The relatively more pessimistic 
scenario is to perform the research with a shorter questionnaire on a monthly basis on 
a smaller, but also representative sample consisting of adults living in a non-
institutional household in Hungary (similar to the Omnibus-research of TÁRKI).82 
 
Prepared to take both versions I carried out three pilot tests. The first survey took one 
hour per person to finish and needed an active interviewer role which I carried out on 
ten of my close acquaintances. The second and the third test was carried out in two 
different times on students of the Budapest University of Economic Sciences and 
Public Administration. These shorter tests took only 5-10 minutes per person to 
finish and consisted of a set of questions to be filled in independently. 
 
VI.2.1. Subjects of the first pilot test 
 
I carried out the first pilot test based on ten close relatives and friends in Budapest, 
Kecskemét and Kiskunfélegyháza in July, 1999. The most important aim of the 
survey was to test the 17-page questionnaire with 36 questions which I compiled 
making use of almost all of the possibilities lying in the contingent valuation 
method.83 
 
The “sample” of the ten persons is not similar in any of the parameters to the 
Hungarian population except for the 50-50% ratio of the sexes.84 This would only be 
of importance by a sample of this size to be able to measure the problems arising by 
the survey and the evaluations concerning the questions from a point of view of a 
                                              
82 For more detailed information on the Omnibus-survey visit the following website: www.tarki.hu. 
To be able to decide which survey and the research based on that I would finally manage to carry 
out depends on many factors, but primarily it is a matter of finance. 
83 For the final version of the questionnaire modified based on the experiences see Appendix 3. 
84 Only one of the ten persons was old, two were middle-aged and seven were between 24 and 26. All 
but one had university or college degree. Eight had university degree, five of whom had this degree 
in economic sciences. Their permanent residence was Kecskemét for five of them, Sátoraljaújhely 
for two and Budapest, Nyíregyháza and Kiskunfélegyháza for the others, although seven of them 
lived in the capital at the time of the survey. There was no inquiry into their financial circumstances 
but eight of the ten persons were most probably in the upper third region of the society. It can also 
be stated with a high probability that the sample over-represented the adult Hungarian population 
with respect to the mental capacities. 
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possibly broader social group. The acquired quantitave-type data can by no means be 
observed as a decent guide with respect to the average, deviation or the range of the 
results. 
 
However, the sample over-represents the population in many respects, therefore I 
could experience a certain “upper limit” of my investigations – upper limit referring 
to numerical data (naturally not in a pure mathematical sense), comprehensibility, 
attention, hepfulness, willingness, etc. 
 
VI.2.2. Role of the interviewer and the subsidiary materials used 
 
The questions, their wording and order, the order of magnitude of the numerical data 
used in them, the type of the examples, etc. applied in the survey have all been a 
deliberate result of the utilization of an immense knowledge of the related field 
assembled together through the past decades. Therefore I do not enter into details 
concerning the problems of every single question in this thesis, but I do have the 
opportunity to characterise the circumstances of the interviews, the subsidiary 
materials used and the role of the interviewer in a few sentences. 
 
During the interviews I always tried to keep a contact based on an interactive 
dialogue with the respondents. I preferred the advantage acquired by occasional 
repetitions, short explanations to make sure every interviewee understands the task to 
the advantage of the interviewer’s objectivity and the equalised surroundings by 
merely reading the questions without any repetitions or explanations. The road 
leading to this is dependent upon situation and individual therefore it can not be 
standardised. Due to these reasons the interviewer is in a difficult situation, as well, 
because he has to consider the optimal level of giving help. 
 
When I asked the interviewees to tell me about their evaluations, experiences, 
feelings or any other remarks on the questions after the survey it was a recurring 
factor to have paid less attention to a small detail, or some words, which were of high 
importance during answering. This happenned frequently, despite the fact that having 
gained experience from the first interviews I always emphasized that every word 
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does or can have a high importance and I also stressed, made pauses, repetitions, etc. 
to help to understand the most important information. As some expressions were of 
utmost importance by the answers and the verbal aids described above did not prove 
to be sufficient in every case I had to modify the wording of some questions. 
 
In order to make it easier for the respondents I used different subsidiary materials 
during the interviews. One of these was the so-called subsidiary table in the form of 
small sheets of paper to serve two goals. Some of them had the role to show the 
decision situation in a tabular account that was perhaps too much “mathematized” 
and thus difficult in the wording of the question. The subsidiary table for Question 10 
looked like the one shown below: 
 
Figure 1. Subsidiary table for Question 10. 
 
 1st risk 2nd risk  
base 2 20  
(1) 2 → 1 20  
(2)  2 20 → 15 out of 100.000 
 
 
The other part of the subsidiary tables would have played a part if the interviewees 
had not been able to answer a question without help. None of the first ten 
interviewees needed this so these tables remained untested. A table like this is shown 
in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Subsidiary table for Question 13. 
 
“I will read numbers in increasing order. Please stop me when I say the number 
compared to what the the value in question is less!” 
READ THE VALUES QUICKLY AND UNHESITANTLY! 
 
0, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 70, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 400, 500, 700, 
1.000, 1.500, 2.000, 3.000, 5.000, 10.000, 20.000 
 
WHEN THE RESPONDENT STOPS YOU ASK HIM/HER: 
“You stopped me at the number .... Can you tell me now what the value in question 
may be?” 
 
WHEN (S)HE BEGINS WITH “Less than ...”, THEN TRY TO MAKE HIM/HER 
SAY A DENOMINATE NUMBER! 
 
 
I constructed another subsidiary material from a millimetre-scaled squared paper 
with the aim of illustrating and making the measure of the probabilities – given in the 
form of x/100.000 as almost always suggested in the scientific literature – even more 
understandable. It is a known fact (being reflected in the interviews, as well) that 
people can handle low probabilities mentally with great difficulty. In order to help 
this problem I constructed sheets of size 25cm×40cm from the millimetre-scaled 
squared paper. These sheets therefore consisted of exactly 250×400=100.000 pieces 
of squares with the length of one millimetre of the sides. Having shaded x number of 
pieces from these squares, the ratio of the black squares compared to the total 
number of squares (being also equal to the ratio of the territories) perfectly illustrated 
the intended size of the risk. This subsidiary material was used in every case. 
According to the experiences told by the interviewees the use of these millimetre-
scaled squared papers significantly helped the answers in most of the cases. 
 
VI.2.3. Experiences of the survey 
 
After having had the questionnaires filled in I had a second, more informal 
conversation with the interviewees asking them about the mental processes 
initialized in them by certain questions, the difficulty of answering, the factors 
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playing a role in the decisions, hearing and understanding the questions for the first 
time and later on, etc. All utilizable opinions were built into the questionnaire. I 
mention the most important experiences here, as well. 
 
I made the situation in Question 10 more transparent by using the subsidiary table 
described above. The alternative (2) is clearly more favourable than alternative (1) 
because it brings a five times higher reduction of risk. Despite of this only four chose 
alternative (2) correctly, and only three of these four chose it based on the correct 
reason. Most of the others chose alternative (1) because of the halved probability or 
because of an incorrect calculation (for example wrongly multiplying the 
probabilities), while others termed the 1/100.000 risk in alternative (1) as “being 
shrunk into insignificance”. 
 
The decision situation in Question 11 (which I used in the second and third pilot 
tests, as well) can easily be modelled mathematically: choosing between a 
distribution resulting in any number of deaths from 0 to 100 with an expected value 
of 1 (“statistical death”) – with a constantly decreasing but precisely definable 
probability beginning from 1 and a surely resulting 1 death (“anonymous death”). 
Nobody perceived the problem this way. Only some of the respondents had taken 
into consideration that the expected number of deaths is 1 by both alternatives. They 
rather used intuition or some kind of a principle (like “I don’t want to choose certain 
death”) by their decisions. 
 
Question 14 was also used in both the second and the third test. It was clearly evident 
after the interviews during the first test that almost all respondents – although the text 
had not referred to it by any means – gave their answers with respect to the ticket 
price of 20.000 forints to the maximum willingness-to-pay values for risk reduction 
or the minimal willingness-to-accept compensation values for risk increase. 
Theoretically the measure of risk-taking should be the exclusive factor during 
decision, the ticket price should not play a part – Hypothesis 3 referred exactly to 
this. This phenomenon seems to contradict this hypothesis. The fact that the answers 
given to another evaluative question (No. 20) resulted in a totally different value of 
human life (see Table 9) strengthened the belief further that one can not evaluate 
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risk, as a good in itself, only together with its characteristics where these 
characteristics would also be elements of the evaluation just like risk, the basic good. 
 
Question 14 justified another phenomenon, as well, which was dealt with among the 
philosophical considerations in connection with cost-benefit analysis. Most of the 
respondents gave voice to their problems about having to think of affording a safety 
device taking their current financial situation into consideration. As most of the 
respondents were students before their graduation their financial situation did not 
afford them to pay as much for a safety device as they would be willing to ‘after their 
hearts under normal conditions’. Therefore the amount they are willing to pay at the 
time of the survey is not in conformity with their actual preferences only with a 
preference system presenting a basis for an evaluation of possibilities of a seriously 
limited set due to the conditions.85 
 
Question 15 of the actual questionnaire became the third and last question during the 
second and third pilot test. Making a pleasant surprise all ten interviewees realised 
that having had their choice in the a) part of the question about snow versus rain they 
insisted on remaining consistent with themselves and had the same decision in the b) 
and c) part of the question, as well. 
 
Question 22 was another pleasant surprise where all of the ten respondents chose the 
dominant alternative A, although only seven of them realised the dominance whereas 
the other three chose this possibility because of other reasons.86 
 
                                              
85 At the occurrence of this problem I gave the answer to everybody that they should think of an 
amount they would really be willing to pay and they can afford given their current situation (just as 
the original question asked them). The representativity of the survey on a great sample will make 
sure that these ’true only on the short run’-type answers would shape the big picture to an extent 
with respect to their true rate in the society. This procedure is also underlined by the fact that it 
would be a logical fault resulting in serious distortions if the respondents – already placed in a 
fictitious situation – were to give an evalutaion based on another fictitious financial situation from 
which we would be trying to draw conclusions with ’scientific methods’ about reality. 
86 The following phenomenon was frequent: the answerers initially switched the two values of cost 
automatically not having realised they had already been in a reverse order compared to being 
logically right. After a short period of time they noticed the dominance and that time they thought 
the question had been wrongly worded and told this to the interviewer. Then I told them without 
explanation to ’decide, the wording was all right’. Given this instruction all of them chose the 
’right’ alternative. 
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According to my experiences Question 24 seemed to be the most successful; I felt 
the validity of the answers given to this question was the most powerful during the 
interview. The role of other factors besides risk usually attached to the valuation 
were probably the smallest here. Most of the respondents found this question to be 
not too difficult, interesting and set them thinking – these characteristics all 
coincided with our intentions. 
 
Two tables should be examined if we were to sum up numerically the experiences of 
the pilot test. Table 7 is to illustrate whether we were successful in reaching our aims 
with the methods applied, namely whether we were getting answers to show the 
value of implicit human life to our evaluative questions. The validity would be 
strengthened by the fact that the relative order of the respondents with respect to their 
valuations of risk is not modified considerably based on their answers given to 
questions differing in wording, subject, logic and even far from each other physically 
within the questionnaire itself. The table shows a surprising harmony with respect to 
this. The ten respondents can be placed into four distinctive groups. Respondents No. 
1, 2 and 10 had the highest results (sum of their rank orders being 7,5, 8 and 8,5 
respectively), the second group consisted of respondents No. 5 and 3 (with sum of 
rank orders 11 and 13), respondents No. 9, 8 and 4 formed the third group (with sums 
of 18, 20,5 and 21,5 respectively) and finally risk had the lowest values with 
respondents No. 7 and 6 (sum of their rank orders 27 and 30 respectively). 
 
Our confidence invested in our method and questions can further be strengthened by 
examining the correlation between columns of the rank orders of each question. The 
correlation value is 0,808 between Questions 14 and 20, the value is 0,827 between 
Questions 14 and 28 and it is 0,683 between Questions 20 and 28. These correlation 
values count as very high showing a strong relation. However I do not intend to show 
the appearance of having a belief to be able to draw any similar conclusions from a 
small sample like this. 
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Table 7. Risk evaluation rank order of the respondents.87 
 
Question 14 20 28 Sum 
Respondent     
1 2 2,5 3 7,5 
2 1 4 3 8 
3 4,5 2,5 6 13 
4 7 6,5 8 21,5 
5 3 5 3 11 
6 9 9 9 27 
7 10 10 10 30 
8 7 6,5 7 20,5 
9 7 8 3 18 
10 4,5 1 3 8,5 
 
 
Finally, Table 8 shows the value of human life concluded from the given questions in 
our group of ten people. The average in the last row is based on a weighing of 
subjective judgment of the usefulness and validity of the questions. 
 
 
Table 8. The value of human life in our sample of 10 people. 
 
 Data in million HUF 
Question VHL weight 
14/a 468 1/6 
14/b 366 1/6 
20/a 1.914 1/6 
20/b 2.743 1/6 
28 567 1/3 
Mean 1.104  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
87 The rank order shows the decreasing evaluation of human life of the respondents given to the 
questions together with their subquestions. In case of equal evaluations the average of the ranks is 
shown in the table. 
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VI.2.4. The second pilot test 
 
I compiled a questionnaire with only three detailed questions that can be filled in in 
5-10 minutes based on the first pilot test with the intention of getting the most results 
as possible within the given limits.88 These results are suitable for two things. On the 
one hand they help to formulate conjectures and hypotheses, on the other hand they 
serve a basis for the survey on a large sample. 
 
The questionnaire was filled in for the first time in 2001 by 55 students in the second 
year (so most of them were around 20 years of age) in the Budapest University of 
Economic Sciences and Public Administration. The one and only demographic 
question was about the sex of the respondent, so we know that there were 26 females 
(girls) and 29 males (boys) in the sample. 
 
The respondents were not given any instructions and information before or during 
their answering. The reason for this was that I tried to formulate the questions in a 
way that they would have no need to call for the interviewer’s help. 
 
VI.2.5. Lessons of the pilot test 
 
Question 1)89 tried to reveal the difference between the evaluation of anonymous and 
statistical human life. Choosing alternative (1) in both cases – a) and b) – the 
respondent values anonymous life higher (by choosing “statistical death”) while 
choosing alternative (2) gives a higher value for statistical life (by choosing 
“anonymous death”). While the respondent is not personally involved in the case 
described in a), the case under b) has the respondent and his/her close acquaintances 
exposed to the danger. Table 9 shows the results to this question based on the total 
sample and the subsample of boys and girls separately. 
 
                                              
88 See Appendix 4 for the questionnaire. 
89 The question – with slight differences – was also part of the survey conducted by Hammerton-
Jones-Lee-Abbott [1982]. 
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Table 9. Distribution of answers given to Question 1 in the pilot questionnaire based 
on the total sample and the subsample of boys and girls in 2001. 
 
 total sample
 1/a 
  1 2 sum 
1 14 10 24 1/b
2 8 23 31 
sum 22 33 55 
 
  boys  girls 
  1/a  1/a 
  1 2 sum   1 2 sum 
1 10 4 14 1 4 6 10 1/b 
2 4 11 15 
1/b
2 4 12 16 
sum 14 15 29 sum 8 18 26 
 
Based on the tables the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 
a) There is no definite decision about whether the anonymous or the statistical life 
should be valued higher. Nevertheless the majority of both sexes feel statistical 
life more valuable. 
 
b) The difference between the answers of the boys and girls are perceptible. The 
ratio of the two alternatives – (1) and (2) – was practically equalized in both – a) 
and b) – cases by the boys, while the girls definitely feel statistical life more 
valuable, especially in the case where the respondent and her close acquaintances 
were not exposed to danger in the hypothetical situation (outsider judges). 
 
c) Being personally involved has a significance, especially among girls. This is 
shown by having 28% for the ratio of “cross-votes” (when a respondent chose a 
different alternative in cases a) and b)) for boys, while 38% for girls (the average 
is 33%). 
 
Let’s change the order and discuss the third question briefly. With this playful, 
coherence-examining question we can test the extent of conformity with the standard 
axioms of rational choice shown by the respondents in simple decision situations 
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under uncertainty.90 To meet the requirements of coherence anyone choosing 
possibility A in case a) then (s)he has to make a preference for possibility B in case 
b). This is mutatis mutandis true for possibility B, as well. 
 
The sample consisting of students of economics proved to be of very “coherent 
thinking”. Only 4 of the 55 did not pass this test, all of them girls.91 
 
Finally the second question was the evaluation question based on which we can 
attach money value to the statistical human life. The question consisted of four 
subquestions calling for answers to evaluate risks of different size. The first two 
subquestions measured willingness to pay (WTP) for risk reduction, while the other 
two measured willingness to accept compensation (WTA) for risk increase. 
 
The answers of 0 forint given for questions c) and d) need special consideration and 
handling. This can happen becaues of two reasons. 
 
i) The respondent is not willing to accept a compensation of even 20.000 forints for 
risk increase. 
ii) The risk increase has not any negative utility, meaning no costs attached for the 
respondent therefore (s)he need not be compensated with any amount. 
 
There weren’t any questions in the questionnaire to be able to decide which one of 
these reasons was the actual one for each respondent (we can make attempts to find it 
out in the large sample research), however, we can most probably decide it based on 
the answers given to questions a) and b). In every case where the answers to 
questions a) or b) were differing from 0 it can be presumed, that the reason is i), 
while having 0 answer for both a) and b), the reason is presumably ii). 
 
                                              
90 I have already discussed some aspects of this issue, for more detailed examination see: Savage 
[1954]. This concrete type of question was used in the following surveys: Hammerton-Jones-Lee-
Abbott [1982], and Jones-Lee-Hammerton-Philips [1985]. 
91 Due to the extremely small sample number we should not draw any kind of conclusions whether 
there is a difference between males and females in this respect. 
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In accordance with this I modified the 0 evaluation to the maximal 20.000 forints 
where I presumed reason i), in order to avoid further distortion of these data. We 
have to see that 20.000 forints in these cases is a lower limit. The number of the 
questionnaires where I had to modify accordingly was relatively high; 14 out of the 
55 questionnaires. 
 
Table 10 shows the results of the value of human life after the modifications. I make 
three remarks to the table: 
 
a) The values are shown with respect to six samples. On one hand there is the total 
sample and the subsamples of boys and girls. On the other hand there is a 
truncated version of each original sample (marked with the letter “t”). I left out 
those respondents who gave a 0 answer to subquestions a) and b). Their answers 
would mean that they were unwilling to pay any amount to decrease the risk 
therefore resulting in a 0 value of statistical human life among them. Another 
question would be needed to find out whether their willingness to pay was really 
0 in this situation or they just did not understand the question properly. The 
significance of the problem is shown by having had the sample of 55 persons 
truncated by 20 persons. 
b) The last row of the table shows the averages of the answers given to the four 
subquestions with respect to all six kinds of samples. These are not simple 
arithmetical averages because I tried to give weights to the results based on their 
reliability. The values calculated for the four subquestions from a) to d) received 
the weights 35-35-20-10 per cent respectively. According to those written before 
we have to calculate with a lower limit in the case of WTA-type evaluations (in c) 
and especially d)), while there is no limit like this in the case of WTP-type 
evaluations (in a) and b)). 
c) A coherence-test is involved in this question, as well. Those respondents who 
either gave a lower value to subquestion b) than a), or gave a lower value to 
subquestion d) than c) did not pass this test. Only one respondent of the truncated 
sample of 35 persons failed to pass this test. 
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Table 10. Results given for the value of statistical human life for each sample based 
on the answers given to the second question in 2001. 
 
 data in million HUF 
total total boy boy girl girl 
sample t. sample sample t. sample sample t. sample 
55 prs 35 prs 29 prs 19 prs 26 prs 16 prs 
2/a 156 245 109 166 209 339 
2/b 131 206 102 155 163 266 
2/c 129 151 133 151 124 150 
2/d 54 67 53 62 56 73 
mean92 132 195 106 149 161 249 
 
 
Based on the results the following remarks can be made:93 
 
a) WTP values were higher than WTA values in all of the subsamples. This 
harmonises to the experiences of the earlier surveys. It is an interesting fact that 
the WTP values were significantly higher among girls than boys, however, the 
differences between the WTA values of these subsamples were not so striking. 
b) The linearity of the function WTP (risk) or WTA (risk) (that is where the value 
given in question 2/b) is to be 7/4 times the value given in question 2/a) or the 
value given in question 2/d) is to be three times the value given in question 2/c)) 
can not be detected in any of the respondents giving answers other than 0. This 
means that none of the respondents possess such a robust ‘internal value of life’ 
that they would be able to consequently evaluate a change of risk threatening 
their life proportionately to that of its level. 
c) The smaller the change of risk that had to be evaluated in the questions the bigger 
the value of statistical human life became. 
                                              
92 For the weighing scheme and the reasons see text above. 
93 It is important to draw attention to the fact again that we should not feel entitled to draw any kind of 
valid consequences from the sample due to its small number of participants from a well 
circumscribed social group. However, we have the possibility to fix some conjectures in connection 
with special trends, values in our memory. 
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d) The value of statistical human life is most probably between 132 million and 195 
million 2001 forints in the case of this small sample. 
 
VI.2.6. Repeating the test 
 
I repeated the test two years later in 2003. I had the same questionnaire filled in with 
the same age group in the same university. Repeating the test had a double purpose. 
On one hand it can be examined whether we would be able to draw similar 
consequences as for the first time.94 On the other hand I asked the respondents in a 
group interview after the test whether they had any – and if yes what kind of – 
problems during answering. Its aim was to further develop the quality of the 
questionnaire by rephrasing the questions in order to enhance the probability of the 
success of the large sampled survey with utilisable results.95 
 
This time the test was filled in by 68 students with exactly 50% of the representatives 
of each sex. As I have mentioned before and it also turns out from the questionnaire 
we know no other demographical characteristics of the sample. Nobody received any 
kind of help before or during answering – just like in the test previous time. 
 
The answers given to question 1) investigating the difference of evaluation between 
anonymous and statistical human life are the following: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
94 Of course the question is again not about statistically testing the constancy in time of the results, 
becaues this test is not suitable for that due to the reasons mentioned before. 
95 See Appendix 5 for the modified questionnaire. A remark has to be made here that it would be 
important to carry out a last test survey before the finalisation of the questionnaire to be used for the 
large sampled survey (the size and list of questions of which is mostly dependent upon the 
possibilities avaliable). The subjects of this test would consist of the less qualified strata of the 
society which is of crucial importance during the final wording and understandability of the 
questions. 
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Table 11. Distribution of answers given to question 1) in the test questionnaire based 
on the total sample and the subsample of boys and girls in 2003. 
 
 total sample
 1/a 
  1 2 sum 
1 32 15 47 1/b
2 6 15 21 
sum 38 30 68 
 
  boys  girls 
  1/a  1/a 
  1 2 sum   1 2 sum 
1 16 9 25 1 16 6 22 1/b 
2 4 5 9 
1/b
2 2 10 12 
sum 20 14 34 sum 18 16 34 
 
 
The following statements can be made by comparing the results of this table with 
that of the one filled out in 2001. 
 
a) There is no definite decision just like before about whether the anonymous or the 
statistical life is to be valued higher. This time anonymous life proved to be more 
valuable in both – a) and b) – cases, which is just the opposite finding compared 
to the experience gained two years before. 
b) The difference of the answers between boys and girls in 2003 is not so striking as 
it was in 2001. This time not only the majority of boys but most of the girls chose 
alternative (1) in both cases, resulting in a bigger ratio among girls (76%) than 
boys (62%) having answered the same way to both questions – that means 
consequently valuing either anonymous or statistical human life higher. This was 
just the opposite two years ago (62% of the girls and 72% of the boys). 
c) The ratio of the “cross-votes” is 31% based on the total sample, slightly lower 
than in 2001 when it was 33%. This shows that being personally involved had 
significance among the respondents of the second test, as well. However the ratio 
of those valuing anonymous human life higher was bigger when being personally 
involved this time. 
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Summarising the experiences gained from the answers to question 1) it can be stated 
that they show a slightly opposite finding compared to the results two years ago. 
Therefore we can deduce the consequence that we can not foretell with a great 
probability the results of a survey based on a representative sample with respect to 
the evaluation of the anonymous and the statistical human life. The probability of 
not being able to show a statistically significant difference between the two 
evaluations is not low, based on the two tests. We can not even make conjectures 
about the differences in the evaluations between males and females. 
 
I carried out some modifications to become more precise in the wording of the 
questions based on the experiences of the interviews following the answering. It was 
not clear whether the epidemic infects only this week or later on as well, which does 
have a significant role in answering. I also had to make more clear in the wording 
that there were exclusively those two possibilities described to solve the problem. 
The wording of question 1/a) also needed a slight change to be more precise. 
 
It became evident during the conversation that it is very hard to reach the feeling of 
being personally involved by drawing up a hypothetical situation (see also 
disadvantages of CV method), only a few respondent was capable of fully feeling 
into it. It also became clear that even the group certainly over-representating the 
society with respect to cognitive capacities could not have a good grip on the 
situation during the short time available for answering what kind of alternatives they 
had to compare in a mathematical-statistical meaning. As a consequence the time 
limit available for answering has to be enlarged, but not even this time should we 
expect the relatively precise realisation of the probability-distributions of the two 
alternatives. My opinion is that further specification of the wording makes 
understanding not easier, but more difficult. 
 
The question occurred to me to give an independent possibility to choose “I don’t 
know” or “I don’t understand” or both. The reason I finally rejected this idea was 
that I think this would have ensured such an easy “avenue of escape” during 
questions that do need a little mental activity that answeres would choose these 
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options in a greater amount than their real ratio therefore causing reduction in the 
validity of the consequences. 
 
I could gain favourable experiences by the third question testing coherent thinking 
by the repeated test, as well. Only seven of the 68 respondents did not pass the test. 
This time three of them were males so the rejection of building up a hypothesis about 
females being more probable to fail this test than males became confirmed. It became 
clear during the interview following the answering that this question was easy to 
understand for this social group, most of them realised the “trick” lying in it. Another 
favourable experience is that students tried to understand and answer properly to this 
question as well despite of the short time available and they were not in a haste to 
“get it over”. 
 
Finally let us discuss the second, evaulative question. I carried out the same 
modifications after the answers as I had done with the results of the previous test. 
The results can be seen in Table 12, which is parallel to Table 10. 
 
Table 12. Results given for the value of statistical human life for each sample based 
on the answers given to the second question in 2003. 
 
 data in million HUF 
total total boy boy girl girl 
sample t. sample sample t. sample sample t. sample 
68 prs 50 prs 34 prs 25 prs 34 prs 25 prs 
2/a 117 159 87 119 146 199 
2/b 157 214 104 142 210 286 
2/c 144 183 141 173 147 192 
2/d 56 68 57 68 54 69 
mean96 130 174 101 133 159 215 
 
 
The following remarks can be made by comparing this table to the results of the 
analogous table based on the survey in 2001. 
 
                                              
96 For the weighing of the average and the reasons see text in connection with the survey in 2001. 
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a) The necessary truncation of the total sample was smaller in 2003 (26%) than in 
2001 (36%). This partly gives the reason for the value of life coming from the 
answers of the truncated and subsamples being somewhat closer to the values of 
the untruncated and subsamples than two years before. 
 
b) Unlike the survey in 2001 this time the highest value of statistical life came from 
question 2/b) instead of 2/a). The reason for this is mostly because of the 
decrease of the value of life based on the answers to question 2/a), only a smaller 
part is due to the increase of the value of life based on the answers to question 
2/b). 
 
c) The value of life based on the answers given to 2/c) increased compared to that of 
in 2001 (with 12% in the total sample and 21% in the truncated total sample) 
with the measure of the increase roughly equalling to the depreciation of money 
(around 15% in the given time interval). The difference is insignificant in 
question 2/d) based on the total and truncated total sample, the values coming 
from the subsamples of girls and boys approached each other. 
 
d) WTP-questions resulted in a higher value of life than WTA-questions again, 
although the value of life is less in question 2/a) than in question 2/c) for both the 
untruncated and the truncated total sample due to the male respondents. 
 
e) The value of statistical human life in the sample of 2003 is surprisingly close the 
value of the sample of 2001: it is most probably between 130 and 174 million 
2003 Hungarian forints. 
 
The conversation following the answering in order to further clarify this question 
proved to be useful again. On one hand I thought it inevitable to change the 20.000 
forints in the question to 50.000 forints which is a more realistic amount in our 
present (and future) price relations and it also serves a two and a half time larger 
possibility to financially evaluate the increase of risk in the WTA-question. 
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WTP-subquestions were generally easy to understand for the students. I still made it 
even more clear here that the amount to be written in is to be paid as an extra above 
the 50.000 forints. 
 
Having experienced more difficulty and misunderstanding in the WTA-subquestions I 
rephrased them. A new answering possibility had to be shown in an explicit way for 
cases when the respondent felt that not even the total amount of 50.000 forints would 
be enough for him/her to compensate for the risk increase. Up until now the 
respondent was right in writing 0 forint in this case, however this could also mean 
that the respondent did not need any amount of money for compensation for the risk 
increase. Answering 0 forint in the new questionnaire can mean only this latter case. 
 
Finally it was confirmed that it had been very hard to perceive the measure of risk 
expressed by numerical values. The perception of the measure of risk is made easier 
in cases when referring to a measure of risk of a real and frequently occurring 
everyday phenomenon. However, we encounter here the distorting effect coming 
from subjective perception, meaning that the same objective risk (for example the 
danger of an air flight) can be percepted as being of different measures, so the 
measure of risk brought into comparison with it would naturally also be dispersed 
among the respondents. The illustration of the measure of risk and promoting its 
mental reception can be helped by a visual tool (like the the millimetre-scaled 
squared paper I used in the first test) shown by the interviewer that would serve as a 
proper solution. 
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VII. REGULATION IN CASE OF A BOMB ALARM – A THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Bomb alarm is one of the incidents suitable for hindering the satisfactory functioning 
of social order. Its massive appearance causes significant financial loss not only 
directly but due to its facelessness, incalculableness and insidiousness it can have a 
disturbing, alarming effect decresing, can reduce safety to a much wider group than 
those directly involved; even to a society. Although several examples can be cited 
from the last years in Hungary, fortunately we still can not talk about it as becoming 
a massive, general phenomenon.97 
 
According to the statement of the Central Statistical Office there is no official 
statistics written about bomb alarms so their frequency and the significance of the 
problem can merely be demonstrated in a rather indirect way. The following table 
shows the number of results found for the special expressions in the most widespread 
Hungarian Internet browsers. These expressions are all (with the exception of ‘cost-
benefit analysis’ listed only as a point of interest) in connection with phenomena 
bearing negative judgment; sin, deviant behaviour and society-wide catastrophes. 
 
Table 13. Results for certain expressions in the Internet. 
Expression Origo-vizsla Google Heuréka Mean 
Bomb alarm 3 791 8 130 355 4 092 
Kidnapping 2 327 2 830 386 1 848 
Domiciliary visit 5 651 8 030 1 858 5 180 
Suicide 13 737 5 930 4 567 8 078 
Earthquake 13 462 14 100 3 420 10 327 
Drug 43 527 21 300 7 288 24 038 
Cost-benefit analysis 1 091 715 12 606 
Date of query: 3 October 2003. 
 
The numbers clearly give an idea of a phenomenon that is bound to be examined, 
however, the intention of drawing up an adequate, nationwide solution on the long 
run to remedy the problem is still not in the top of today’s political agenda. Its reason 
should not be searched for in rationality (namely the proper priorisation of efforts to 
                                              
97 For a short summary of some Hungarian bomb alarms in the past few years see Appendix 6. 
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minimalise social costs) but in the priorisation of issues calling for immediate 
treatment, issues of scandalous nature or receiving public attention by the media or 
perhaps influencing the popularity of the parties or the government in any way. 
 
Bomb alerts – as we could see through the examples of the Hungarian cases – show 
difference from and similarity to each other at the same time. They are different 
primarily in the character of the target and the motivation of the alarming. They are 
similar in special definitive characteristics, like: 
 
a) their aim is harmful and destructive for society; 
b) the alarm has no results: the bomb is in fact not placed in the indicated place; 
c) the perpetrator of the crime does not fall into the hands of the police. 
 
There are exceptions to the second and especially the third characteristic, but 
definitely not to the first one. 
 
From economic viewpoint bomb alarm is a tool for a citizen intending to cause 
trouble with which (s)he can cause a significant social damage with a very small, 
practically negligible individual cost (for the perpetrator: investment). The social 
damage is in the decisive majority of the cases much too larger than the individual 
benefit of the perpetrator – for example postponing a written examination! Therefore 
the phenomenon of a bomb alarm would result in a net cost in the viewpoint of 
society even if we accepted the individual benefit of the perpetrator, of course we do 
know that this factor must not be internalised. The net social cost of bomb scare is 
equal to its gross social cost in social cost-benefit analysis because the benefits 
connected to it is not acknowledged.98 
 
This characteristic just mentioned serve a reason for the reconsideration of the 
regulation in connection with bomb alarms in order to draft an alternative solution 
different from the actual one – at least as an intellectual theoretical model. 
 
                                              
98 See also Boardman-Greenberg-Vining-Weimer [1996], p. 44-45. 
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VII.1. Current regulation and law surroundings99 
 
The current provisions of law do not give a straightforward, direct guide in Hungary 
about the actions to follow in case of a telephone call or other information coming 
from an unidentified source threatening with a bomb. The behaviour expected by the 
legislator can be deduced only indirectly. 
 
In a certain way educational institutions form an exception based on the MKM 
Regulation No. 11/1994. (VI. 8.) on the Operation of Educational Institutions in 
Paragraph 4, Section 1, Point o) stating that the organisational and functional 
regulation of these institutions has to involve the ‘necessary actions to be taken in 
case of an extraordinary event, bomb alarm, etc.’. Even in this case the regulation 
orders to define the necessary actions instead of defining the necessary actions 
themselves. 
 
The bomb alarm is not named in the compulsory elements of the organisational and 
functional regulations of any other institutions or in the Government Regulation No. 
217/1998. (XII. 30.) on the Rules of Operation of the General Government giving 
general rules for public agencies and bodies. 
 
In the lack of direct guide we have to examine how the problem is handled by the 
Hungarian legal system, namely the criminal code100 as it is about a crime. A person 
threarening with a bomb commits the crime of threatening with public danger 
executing the statement of facts in Paragraph 270/A in the criminal code.101 Section 
(1) of this paragraph says that ‘the one who states an untrue fact to others about an 
event bound to come and threatening with public danger that is suitable for 
                                              
99 I expended a great care on the proper use of the legal technical terms (terminus technicus) in this 
subchapter. Despite all my efforts it can happen that I do not use the terms properly in some places. 
I apologize for this in advance especially from Readers of the legal profession. 
100 Act IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code. 
101 The reason given by the minister for framing this law in 1997 – as a special case of the spreading 
of disquieting rumours in Paragraph 270 of the criminal code – is that cases about unidentified 
persons threatening different public institutions with having placed bombs there became very 
numerous. 
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disturbing public order commits crime...’102. If the threatening is about radioactive 
substance or it has seriously disturbed public order it is handled as an aggravating 
circumstance when judging the action. The untruthfulness of the stated fact is an 
important criterion in the viewpoint of realising the statement of facts, meaning that 
the occurence of the event with public danger should not threaten in reality; the 
stated ‘fact’ should be a forgery known by the perpetrator. In case of a bomb alarm 
this is equivalent to the factor motivating the accomplishment of the total theoretical 
model, namely that the aim of the threatener is just to disturb public order and not to 
actually blow up a bomb. 
 
If the unidentified person actually places a bomb then (s)he violates the law (and 
commits a crime against the society) naturally not by his/her telephone call but by 
his/her action to blow up the bomb realising the statement of facts of causing public 
danger or perhaps act of terrorism. The former statement of facts is included in 
Section (1) of Paragraph 259 of the criminal code: ‘if a person causes public danger 
by causing flood, by executing the destroying effects of explosive, radiating or any 
other material, energy or fire or hinders averting of public danger or alleviating its 
consequences commits a crime ...’. It is an aggravating circumstance when judging 
the action if the crime is committed in a criminal gang or causing extraordinarily big 
pecuniary loss or causing the death of one or more people. Warning about the public 
danger may be a mitigating circumstance especially when the public danger is not 
carried into effect, so the bomb explosion is successfully kept back. According to 
Section (6) ‘the punishment may be mitigated without restraint if the public danger is 
voluntarily terminated before the harmful consequences had taken place’. (The 
statement of facts of the act of terrorism is dealt with in Paragraph 261 of the 
criminal code, we do not discuss this in details.)103 
                                              
102 The perpetrator of the crime is to be sentenced to imprisonment not exceeding two years, to carry 
out work of public interest or to be punished with a fine. Based on Section (2) the sentence is three 
years in prison if the crime desribed in Section (1) is committed by threatening with radioactive 
materials. If the public order is seriously disturbed the punishment based on Section (3) is 
imprisonment not exceeding three years in case of Section (1) and imprisonment not exceeding five 
years in case of Section (2). 
103 The crime of causing public danger is to be punished with an imprisonment ranging from two to 
eight years. The punishment is an imprisonment ranging from five to ten years if the crime is 
committed in a criminal gang or causing an extraordinarily big pecuniary loss; and it is an 
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In our viewpoint the judgement of the behaviour of the person receiving the 
telephone call threatening with public danger or is notified by the receiver of the call 
and is competent to take orders in connection with it is more interesting. If an 
internal regulation describes the necessary actions to be taken in case of a bomb alert 
then the judgment of the behaviour of this person can take place based on that, it can 
be clearly decided whether his/her actions were right or wrong. The legal 
consequences in connection with it can also be unambigiously determined. (We 
presume of course that this internal regulation is in conformity with the provisions of 
law.) 
 
If there is no internal regulation that would serve a direction about the necessary 
steps to be taken then the competent person in connection with it has a deliberation 
possibility. If (s)he notifies the authorities then (s)he brings about the usual course of 
action resulting in material and/or non-material costs for the authorities taking action 
and for the given institution as well. If (s)he does not notify the authorities then (s)he 
takes a risk. If the threatening was only a false alarm then nobody suffers damages, 
the case will not become an issue of the police, no crime or offence except for 
threatening with public danger is realised. However if the bomb was really placed in 
the premises and it actually explodes then the person failing to notify the authorities 
realises the statement of facts of the crime of causing public danger (see above) 
because (s)he hindered averting of public danger or alleviating its consequences. (If 
                                                                                                                                
imprisonment ranging from five to fifteen years or for life if the causing of public danger causes the 
death of one or more people. 
If the causing of public danger is committed through negligence, (s)he is to be sentenced to an 
imprisonment not exceeding three years in case of an offence, not exceeding five years in case of an 
extraordinariliy big pecuniary loss, not less than two and not exceeding eight years in case of 
causing the death of one or more people. The one who makes preparations for causing public 
danger is to be sentenced to an imprisonment not exceeding three years. 
The statement of acts of the crime of act of terrorism is realised if one commits a violent crime 
against a person or in connection with weapons, or causes public danger in order to 
a) force state organ, other state, international organisation to do, not to do or tolerate something, 
b) intimidate inhabitants, 
c) change or disturb the constitutional, social or economic order of another state or disturb the 
functioning of an international organisation. 
The perpetrator of the act of terrorism is to be sentenced to an imprisonment not less than ten and 
not exceeding fifteen years or for life. Section (8) of Paragraph 261 is important and therefore needs 
to be emphasised for our viewpoint: ‘the one who obtains trustworthy knowledge of an act of 
terrorism about to be committed and does not notify the authorities as soon as possible commits a 
crime and is to be sentenced to an imprisonment not exceeding three years’. 
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the bomb actually does not explode then we can not talk about public danger, so the 
statement of facts of causing public danger is not realised.) It is a significant 
mitigating circumstance if the jury qualifies the action negligent, in this case there is 
only an offence (of course the amounts of punishments are also significantly milder). 
 
It can be seen that the judgment of the behaviour of the person receiving the 
telephone call or message threatening with a bomb is fundamentally dependent upon 
whether there is a bomb or not behind the threatening. Failing to notify the 
authorities in the former case can result in a serious punishment. As the receiver of 
the call can not know whether the threatening is a false alarm or not, the rational 
action to take is clearly to notify the authorities, except for the case when – based on 
his/her deliberation – the expected measure of the damage caused is more significant 
to him/her than without the notification. This can happen when the receiver judges 
the probability of having a bomb that can explode negligible while notifying the 
authorities would cause a highly significant damage for him/her. These two 
conditions exist together only in a very small number of the cases so we may state 
that – given the current law surroundings – the rational action to take after receiving 
a threatening with a bomb is to notify the authorities who are bound to probe into the 
matter following the way prescribed to them without deliberation. 104 
 
VII.2. An alternative regulation model 
 
The new regulation would be briefly the following: the procedure to be taken in case 
of receiving an unidentified telephone call threatening with an explosive device 
would be to notify the person – referring to the proper place of the regulation – that 
as an effect of the threatening no other action has to and therefore will not happen 
based on and abiding by the provisions of law, except for notifying the police who 
will start to trace down the person making the telephone call. 
 
                                              
104 The ambigous social judgment of the current procedure applied in case of a bomb alarm is well 
demonstrated by an event in Hatvan in 1997, when the owner of a disco denounced the police 
taking action after a bomb alarm 
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VII.2.1. Bomb alarm versus act of terrorism with explosion 
 
We draw up a model in the following section to confront all social costs of the above 
regulation with all of its social benefits. As a matter of fact we will execute a social 
cost-benefit analysis of the regulation, substituting the lack of precise data for 
variables of the cost- and benefit-items and the formula describing them. This is the 
point where the subject of the section meets the subject of the thesis: ‘sacrificing’ 
statistical human life, that is the increase of the risk of death due to the explosion is 
one of the most important costs of the regulation. 
 
The most striking characteristic of the bomb alarm is that it is not about the bomb, 
but rather about the alarm itself. The aim of the person telephoning is not the 
explosion of the building or any other institution and therefore the extinction of the 
lives of innocent people, because if it was so then it would not be rational to notify 
anyone in advance, risking that the bomb would be found and the explosion would be 
undone. It is important to note, however, that unfortunately this does not always 
happen in the way described, we may not always take the rationality of the person 
threatening with a bomb alarm for granted. It has already happenned even in 
Hungary (although in a negligible quantity) that the bomb disposal squad did find a 
bomb in the building. Therefore this possibility has to be represented in our model. 
 
Our fundamental assumption however still remains the following: the person 
intending to explode a bomb and therefore cause the greatest possible damage to the 
society should conceal his/her activity and carry out the explosion in the most 
suitable time without leaving any kind of trace behind him/her. The perpetrator can 
maximalise the damage caused and at the same time decrease the danger of getting 
caught by the police to a minimal level by not giving another possible clue to the 
police by identifying the telephone call. It is natural to assume that getting caught has 
a negative benefit for the perpetrators so it is desirable for them to avoid it. 
 
On the other hand the real aim of the person threatening with a bomb is not to blow 
up the bomb but to cause panic (with the aim of avoiding a written test, calling public 
attention to anything, causing damage to a competing company, etc.). 
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Consequently we can not avoid the intentional bomb explosion (perhaps to be 
handled as an act of terrorism) causing significant social damage with the help of an 
investigation after the bomb alarm. On the contrary, we give rise to a social cost of 
an activity with a criminologically different weight and category having a completely 
different motivation but also harmful to society. And this is exactly the wish we 
satisfy for the person threatening with a bomb but not intending to blow that up. If 
we accept that the bomb alarm and the act (of terrorism) of a bomb explosion are 
two phenomena of completely different characteristics having a common section 
only in very small number of cases then we have to examine the following statement: 
the minimalisation of the social damage happens with a greater probability if society 
does not react to the telephone call threatening with having supposedly placed a 
bomb – besides attempting to identify the person making the call –, therefore 
avoiding all kinds of material, non-material damages, costs arising due to the alarm 
and the vacation. 
 
VII.2.2. Calculation of the costs of the regulation 
 
The alternative regulation has the following cost elements compared to the status 
guo: 
 
1) marketing cost of introducing the new regulation, 
2) the social damage caused by certain (to be exactly defined later) explosions that 
could be avoided by the investigations after the telephone calls. 
 
We can divide the first cost element into two parts. Let K be the cost item to mark the 
one-time cost in the present to make the regulation modification well known to 
everybody including the potential threateners. This cost item would be significantly 
decreased by the fact that it would probably gain a huge attention for itself through 
the media even without the introducing campaign, thus generating a wide publicity to 
the regulation with the help of news coverage. We have to take into consideration a 
smaller marketing cost (k) to be paid as an annuity every year in order to keep this 
knowledge fresh in the public. The sum of the net present values of the two cost 
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elements is K + k/(rk-gk), where rk is the nominal social discount rate to be applied 
and gk is the assumed constant annual rate of increase of the value of k.105 
 
The marketing work in connection with making the new regulation widely known is 
an important element of the model, because that would generate the increased 
realisation of the absence of the intended consequences – the confusion and vacating 
to be caused – in the minds of the potential threateners. It is highly essential for the 
communication to be creditable and the proceedings of the new regulation to be 
strictly insisted on by the authorities. 
 
The other target group of the marketing campaign is every potential receiver of the 
telephone calls and every manager competent in giving out the necessary orders who 
should also be fully aware of the new regulation. 
 
The key element of the theoretical model is the hundred percent commitment to the 
behaviour required by the new regulation and its realisation in the minds of the 
potential threateners. If this happens then – assuming rational behaviour – the aim of 
the threatener who actually places a bomb in the designated place is not the 
generation of the damage caused by the threatening itself (he already knows that it 
will not take place!), but the explosion! If the aim is the explosion then the 
perpetrator can do that under the old regulation as well, without notification, 
naturally. Thus we have to calculate only those damages caused by explosions as 
social cost caused by the new regulation where the aim of the perpetrator is 
 
a) not the explosion but causing disorder (in this case this was an irrational activity, 
but we can not preclude this possibility), 
b) the action against the new regulation (perhaps guided by the intention to replace 
the original regulation) to prove its harmful nature to society. 
 
Case a) describes the activity of people who intended to cause the effect of 
threatening with a bomb (perhaps ignorant of the fact that it was bound to become a 
                                              
105 The information on writing the formula is to be discussed later. 
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failure due to the new regulation), but they did actually place the bomb hoping that it 
would have been found anyway. This is by no means a rational behaviour, especially 
if the threatener is told by the receiver of the call that the authorities will not take the 
actions desired by the threatener. The threatener with this latter information who still 
not defuses the bomb wanted either to actually explode the bomb (in this case the 
damages caused should not be included in the costs of the new regulation based on 
the reasons desribed before) or (s)he does not believe it or perhaps does not 
understand it. The damages caused in the latter two cases are to be included in the 
costs of the new regulation. The case is similar when the receiver of the call has no 
time to or – out of any reason – can not tell the threatener the sentence about the 
‘failure’ based on the new regulation. It is important to lay an emphasis again on the 
fact that every subcase described in case a) is supposed to be irrational behaviour 
(the threatener places a bomb without the intention of exploding it). 
 
The problem described in case b) is more complex. In this case the threatener does 
know about the new regulation, but wants to prove its harmful nature and this is the 
very reason of placing a bomb, making the telephone call and exploding the bomb 
afterwards. The question goes: who might have such a powerful motivation to do 
this? We know that in case b) it is not about an irrational behaviour, so we should 
suppose that the perpetrator has such a strong desire to return to the old regulation 
that (s)he is actually ready to explode the bomb together with significantly increasing 
the risk of his/her arrest due to the telephone call. This assumption is not too life-like 
for anyone thinking rationally, especially if the commitment of the society and the 
politics to the new regulation is unquestionable and the measures taken by the 
authorities are also consistent every time. Of course this social and political 
commitment may decrease and even cease to exist (by this way realising the 
intention of the threatener-exploder) after a series of ‘successful’ explosions 
(preceded by a notification). It is important to stress, however, that the threatener 
exactly knows that the bomb is to be exploded so this perpetrator is someone who 
will not be diverted from his/her original purpose by the consequences of the bomb 
explosion. It can be supposed with reason that this kind of perpetrator would explode 
the bomb under the old regulation as well – of course finding another reason for it. 
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Taking the above described into consideration we have to include another social 
damage – caused by the explosions that could have been avoided under the old 
regulation – in the second social cost element of the new regulation. This damage can 
be divided into three parts: (1) material damage, (2) damages arising from human 
injuries and (3) damages arising from losses in human life. Let the annual measure of 
the first element be denoted by na×a, where na is the number of explosions and a is 
the measure of an average material damage caused by an explosion. Let the formula 
ns×s be the annual measure of the second element, where ns is the expected number 
of injuries in a year and s is the measure of the average social damage connected to 
one injury. Finally let the formula nl×l be the measure of the social damage arising 
from losses of human life, where nl is the expected number of losses in human life in 
a year and l is the measure of the social damage connected to one loss in human life 
which is exactly equivalent to the value of statistical human life. If we continue to 
work with the assumption of the constant annual increase of the values of a, s and l 
and the constancy of the expected numbers of explosions, injuries and losses in 
human life then the value of the total social cost connected to the new regulation 
(Creg) can be calculated as shown below: 
 
Creg = K + k/(rk-gk) + (na×a)/(ra-ga) + (ns×s)/(rs-gs) + (nl×l)/(rl-gl), 
 
where ra, rs and rl are the nominal social discount rates of the cost elements a, s and l 
respectively; ga, gs and gl are the supposed rates of annual increase of the nominal 
values of a, s and l. 
 
For the sake of simplicity we had the assumption of the constant increase of the 
nominal measures of the cost element units and the constancy of the expected 
numbers of explosions, injuries and losses in human life (that is the annuity-type 
presence of the cost elements) when creating the formula. The former assumption is 
realistic, but not the latter one, if we consider that in case of the obviousness of the 
commitment to the new regulation the number of the explosions arising from the 
second (and designated by b) reason is expected to decrease by time. Therefore the 
 122
formula may be changed to be more sophisticated but this is of slight importance in 
view of the theoretical model. 
 
VII.2.3. Calculation of the benefits and the net benefit of the regulation 
 
A very significant benefit element of the new regulation compared to the old one is 
the absence of all those social damages that are accompanied with bomb alarms 
presently. These are the costs of actions taken by the authorities (let h denote its 
average measure), the costs emerging at the injured party of the bomb alarm and at 
any others directly involved (moral cost, costs emerging from interruption of 
business function: material, loss of time, etc., let d denote its average measure) and 
the moral damage hardly to be operationalised and defined numerically emerging not 
at those directly involved but rather connected to the feeling of exposure to bomb 
alarm threatenings. We have to calculate with a society-wide moral damage under 
the new regulation – out of other reasons – as well, but not having had taken that into 
consideration at the calculation of the cost-formula we do not have to include it here 
either. Therefore the value of the total benefit of the new regulation (Breg) can be 
calculated as shown below: 
 
Breg = (nr×h)/(rh-gh) + (nr×d)/(rd-gd), 
 
where nr is the number of bomb alarms under the old regulation, rh and rd are the 
nominal social discount rates connected to benefit items h and d respectively; gh and 
gd are the supposed rates of annual increase of the nominal values of h and d. (When 
creating this formula we used similar asumptions as in the case of the cost elements.) 
 
Now we can create the net social benefit – in other words, the net present value 
(NPV ) – of the new regulation described in the theoretical model as shown below: reg
 
NPVreg = Breg – Creg = (nr×h)/(rh-gh) + (nr×d)/(rd-gd) – [K + k/(rk-gk) + (na×a)/(ra-ga) 
+ (ns×s)/(rs-gs) + (nl×l)/(rl-gl)] = 
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= (nr×h)/(rh-gh) + (nr×d)/(rd-gd) – K – k/(rk-gk) – (na×a)/(ra-ga) – (ns×s)/(rs-gs) 
– (nl×l)/(rl-gl). 
 
Now we can displace by the expected values (being produced based on calculations, 
statistical estimations and other examinations) of the variables – among others the 
value of statistical human life as one of the important elements of the model – into 
the formula then we receive the net social benefit of the new regulation. If this value 
is positive then it is worth introducing it, otherwise not. 
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VIII. CLOSING REMARKS 
 
I will briefly discuss four subjects as closing remarks. I present the method of the so-
called meta-analysis (namely the ‘analysis of the analyses’) and the results of the 
most up-to-date examination. I put it into words again why the examination of the 
value of human life should be handled as a question of cardinal importance for 
economic sciences. I summarise the results of the investigations of the research 
questions and hypotheses built up described in my essay. Finally I indicate the 
possible and – based on the most recent scientific literature – actual directions of the 
pursuance of my research. 
 
Meta-analyses form a special type of the researches handling with the examination of 
the value of human life. Being a kind of secondary research they wish to produce 
new results (and not only descriptive summarisation) with the help and elaboration of 
the analyses as inputs of the scientific literature thus contributing to the further 
development of the field. The studies of W. K. Viscusi [1993] and the research of the 
writer trio of A. Fisher, L. G. Chestnut and D. M. Violette [1989] from the past years 
and most recently the work of J. R. Mrozek and L. O. Taylor [2003] are examples of 
using this method. 
 
Elaborating about fifty of the most significant researches based on labour market 
approach the writer duo came to the conclusion that the researches using and setting 
the surroundings of the so-called best practice – being the closest to reality – 
assumptions out of the results fluctuating in very wide ranges (from 100 thousand 
dollars to 25 million dollars) produce the value of 1,5 – 2,5 million (year 1998) 
dollars as the value of statistical human life. 
 
Why is this knowledge important in view of practical decision making? I laid 
emphasis several times in my essay on the fact that defining the value of human 
life is important not because of theoretical reasons but because its assistance given 
to making public policy and regulation decisions. For example, according to the 
estimations of traffic experts, 11 thousand human lives may be saved in the member 
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states of the European Union annually if the average speed decreased by 5 
km/hours106. Putting a value of 1 million euros for the statistical human life based on 
the calculations of the EU, the social benefit (more precisly one of its important 
parts) of the actions resulting in the appropriate decrease in speed is to be easily 
calculated and could be compared to the social costs. 
 
As James K. Hammit remarks it in one of his short writing, in the majority of the 
public programs aiming to keep and save health and life, it is the social benefit 
arising from saving human lives that constitutes the considerable part of all of the 
benefits in connection with the program (Hammit [2003], p. 271). He quotes the 
Clean Air Act by way of example; the 90% of the benefits of this new regulation 
would be generated by the decrease of the death rate by the year 2010.107 The 
dominant and desirable role in the consideration of the costs and – primarily – 
benefits not directly connected to actual cash flow and the effective use of public 
funds of the attachment of the appropriate money value is unquestionable among 
the experts nowadays and it is recognised and accepted more and more by the 
decision makers as well. 
 
I had the pleasant surprise during my own empirical researches that I managed to get 
a similar numerical result108 with respect to the value of statistical human life – based 
on primarily the research with the wage-risk method and secondarily the pilot tests 
with the CV method – as the most respectful Anglo-Saxon researches. My 
investigation produced the range 78-393 million forints (in year 1998) for the most 
probable interval of the value of human life, with 250 million forints being the 
most probable value. Based on this the most probable value of statistical human 
life in the beginning of year 2004 in Hungary is between 350 and 400 million 
forints. This gives the answer to my basic research question at the same time as 
well. The results – determined merely for curiosity – of the pilot tests helping the 
                                              
106 The verbal and numerical facts in this section originate from the study of Holló [2001]. 
107 The writer remarks that this high rate is probably due to the fact that the experiments to monetise 
all of the other – hardly expressible in money – benefits (for example the effect of decreasing air 
pollution to the ecosystem) are still in their infancy compared to the evaluation of human life. 
108 It is pleasant because of two reasons. On one hand it increases the confidence in the methods used, 
on the other hand it is satisfying that we are not behind the developed world in this respect either. 
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large sampled CV research are 1.104 million forints (1999) in the first test, a range 
between 132 and 195 million forints (2001) in the second test and a range between 
130 and 174 million forints (2003) in the repetition of the second test. 
 
The proper interpretation of the results is of high importance. We still not know 
whether a program that can save a human life at a cost of 110 or 350 million forints 
surely meets with the social acceptance. Our results do not entitle us to such an 
accuracy. However, we can be sure that if this value is, for example, 35 million 
forints, then the answer of the society is surely ‘yes’, while if it is 3,5 billion forints 
then, it is surely ‘no’. 
 
As mentioned above, the confidence in the results can be further increased by the fact 
that they harmonise with the numerical data gained from the most important Anglo-
Saxon researches. Although the value equalling to about one and a half million 
dollars is slightly lower (about half) than the most reliable American and English 
values, however this fact should by no means be explained as Hungarian statistical 
human life being less valuable than for example that of the American, although the 
naive comparison of the numbers might suggest it that way. The statistical human 
life can only be interpreted in a given population so it is not suitable for direct 
comparison. It is normal for any communities having a nominally lower income and 
wealth at their disposal to evaluate their own lives at a lower level (to be more 
precise: at a smaller amount of money), too. Yet this value is characteristic to the 
given community, and the ‘statistical individual’ as a member of this community. 
By no means is it characteristic to the individual in relation to individuals from 
other communities. 
 
I tested Hypothesis 1 with the method of regression analysis with the help of wage as 
the dependent variable. It was ascertained during the examination that the hypothesis 
can be accepted as being true because the coefficient related to the risk explanatory 
variable definitely proved to be different – being significantly in the positive region – 
from zero in the models considered to be the best, at the usual levels of significancy. 
This means that the application of this method should not be rejected in the 
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examination of statistical human life bacause the employees receive premium in 
their wages (of course implicitly) in return for occupational risk. 
 
The test of the Hypotheses 2 and 3 can be carried out with the help of the large 
sampled CV research. I performed three pilot tests as a preparation to it. The results 
of the tests can be summarised as the followings in view of the hypotheses. The tests 
(second pilot test and its repetition) in connection with Hypothesis 2 did not 
support our conjecture about the measures of the values of anonymous and 
statistical human life compared to each other. This means that we can leave this 
hypothesis in its original form but its acceptance as being true – based on our new 
knowledge from the results of test – has a lower chance than before the tests. 
 
The first test in connection with the Hypothesis 3 was carried out on such a small, 
statistically negligible sample that it would be totally ‘unscientific’ to draw up any 
kind of conjectures so we can leave that in its original form. The first test was of 
excellent help to us in placing an appropriate methodology for testing our hypothesis 
at our disposal. 
 
I find it worthwhile to briefly touch upon the possible research directions at the end 
of my study. As I have mentioned it more than once – given the necessary conditions 
– the large sampled data survey using the CV method could be carried out using 
the results of the tests, based on which we can obtain a new, valid numerical data 
for the value of human life together with statistically testing the Hypotheses 2 and 
3. The approach of Moore and Viscusi ([1988b] and [1990]) evaluating human life-
years and not human life can also be made the subject of an empirical investigation. 
The evaluation of the risks of non-deadly accidents can also be investigated more 
thoroughly.109 Although this would rather give a direction to evaluate health and 
‘human capital’ instead of evaluating human life but the strict separation of the two 
things does not seem a lucky choice either.110 Furthermore, the regression 
                                              
109 The research of Olson [1981] may give a direction in connection with it. 
110 The available statistics of the working place accidents were not appropriate for calculations of the 
similar type out of two reasons. On one hand the total aggregation concealed the qualitative 
differences lying in the consequences of the accidents, on the other hand the two variables could not 
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calculations should also be carried out with risk variables broken down by 
occupations and based on additional mortality data. This would not require 
modification in the methodology. 
 
Finally – to satisfy my own increased interests shown in the investigation of 
theoretical questions – a theoretical problem, the examination of the value of human 
life in case of projects stretching over the national borders could be tightly connected 
to the subject of my present essay. We can prima facie feel the practical significance 
of this problem (we should think on the evaluation of the environmental protection 
investments in connection with the cyanide pollution in the river Tisza some years 
ago), its theoretical curiosity is provided by the need to combine the many different 
preference systems (and the dissimilar income-wealth, cultural and political-social 
differences providing their basis) of many populations and to integrate them into one 
final decision. 
 
Working out all of these possibilities would go beyond the ranges already wide even 
without them of my present Ph.D. thesis in volume and in contents. 
 
It can supply an excuse for me for the bulkier than usual representation of scientific 
literature that the aim of my essay in addition to the empirical researches was 
primarily to provide an insider view into the attitude of raising a problem and 
thinking that characterise the economists or at least part of them nowadays. By the 
evaluation of human life and thus the promotion of the effective use of public 
funds and public property, the economics fulfils its utmost goal: helping in the 
solution of social problems. 
                                                                                                                                
be handled together in the regression model because of the high correlation with the data of the 
deadly accidents. 
 129
APPENDIX 1 
Summary of the most important research results 
 
Study Best estimate for the VSL 
(thousand dollar, 1990) 
Labour market approach  
Thaler and Rosen [1976] - USA 1.000 
Brown [1980] - USA 1.500 
Marin and Psacharopoulos [1982] - UK 2.800 
Smith [1983] - USA 1.300 
Arnould and Nichols [1983] - USA 900 
Low and McPheters [1983] - USA 1.200 
Moore and Viscusi [1988a] - USA 7.300 
Gegax, Gerking and Schulze [1991] - USA 1.600 
  
Revealed preferences approach  
Ghosh, Lees and Seal [1975] - UK 700 
Dardis [1980] - USA 600 
Portney [1981] - USA 800 
Ippolito and Ippolito [1984] - USA 700 
Atkinson and Halvorsen [1990] - USA 4.000 
  
Contingent valuation approach  
Acton [1973] - USA 100 
Melinek, Woolley and Baldwin [1973] – UK 170 
Jones-Lee [1976] – UK 15.600 
Jones-Lee, Hammerton and Philips [1985] - UK 3.700 
Viscusi, Magat and Huber [1991] - USA 9.700 
 
Source: Fisher-Chestnut-Violette ([1989], Table 1, p. 90), Jones-Lee ([1989], Table 2.2-2.3, pp. 91-
93), Viscusi ([1993], Table 2, 5, 6, pp. 1926-1927, 1936, 1940)111 
 
                                              
111 The table contains the best estimates according to the researchers for the value of statistical life in 
December 1990 prices. However, the data can only be found in this form in the study of Viscusi 
[1993], the data from the two other studies are converted in the best possible way. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Mean and standard deviation of the variables. 
 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Dependent variables   
JOVED1 37.511,688 29.620,518 
JOVED2 39.176,085 33.218,324 
LNJOVED1 10,389 0,508 
LNJOVED2 10.419 0,526 
  
Independent variables  
HALKOCK 6,875 8,899 
BALKOCK 1.189,898 1.595,225 
VAROS 0,659 0,483 
BUDAPEST 0,180 0,391 
DUNANTUL 0,352 0,487 
HAZAS 0,644 0,488 
NEM 0,514 0,509 
KOR 38,288 11,007 
ISKOLA 11,357 2,563 
GYERMEK 0,829 0,966 
IDNYELV 0,186 0,397 
BETEGSEG 0,202 0,409 
MELLEK 0,070 0,261 
MEZOGAZD 0,067 0,254 
IPAR 0,372 0,493 
ONALLO 0,075 0,268 
VEZSZELL 0,345 0,486 
CEGMERET 0,805 0,404 
ALLAMTUL 0,352 0,486 
MAGYTUL 0,677 0,476 
KIEGJUT 0,446 0,506 
MAGYAR 0,974 0,164 
CIGANY 0,011 0,108 
UJSAGOLV 0,651 0,486 
KONYVOLV 0,297 0,465 
SZINHAZ 0,231 0,429 
HANGVERS 0,112 0,322 
MUZEUM 0,331 0,479 
SPORT 0,298 0,469 
BARATOK 2,235 3,770 
SZELSPOL 0,085 0,284 
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APPENDIX 3 
The QUESTIONNAIRE applied in the first test. 
 
 
     Budapest University of Economic 
Sciences 
No.     Department of Public Services 
 
 
 
 
 
The value of human life in Hungary 
 
Questionnaire 
 
 
1 9 9 9 
 
 
Answering is voluntary! 
 
 
 
 
Place of survey: ........................................ county, ................................ (settlement) 
Type of settlement: (1) - farm 
   (2) - village 
   (3) - town 
   (4) - county seat 
   (5) - Budapest, district: ..... 
 
Date of survey: 1999. ................. month ........... day  
 
No. of interviewer:  
 
I declare, that I handle the personal data handled and surveyed by me confidentially 
and will hand it over only to the person competent in the survey. 
 
Signature of the interviewer: ....................................... 
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1. Sex of the respondent: (1) - male 
    (2) - female 
    (X) -  
 
 
2. When were you born? 
 
   .............. year 
 
   (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
   (X) -  
 
 
3. What is your family status? 
 
   (1) - single 
   (2) - married 
   (3) - widow 
   (4) - divorced 
 
   (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
   (X) -  
 
 
4. What is your place of residence? 
 
............................... county, ................................ (settlement) 
 
   (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
   (X) -  
 
 
5. What type of settlement is this? 
 
ASK ONLY IF IT HASN’T TURNED OUT YET! 
 
   (1) - farm 
   (2) - village 
   (3) - town 
   (4) - county seat 
   (5) - Budapest 
 
   (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
   (X) -  
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6. What is your highest finished educational degree? 
 
 (1) - did not attend school 
 (2) - 4 or 6 primary, or less than 8 grades 
 (3) - 8 primary, 4 civil or 4 years of secondary school in old school system 
(4) - industrial / vocational / stenographic school, certificate of mastership, 
journeyman’s certificate, school of professional training 
 (5) - specialised secondary school, engineering school 
 (6) - secondary grammar school, other secondary school 
 (7) - college, higher level of engineering school 
 (8) - university 
 
 (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
 (X) - 
 
 
7. Do you work? 
 
YES → (1) - works as a subordinate 
   (2) - works in an individual or joint venture 
(3) - works casually or as a helping family member 
(4) - is on maternity leave (has a working place) 
 
NO →  (5) - unemployed 
   (6) - pensioner 
   (7) - other non-worker (student, dependent, etc.) 
 
   (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
   (X) -  
 
CALL HIS/HER ATTENTION: 
 
Please don’t answer the following two questions if you feel yourself uncomfortable! 
 
 
8. How much is your monthly (net) income? 
 
 HUF.................... 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
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9. How much is your household’s monthly (net) income per person, including 
your income, as well? 
 
 HUF.................... 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
 
 
10. Imagine, that you have to face two types of deadly risks at the same time, for 
example deadly risks of two independent food poisonings: 
 
a) the measure of the deadly risk is 2 out of 100.000 in the first case 
b) the measure of the deadly risk is 20 out of 100.000 in the second case 
 
You can not avoid any of the risks, so the two risks will be present in a 
certain extent, but you have the possibility to decrease the risk of one of 
them. Which one would you choose? 
 
 (1) - The first risk should be 1 out of 100.000 instead of 2 out of 100.000. 
(2) - The second risk should be 15 out of 100.000 instead of 20 out of 
100.000. 
 
 (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
 (X) -  
 
 
11. There are 100 inhabitants in an island. They set off on a journey to visit the 
mainland once every week. There is an epidemic raging in the mainland 
currently and we know it for certain that exactly one of the islanders 
returned back infected from the usual weekly journey. This infection is not 
necessarily deadly, anyone can recover from that without any problems. 
Unfortunately, nobody knows (not even the infected person) who that one 
infected man is. There are two possibilities: (1) If nobody does anything 
then every islanders will be infected and will have a risk of dying because of 
the infection with a probability of 1/100 independent from each other. This 
means that it is possible that nobody dies, but it is also possible that one or – 
if they are less lucky – even two, three or in an extreme case all hundred of 
them die. The chance of dying is 1% for everybody, therefore the most 
probable case will be that 1 islander would die. (2) However, if a doctor 
gives a vaccination to everybody then nobody will get infected, but the man 
already infected will certainly die on the next day due to the vaccination. 
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11/a. Which solution would you prefer as an outsider? 
 
  (1) - They do nothing. 
  (2) - They give everybody the vaccination. 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
11/b. Which solution would you prefer if you were one of the islanders and your 
family and friends were islanders, as well? 
 
  (1) - Nobody should do anything. 
  (2) - The doctor should give the vaccination to everybody. 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
12. Has any of your close relatives or acquaintances suffered a serious traffic 
accident in the past year? 
 
 (1) - YES  JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 15!   
 
 (2) - NO  JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 13!  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
13/a. What do you think, how many people suffer traffic accidents from 100.000 
people (from about 1% of the population) in Hungary annually? 
 
 ....................   NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
13/b. What do you think, how many people die of traffic accidents from 100.000 
people (from about 1% of the population) in Hungary annually? 
 
 ....................   NEEDED HELP:  
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  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
14. Imagine you have to go to a longer journey by bus. You receive 20.000 
forints to cover your travelling expenses and you are given the name of the 
travelling company that will take you to your desired destination place for 
exactly 20.000 forints. The probability of you dying in an accident suffered 
during this trip is exactly 8 out of 100.000 people. 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
However you have the possibility to travel by the bus of another company 
that is more safe but of course more expensive, as well and you have to pay 
the extra amount for yourself. 
 
 
14/a. How much money would you be willing to pay (if you would be willing 
any) to decrease the risk of a fatal accident to the half of the original, so to 4 
out of 100.000 people? 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
14/b. How much money would you be willing to pay (if you would be willing 
any) to decrease the risk of a fatal accident to the one eighth of the original, 
so to 1 out of 100.000 people? 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
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You can also decide to choose another, less safe, so riskier bus instead of the 
one originally presented and therefore rather keep part of the 20.000 
forints. 
 
14/c. What is the minimum amount to be kept (if there is any) from the 20.000 
forints together with the fact of having to travel by a bus by which the risk 
of a fatal accident is the double of the original, so 16 out of 100.000 people? 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
14/d. What is the minimum amount to be kept (if there is any) from the 20.000 
forints together with the fact of having to travel by a bus by which the risk 
of a fatal accident is four times the original, so 32 out of 100.000 people? 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
15. You have the luck to be offered to take part in a very favourable game 
without any cheating. You may choose from two alternatives (A and B) – 
both of them rewarding for you, the exact amount of your prize only 
dependent upon the weather on December 24th, so on Christmas Eve this 
year. There are three possibilities: rainy, snowy or dry weather. If you 
choose alternative A you win 10.000 forints but only if the weather is rainy 
on that day. If you choose alternative B you win the same amount; 10.000 
forints but only if the weather is snowy on that day. 
 
 
15/a. Which alternative do you choose? 
 
 (A)  - HUF 10.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 0 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
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 (B)  - HUF 0 if it rains 
  - HUF 10.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
 (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
 (X) -  
 
 
15/b. Which one would you choose if the alternatives were the following? 
 
PUT THE TWO ALTERNATIVES INTO WORDS SIMILAR TO THE EXAMPLE 
DESCRIBED BEFORE! 
 
 (A)  - HUF 0 if it rains 
  - HUF 10.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 50.000 if it is dry 
 
 (B)  - HUF 10.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 0 if it snows 
  - HUF 50.000 if it is dry 
 
 (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
 (X) -  
 
 
15/c. Which one would you choose if the alternatives were the following? 
 
PUT THE TWO ALTERNATIVES INTO WORDS SIMILAR TO THE EXAMPLE 
DESCRIBED BEFORE! 
 
 
 (A)  - HUF 5.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 4.500 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
 (B)  - HUF 4.500 if it rains 
  - HUF 5.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
 (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
 (X) -  
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IF YOU JUMPED HERE FROM QUESTION NO. 12 THEN JUMP TO 
QUESTION NO. 22! 
 
 
16. Does your family has a car and do you regularly (weekly) drive? 
 
(1) - There is a car, I regularly drive.                 → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 20!
  
(2) - There is a car, I do not drive regularly.      → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 17!
  
(3) - There is no car, but I regularly drive.         → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 19!
  
(4) - There is no car, I do not drive regularly.    → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 18!
 
(Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
(X) -  
 
 
17. Can you drive? 
 
  (1) - Yes 
  (2) - No 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 20! 
 
18. Can you drive? 
 
  (1) - Yes 
  (2) - No 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 19! 
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19. Have you or anyone else in your family ever had a car? 
 
  (1) - Yes 
  (2) - No 
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 20! 
 
 
20. Imagine, you have just won a certain type of car on a lottery. You have the 
possibility to have a new type of safety device installed in your car for extra 
costs. So you don’t have to pay for the car, but you have to pay for the 
safety device. The next questions will all refer to how much you would be 
willing to pay for different types of safety devices. You would always have 
to pay an annuity (annually), not a lump sum payment. Please always take 
your current financial situation into consideration. 
 
 
20/a. 8 out of 100.000 people die in a fatal traffic accident as a car driver in 
Hungary annualy. The safety device you may choose to be installed would 
decrease this risk for you, that is, exclusively for the driver to the half, 
meaning 4 out of 100.000 people. This means only every second accident 
would be fatal for you whereas you would lose your life without the safety 
device. Taking your current financial situation into consideration what is 
the maximum amount of annuity that you would be willing to pay annually 
for this safety device defending the driver? 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
20/b. Another safety device would decrease this risk for you, that is, exclusively 
for the driver with 25%, meaning 6 out of 100.000 people. This means you 
would survive one accident out of four with the safety device, whereas all 
four would be fatal without the safety device. Taking your current financial 
situation into consideration what is the maximum amount of annuity that 
you would be willing to pay annually for this safety device defending the 
driver? 
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SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
20/c. The next question refers to a safety device that decreases not only the risk 
of the driver but of the passengers, as well. Take it into consideration that 
usually there is one passenger, too sitting in the car, whose risk to a fatal 
accident is about the same as the driver’s. Imagine, that you may choose a 
safety device to be installed that would decrease this risk for the driver and 
the passengers, as well to the half, meaning 4 instead of 8 out of 100.000 
people. This means that only every second accident would be fatal for you 
and your passengers whereas you and your passengers would lose their life 
without the safety device. Taking your current financial situation into 
consideration what is the maximum amount of annuity that you would be 
willing to pay annually for this safety device defending the driver and the 
passengers, as well? 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
 HUF ....................  NEEDED HELP:  
 
  (Y) - DOESN’T KNOW 
  (X) -  
 
 
21. The question before dealt with the risk of death during the accidents. 
However the accidents have other consequences some of which are listed 
below. Although we didn’t ask you before, please tell us whether you took 
the following elements into consideration during answering? 
 
 
      Yes   No 
 
Working hours falling out             
Future income falling out             
Pain caused to relatives, friends            
Expenses for repairs, material damage caused       
Legal expenses              
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22. Imagine that you have to spend three months on a foreign place because of 
business or some other reasons. You can choose between two similar 
accommodation possibilities – A and B – being different only in the deadly 
risk arising from air pollution and the measure of the cost of living specific 
to each region which latter cost has to be financed by you. Let’s suppose 
further on that if you don’t die of the disease caused by air pollution during 
the three months then you won’t have to fear any other negative effects 
later on in your life, so the deadly risk alone remains the only negative 
effect. 
 
Let the deadly risk arising from air pollution during the three months be 10 
out of 100.000 people in region A and 20 out of 100.000 people in region B. 
The sum of the cost of living for the three months is 80.000 forints for 
region A and 100.000 forints for region B. 
 
SHOW THE PROBABILITY! 
 
Which one do you choose? 
 
(1) - A (10; 80.000)               → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 23! 
 
(2) - B (20; 100.000)             → EXPLAIN, WHY IT IS A WRONG 
CHOICE THEN JUMP TO 
QUESTION NO. 24! 
 
 
23. Please tell me why you chose alternative A! 
 
IT’S NOT THE EXACT, WORD BY WORD ANSWER THAT IS IMPORTANT, 
BUT THE FACT WHETHER (S)HE REALISED THE DOMINANCE OF 
ALTERNATIVE “A” IN BOTH FACTORS! 
 
(1) - Alternative A is dominant in both 
factors                          → 
 
JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 24! 
(2) – Any other reason           → EXPLAIN WHY ALTERNATIVE “A” IS 
DOMINANT THEN JUMP TO 
QUESTION NO. 24! 
 
 
24. The situation is the same as before: imagine that you have to spend three 
months on a foreign place because of business or some other reasons. You 
can choose between two similar accommodation possibilities – A and B – 
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being different only in the deadly risk arising from air pollution and the 
measure of the cost of living specific to each region which latter cost has to 
be financed by you. Let’s suppose further on that if you don’t die of the 
disease caused by air pollution during the three months then you won’t 
have to fear any other negative effects later on in your life. 
 
 
Which alternative would you choose? 
 
24/a. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 10.000)  (3) - indifferent 
24/b. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 20.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/c. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 30.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/d. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 40.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/e. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 50.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/f. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 60.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/g. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 70.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/h. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 80.000)   (3) - indifferent 
24/i. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 90.000)   (3) - indifferent 
 
 
 25. Were there any problems?   
 MORE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE!  
   
 (1) - No.                                                               → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 28!  
   
 (2) - Yes, (s)he didn’t switch to A.                      → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 26!  
   
 (3) – Yes, (s)he switched from A or indifferent to B or 
indifferent.                                                   →
JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 26!  
   
 (4) – Yes, (s)he didn’t choose A at h or i.            → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 26!  
 (5) – Yes, (s)he was indifferent more than once. → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 26!  
   
 
26. Now which alternative would you choose? 
 
EXPLAIN HIM/HER IN ADVANCE THE PROBLEMS WITH HIS/HER 
ANSWERS BEFORE! 
 
26/a. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 10.000)  (3) - indifferent 
26/b. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 20.000)   (3) - indifferent 
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26/c. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 30.000)   (3) - indifferent 
26/d. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 40.000)   (3) - indifferent 
26/e. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 50.000)   (3) - indifferent 
26/f. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 60.000)   (3) - indifferent 
26/g. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 70.000)   (3) - indifferent 
26/h. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 80.000)   (3) - indifferent 
26/i. (1) - A (10; 80.000) or (2) - B (20; 90.000)   (3) - indifferent 
 
 
   
 27. Were there any problems?   
   
 MORE ANSWERS ARE POSSIBLE!  
   
 (1) - No.                                                              → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 28!  
   
 (2) - Yes, (s)he didn’t switch to A.                     → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 29!  
   
 (3) - Yes, (s)he switched from A or indifferent to 
B or indifferent.                                           →
 
JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 29!
 
   
 (4) - Yes, (s)he didn’t choose A at h or i.           → JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 29!  
   
 (5) - Yes, (s)he was indifferent more than once.→ JUMP TO QUESTION NO. 29!  
   
 
 
28. PERFORM THE PROCEDURE OF HALFING THE INTERVAL! THE 
RESULT: 
 
 HUF .................... (B cost of living) 
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THE NEXT QUESTIONS ARE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RESPONDENT 
BUT THEY ARE ADDRESSED TO YOU! 
 
 
29. Based on your opinion do any of these criteria – making the answers 
excluded from the survey – be applied to the respondent? (More answers 
are possible!) 
 
(1) - (S)he didn’t answer fully to practically any of the evaluative questions. 
(2) - (S)he did’t take the task seriously. 
(3) - (S)he was seemingly unable to interpret the questions and his/her task. 
 
(4) - None of the above excluding criteria can be applied. 
 
 
30. Was the respondent interested in the subject of the questionnaire? 
 
(1) - Rather yes 
(2) - Rather no 
 
(Y) - You can not decide 
(X) - 
 
 
31. Did any of the questions arouse his/her interest? 
 
(1) - Yes →  Which No.? .............................................................. 
(2) - No 
 
(Y) - You can not decide 
(X) - 
 
 
32. Mark from 1 to 5 deciding how tired the respondent became during the 
survey. Give mark 5 if (s)he became very tired and mark 1 if (s)he didn’t 
become tired at all! 
 
 5  4  3  2  1 
became very tired      no tiredness at all 
 
(Y) - You can not decide 
(X) - 
 
 146
33. Has it happenned that the respondent’s mind was wandering, couldn’t pay 
attention to the question (e.g. he became tired) and answered only at 
random? 
 
(1) - It has happenned frequently 
(2) - It has happenned sometimes 
(3) - It hasn’t happenned 
 
(Y) - You can not decide 
(X) - 
 
 
34. Were there any questions that proved to be particularly difficult for the 
respondent to answer? 
 
(1) - Yes →  Which No.? .............................................................. 
(2) - No 
 
(Y) - You can not decide 
(X) - 
 
 
35. Were there any questions to which (s)he was particularly unwilling to 
answer? 
 
(1) - Yes →  Which No.? .............................................................. 
(2) - No 
 
(Y) - You can not decide 
(X) - 
 
 
36. Have you got any other comments, remarks? 
 
(1) - No 
(2) - Yes, more specifically: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORK! 
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APPENDIX 4 
The QUESTIONNAIRE applied in the second pilot test. 
 
 
Sex of the respondent:  (1) female  (2) male 
 
 
1) There are 100 inhabitants in an island. They set off on a journey to visit the 
mainland once every week. There is an epidemic raging in the mainland 
currently and we know it for certain that exactly one of the islanders returned 
back infected from the usual weekly journey. This infection is not necessarily 
deadly (the probability of death is exactly 1%), anyone can recover from that 
without any problems. Unfortunately, nobody knows (not even the infected 
person) who that one infected man is. There are two possibilities: (1) If nobody 
does anything then every islanders will be infected and will have a risk of dying 
because of the infection with a probability of 1/100 independent from each 
other. (This means that it is possible that nobody dies, but it is also possible that 
one or – if they are less lucky – even two, three or in an extreme case all 
hundred of them die.) The chance of dying is 1% for everybody, therefore the 
most probable case will be that 1 islander would die. (2) However, if a doctor 
gives a vaccination to everybody then nobody will get infected, but the man 
already infected will certainly die on the next day due to the vaccination. 
 
1/a) Which solution would you prefer as an outsider judge? 
 
  (1) - They should do nothing. 
  (2) - They should give the vaccination to everybody. 
 
1/b) Which solution would you prefer if you were one of the islanders and your 
family and friends were islanders, as well? 
 
  (1) - Nobody should do anything. 
  (2) - The doctor should give the vaccination to everybody. 
 
2) Imagine you have to go to a longer journey by bus. You receive 20.000 forints 
to cover your travelling expenses and you are given the name of the travelling 
company that will take you to your desired destination place for exactly 20.000 
forints. The probability of you dying in an accident suffered during this trip is 
exactly 8 out of 100.000 people. 
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However, you have the possibility to travel by the bus of another company that 
is more safe, but of course more expensive, as well and you have to pay the extra 
amount for yourself. 
 
2/a) How much money would you be willing to pay (if you would be willing any) 
to decrease the risk of a fatal accident to the half of the original, so to 4 out of 
100.000 people? 
 
 HUF .................... 
 
2/b) How much money would you be willing to pay (if you would be willing any) 
to decrease the risk of a fatal accident to the one eighth of the original, so to 1 
out of 100.000 people? 
 
 HUF .................... 
 
You can also decide to choose another, less safe, so riskier bus instead of the one 
originally presented and therefore rather keep part of the 20.000 forints. 
 
2/c) What is the minimum amount that you would be willing to keep (if there is 
any) from the 20.000 forints together with the fact of having to travel by a bus 
by which the risk of a fatal accident is the double of the original, so 16 out of 
100.000 people? 
 
 HUF .................... 
 
2/d) What is the minimum amount that you would be willing to keep (if there is 
any) from the 20.000 forints together with the fact of having to travel by a bus 
by which the risk of a fatal accident is four times the original, so 32 out of 
100.000 people? 
 
 HUF .................... 
 
3) You have the luck to be offered to take part in a very favourable game 
without any cheating. You may choose from two alternatives (A and B) – both of 
them rewarding for you, the exact amount of your prize only dependent upon 
the weather on December 24th, so on Christmas Eve this year. There are three 
possibilities: rainy, snowy or dry weather. If you choose alternative A you win 
10.000 forints but only if the weather is rainy on that day. If you choose 
alternative B you win the same amount; 10.000 forints but only if the weather is 
snowy on that day. 
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3/a) Which alternative do you choose? 
 
 (A)  - HUF 10.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 0 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
 (B)  - HUF 0 if it rains 
  - HUF 10.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
3/b) Which one would you choose if the alternatives were the following? 
 
 (A)  - HUF 0 if it rains 
  - HUF 10.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 50.000 if it is dry 
 
 (B)  - HUF 10.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 0 if it snows 
  - HUF 50.000 if it is dry 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ANSWERS! 
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APPENDIX 5 
The QUESTIONNAIRE modified based on the second pilot test. 
 
 
Sex of the respondent:  (1) female  (2) male 
 
 
1) There are 100 inhabitants in an island. They set off on a journey to visit the 
mainland once every week. There is an epidemic raging in the mainland 
currently and we know it for certain that exactly one of the islanders returned 
back infected from the usual weekly journey (this epidemic will cease to exist 
from the next week so it won’t be threatening the islanders again). This 
infection is not necessarily deadly (the probability of death is exactly 1%), 
anyone can recover from that without any problems. Unfortunately, nobody 
knows (not even the infected person) who that one infected man is. There are 
exclusively two possibilities: (1) If nobody does anything then every islanders 
will be infected and will have a risk of dying because of the infection with a 
probability of 1/100 independent from each other. (This means that it is possible 
that nobody dies, but it is also possible that one or – if they are less lucky – even 
two, three or in an extreme case all hundred of them die.) The chance of dying is 
1% for everybody, therefore the most probable case will be that 1 islander 
would die. (2) However, if a doctor gives a vaccination to everybody then 
nobody will get infected, but the man already infected will certainly die on the 
next day due to the vaccination. 
 
1/a) Which solution would you prefer as an outsider judge, so neither you nor 
any of your acquaintances would able to be infected by the epidemic? 
 
  (1) - They should do nothing. 
  (2) - They should give the vaccination to everybody. 
 
1/b) Which solution would you prefer if you were one of the islanders and your 
family and friends were islanders, as well? 
 
  (1) - Nobody should do anything. 
  (2) - The doctor should give the vaccination to everybody. 
 
2) Imagine you have to go to a longer journey by bus. You receive 50.000 forints 
to cover your travelling expenses and you are given the name of the travelling 
company that will take you to your desired destination place for exactly 50.000 
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forints. The probability of you dying in an accident suffered during this trip is 
exactly 8 out of 100.000 people. 
 
However, you have the possibility to travel by the bus of another company that 
is more safe, but of course more expensive, as well and you have to pay the extra 
amount for yourself. 
 
2/a) How much extra money would you be willing to pay (if you would be 
willing any) to decrease the risk of a fatal accident to the half of the original, so 
to 4 out of 100.000 people? 
 
 HUF .................... 
 
2/b) How much extra money would you be willing to pay (if you would be 
willing any) to decrease the risk of a fatal accident to the one eighth of the 
original, so to 1 out of 100.000 people? 
 
 HUF .................... 
 
You can also decide to choose another, less safe, so riskier bus instead of the one 
originally presented and therefore rather ask for and keep part of the 50.000 
forints. 
 
2/c) What is the minimum amount that you would in any case ask and keep for 
yourself from the 50.000 forints to be paid for the journey in return for having 
to travel by a bus by which the risk of a fatal accident is the double of the 
original, so 16 out of 100.000 people? 
 
(1) Not even the total amount of 50.000 forints would compensate me for the 
risk increase. 
 
(2) I would demand at least .................... from the 50.000 forints for taking 
this higher risk. 
 
2/d) What is the minimum amount that you would in any case ask and keep for 
yourself from the 50.000 forints to be paid for the journey in return for having 
to travel by a bus by which the risk of a fatal accident is four times the original, 
so 32 out of 100.000 people ? 
 
(1) Not even the total amount of 50.000 forints would compensate me for the 
risk increase. 
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(2) I would demand at least .................... from the 50.000 forints for taking 
this higher risk. 
 
3) You have the luck to be offered to take part in a very favourable game 
without any cheating. You may choose from two alternatives (A and B) – both of 
them rewarding for you, the exact amount of your prize only dependent upon 
the weather on December 24th, so on Christmas Eve this year. There are three 
possibilities: rainy, snowy or dry weather. If you choose alternative A you win 
10.000 forints but only if the weather is rainy on that day. If you choose 
alternative B you win the same amount; 10.000 forints but only if the weather is 
snowy on that day. 
 
3/a) Which alternative do you choose? 
 
 (A)  - HUF 10.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 0 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
 (B)  - HUF 0 if it rains 
  - HUF 10.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 0 if it is dry 
 
3/b) Which one would you choose if the alternatives were the following? 
 
 (A)  - HUF 0 if it rains 
  - HUF 10.000 if it snows 
  - HUF 50.000 if it is dry 
 
 (B)  - HUF 10.000 if it rains 
  - HUF 0 if it snows 
  - HUF 50.000 if it is dry 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR ANSWERS! 
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APPENDIX 6 
Some of last years’ Hungarian bomb alarms. 
 
The history of Hungarian bomb alarms is neverending. This present list merely picks 
out some from the last years, especially the events of year 2003 at random. 
 
Educational institutions from primary schools to universities are favoured sites of 
bomb alarms. The building of the Faculty of Law of the Szeged József Attila 
University of Sciences had to be vacated after a telephone call in October 1999, 
however these kind of attempts to avoid or postpone a written examination are much 
more frequent in secondary schools. The police was alerted in four different times to 
rush to four secondary schools by a young man from Kaposvár in the spring of 1997. 
Almost two thousand and five hundred students and teachers were demanded to 
leave the premises because of this bomb alarm. The perpetrator of the crime was 
sentenced to a suspended imprisonment by the court of first instance, but the judge of 
the appeal court rejected the suspension and sentenced the young man to five months 
prison with the reasons of a crime causing public danger, threatening thousands of 
people, row of bomb alarms and “too much work generated” for the bomb disposal 
squad. 
 
“The underground will explode” – said an unknown man’s voice in the central 
telephone number of the Budapest Transportation Company at half past six in the 
morning in September 2001. Not having mentioned which line he had been referring 
to all underground lines of Budapest had to be investigated by the police forces. The 
fortunately “unproductive” work took six hours, but the underground trains had not 
stopped but their frequency dropped to about 50%. 
 
Airplanes have also proved to be favoured sites. The Budapest – New York flight 
had to be turned back in fear of a plastic bomb based on a notification in October 4th 
2002. A week later another flight heading for Zürich had no choice but to turn back 
still in the air space of Hungary because of another bomb alarm. The direct cost of 
returning a Boeing 737 flight is 3-4 million forints according to the communication 
of the Hungarian Flight Services. 
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Not even cultural institutions are spared from those threatening with bombs. The 
museum of the House of Terror had to be vacated in February 2003, the motivation 
this time was presumably of political grounds. 
 
Altogether eight letters were found in different institutions in Nyíregyháza in the 
same month in which the unknown letter-writer threatened to explode the institution. 
The list of the “exploder” consisted of two primary schools, one secondary school, 
three kindergartens and two priestly offices. This time the suspect – who had already 
been wanted by the police – was caught which counted as an exceptional case. The 
culprit said to have wanted to attract attention. 
 
There was a double bomb alarm in Szekszárd in September. The announcer said to 
have placed a bomb in a restaurant then – some hours later – in a department store. 
Both cases – as in all other cases depicted here – proved to be false alarms. 
 
Finally the fire services, the ambulances, the police forces, the bomb disposal squads 
and the power and gas suppliers were alerted by an unidentified telephone call to go 
– among other places – to the high school in Nyíregyháza, the Law Court of Bács-
Kiskun County in Kecskemét and the Tesco department store in Miskolc in October. 
 
Source: Internet, October 2003. 
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